Women, Gays, and the Military

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Peacekeeping As A Growth Industry
Laurence Martin

Why Maastricht Will (Still) Fail
Martin Feldstein

Rethinking Asia
Chalmers Johnson

India's Failure
Ross Munro

Religion and Nationalism
Gertrude Himmelfarb

The Vatican's Foreign Policy
James Kurth

Clinton and Trade
Franklin Lavin

Balkan Political Cultures
Noel Malcolm *Christopher Cviic*

Essays & Comments

Elliott Abrams, Eliot Cohen, Fred Iklé, Mark Lagon, John O'Sullivan, Edna Rostow, Heather Wilson, Michael Lind

Number 32 • Summer 1993 • $5.50

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TAYLOR & FRANCIS

Presenting Essential Reading

Studies in CONFLICT AND TERRORISM

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
George K. Tanham
RAND
2100 M Street, NW
Washington, DC

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Bruce Hoffman
RAND
1700 Main Street
P.O. Box 2138
Santa Monica, CA

*The bombing at the New York World Trade Center shattered the illusion that the Unites States was immune to terrorism. Moreover, in the chaotic post-cold war new world order, where intercommunal ethnic, religious, and tribal conflicts are occurring throughout the world–and indeed may have spilled over into the U.S. itself–**Studies in Conflict and Terrorism** provides a uniquely sober, analytical perspective for understanding the causes of these conflicts, their consequences, and prospects for resolution.*

RECENT AND FORTHCOMING CONTENTS

Current Research on Terrorism: The Academic Perspective
-Martha Crenshaw

Current Research on Terrorism and Low-Intensity Conflict
-Bruce Hoffman

Saddam's Failed Counterstrike: Terrorism and the Gulf War
-W. Andrew Terrill

British Security Policies and Ireland: The Decline of a Territorial Imperative
-Michael McKinley

Germany's Red Army Faction: An Obituary ***-Dennis Pluchinsky***

Whither Yugoslavia? Death of a Nation
-Heidi Hobbs

Ethnic Conflict in Russia, Implications for the United States
-Ronald McMullen

Why Indonesia Closed the Straits in September 1988
-Bob Lowry

Covert Action and Congressional Oversight: A Deontology
-Charles Cogan

Low-Intensity Conflict: The Source of Third-World Instability
-V.K. Sood

The Historical Roots of the Kashmir Conflict ***-Anand Mohan***

United States-Indian Defense Cooperation
-Satu P. Limaye

Subscription Information:
Vol 16 (1993), Quarterly, ISSN 1057-610X, Institutional: $124/£71, Personal: $63/£36

TO SUBSCRIBE, PLEASE WRITE
Taylor & Francis, 1900 Frost Road, Suite 101, Bristol, PA 19007-1598
OR CALL TOLL FREE
1(800) 821-8312

SEND TODAY FOR A FREE SAMPLE COPY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

NUMBER 32, SUMMER 1993

Contents

ARTICLES

Peacekeeping as a Growth Industry
Laurence Martin ____ 3

Why Maastricht Will Fail
Martin Feldstein ____ 12

Rethinking Asia
Chalmers Johnson ____ 20

Clinton and Trade
Franklin L. Lavin ____ 29

The Vatican's Foreign Policy
James Kurth ____ 40

A Dark and Bloody Crossroads
Gertrude Himmelfarb ____ 53

The Loser: India in the 1990s
Ross H. Munro ____ 62

The New Poorhouse
Elliott Abrams ____ 70

SHORTS

Women in Combat
Heather Wilson ____ 75

Fit for Duty
Edna G. Rostow ____ 77

A Culture of Humiliation
Christopher Cviic ____ 79

BOOKS

Seeing Ghosts
Noel Malcolm ____ 83

The Enemy Within
Fred C. Iklé ____ 88

War and Cruelty
Eliot Cohen ____ 92

Managerial Man
Mark Lagon ____ 96

A Politically Incorrect Liberal
John O'Sullivan ____ 101

LETTERS ____ 105

QUARTERLY

The Vertical Invasion
Michael Lind ____ 109

THE NATIONAL INTEREST (ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter issues by National Affairs, Inc. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in P.A.I.S., Historical Abstracts, International Political Science Abstracts, U.S. Political Science Documents, Political Science Abstracts, and America: History and Life; and available on microfilm from University Microfilms International. © 1993 by National Affairs, Inc. The National Interest is printed by William Byrd Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

PUBLISHER
Irving Kristol

ADVISORY BOARD
Conrad Black
Eliot A. Cohen
Midge Decter
Martin Feldstein
Samuel P. Huntington
Josef Joffe
H.J. Kaplan
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Henry A. Kissinger
Charles Krauthammer
Daniel Pipes
Robert A. Scalapino
Stephen Sestanovich

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS
Robert W. Tucker
Anthony Hartley (Europe)

EDITOR
Owen Harries

EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Michael Lind

MANAGING EDITOR
Scott McLucas

ASSISTANT EDITORS
Peter Serenyi
Karina Rollins

EDITORIAL OFFICE
1112 16th Street NW, Suite 540, Washington, DC 20036
(202) 467-4884
Fax: (202) 467-0006

SUBSCRIPTION OFFICE
$21 for one year, $38 for two years, $54 for three years.
Please send orders, inquiries, and address changes to:
The National Interest, Dept NI, P.O. Box 3000, Denville, NJ 07834
Outside the U.S. and Canada please add $10 annually.

NEWSSTAND DISTRIBUTORS
Bernhard DeBoer, Inc., 113 East Centre Street, Nutley, NJ 07110
Ingram Periodicals, 1226 Heil Quaker Boulevard, La Vergne, TN 37086-7000

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peacekeeping as a Growth Industry

Laurence Martin

GEORGE BUSH'S proclamation of an impending New World Order in the midst of the Persian Gulf crisis was more than a celebration of rebirth for the United Nations' system, now released from its Cold War freeze by the emerging consensus on the Security Council. It was the third international-organization, collective-security based utopia to be announced to the world by an American president this century.

The classic 1919 and 1945 versions of that utopia were based on the idea of collective resistance to the traditional type of aggressor state. Today, in vastly altered circumstances, the preferred fashion is "peacekeeping" and a set of related concepts trading under perhaps deceptively similar sounding brand names, such as "peacemaking" and "peace enforcement." Because so many of the conflicts attracting attention are no longer of the classic interstate type, the current surge of enthusiasm for peacekeeping goes along with an almost lighthearted readiness to trample across borders and the idea of sovereignty, intruding into hitherto domestic affairs in the name of human or, increasingly, "minority" rights.

As more usual than not in political matters, the purposes are admirable, even compelling. There are, however, increasing grounds for concern about the practicality, prudence, and even morality of the means which some enthusiasts want to adopt. Cautionary notes need to be sounded, not least because bureaucratic euphoria, coupled with empire building, increasingly tempts the UN establishment (though usually not its cautious and perceptive secretary-general). The newly appointed under-secretary for peacekeeping, Mr. Kofi Annan, a man whose entire career, one notes with some misgiving, has been in the UN, strikes an understandably bullish note: "Our cooperations are now so large and complex that we are redesigning the whole department. The days of gifted amateurism are over." Again:

> Just look where we've got to now. A force of heavily armed soldiers is keeping order and distributing food in Somalia [not, of course, actually a UN operation], and another 25,000 armed soldiers are doing similar work in the former Yugoslavia. Who would have believed that two years ago?

And yet again:

> The Security Council is moving toward greater interventionism because in many tragedies public opinion perceives a human imperative that transcends anything else. We are using more force because we are encountering more resistance.

Mr. Annan's last remark is a very succinct summary of one approach. Can only good

Laurence Martin is the director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

come of this trend? It may be worthwhile considering some pitfalls. The point is not necessarily to bring the whole of the recent peacekeeping movement to a halt, but to suggest that it would be more appropriate to proceed in a spirit of caution and gloom rather than zeal and delight.

Old Style, New Style

THE OLD TYPE of peacekeeping operation (PKO) was invented to cool a range of disputes during the Cold War. These were usually to be found in the gray areas between the two blocs and, with the chief and not very auspicious exception of the Congo/Katanga crisis that sent Dag Hammarskjöld to his death, were of a carefully defined and limited kind. In particular the armed forces used were very small, normally drawn from lesser powers with no local interest, and the operations were conducted with the consent of the parties. The operations were devoid of directly coercive content, though there might be accompanying political and economic pressure from the sponsoring great powers. The PKO forces worked by observation, separation, limited mediation and so on to facilitate agreements already arrived at by the parties to a dispute, even if that agreement was often merely not to fight, rather than to resolve the underlying dispute. Success in achieving such resolution rarely accrued to PKOs. If the role was, for instance, to supervise an evacuation or disarmament, the force might eventually get out. Otherwise it was all too likely to remain stuck *in situ* as in Lebanon, Cyprus, and other virtually forgotten operations.

What is typically going on today is very different. As the increasingly heavy armor and growing size of UN forces in several places testify, the element of consent is no longer regarded as essential. In small part this is because the Cold War is over. The sponsors of a force no longer need fear the automatic exploitation of any local resistance by the opposed ideological bloc. Even more important is the fact that more and more of the cases dealt with involve domestic or civil strife, in which there is frequently no clear cut or at least recognized body to give its consent. More decisive still, in civil war, which someone has recently well characterized as nasty, brutish, and long, the stakes are often paradoxically higher than in interstate boundary disputes. In the latter some percentage deal is often conceivable; in the former it is frequently all or nothing.

While forces are getting larger and more heavily engaged, the stakes for the peacekeepers are obviously rising. Such terms as "peacemaking," to denote the advance beyond facilitation and toward enforcement, are clearly designed to minimize the distinction. They also suggest differences of only small degree, often with the implication that we can choose, step by step, what we are getting into. In practice, however, the difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking is that between peace and war, and the flight of steps turns out to be a slippery, if at first gentle, slope.

Thus the British foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, has, over the past year or two, given a number of eloquent and cogent arguments as to why Croatia and Slovenia should not be precipitately recognized, why intervention should be very cautiously approached and, in particular, why British armed forces should not be involved. Yet the recognition took place, British troops and aircraft are indeed involved, and the rules of engagement have been progressively relaxed. The deeper one gets in, the less obvious is the way out. The immense Cambodia operation envisaged from the start a phase of virtual trusteeship; the pace of progress toward termination is already faltering. In Somalia, realism suggested from the first that some neo-colonialist form of UN mandate or trusteeship was likely. Now the Vance-Owen peace plan in Bosnia, should it ever be adopted, looks as if it would be viable, if at all, only given a continued UN presence; a classic case of the transitional about to become the perpetual.

The driving force down these slippery slopes is, of course, as Mr. Annan observed,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

public opinion swayed by the media. TV in particular has developed a great interest in civil strife but its interest is inevitably selective. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's accusation that the attention lavished on Yugoslavia as compared to the several African debacles was racist and Eurocentric was not entirely fair. The first European war since 1945 was bound to galvanize attention, especially in Europe. But there can be no doubt the media do focus attention on particular and preferably accessible places, and thereby reduce the consideration given to other areas. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's pressure and one or two pioneering TV programs eventually put Somalia on the public map. The Sudan, however, remains an under-reported disgrace, and it is a matter for some surprise elsewhere that the United States has so far taken so little interest in its own creation, Liberia.

Nevertheless, where they do strike, the media strike hard. The pace at which the Western powers have become involved in the Kurdish, Somali, and Yugoslav issues is the result. What we have yet to learn in our post-Cold War world is whether the media will prove to have equally hard-to-resist ways of condemning operations that go wrong or grow unexpectedly expensive.

Certainly the possibilities for going wrong are numerous and the costs potentially open-ended. Civil conflicts of the kind now clamoring for the treatment are not merely typically unpleasant; they are also much less amenable to external manipulation than the kind of cross-border aggression Saddam Hussein perpetrated. One of the simplest but most dangerous consequences of crossing the line of domestic jurisdiction is the sheer additional number of cases that then become accessible to public, media-driven demands for action. As a former head of the British Foreign Office Planning Staff wrote recently:

> In perhaps half the countries of the world a majority is oppressing a minority or vice-versa. When ethnic oppression does not turn into ethnic conflict it is most often because of the weakness of the oppressed. Ethnic problems become ethnic conflicts as the power of the state weakens.

If this view is even half correct, to take on a general jurisdiction over minority rights is both to accept an endless agenda and to assume the task of state- and community-building on a vast scale. Until the latter task has been satisfactorily completed in each instance, the unfortunate national agents of the superintending international community will either be chained to a task of trusteeship on the colonial model or find themselves engaging in a series of retreats followed by the collapse of their supposed achievement. Almost by definition, the element of consent required for traditional peacekeeping will be missing. Moreover the skills needed for constructing organic political communities are not those typically disposed of by foreign offices.

Borders, Rights, Minorities

IN THE COLD War "the international community" meant the usually mutually contradicting voices of East and West. Now that community can best be located as residing somewhere between the Security Council and the G-7. Those who speak for the international community or have that task thrust upon them are sliding into the intractable problem of domestic strife because they have accepted responsibility across state borders. The rhetoric of human rights, once a useful tool of ideological conflict but one safely circumscribed by the disciplines of the East-West stand-off, can no longer be so easily paid no more than lip service. This increasingly accepted attitude toward frontiers and borders is, however, very contradictory.

On the one hand, borders are not to be changed by forcible means. This principle—always implicit in the UN Charter—was originally invoked in its modern form as a stabi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lizing device in the Cold War. It meant that the principles of human rights and self-determination must not be allowed to question the Yalta settlement and start a war in Eastern Europe. The principle was also useful for discouraging efforts to rationalize the arbitrary boundaries conferred on Africa and the Middle East by European colonialism.

On the other hand, with greater publicity, some of the illogicalities and even injustices of particular territorial arrangements have become more transparently obvious, and the risks involved in challenging the *status quo* have been reduced for many of the groups affected. While there is still an obvious anxiety not to open up all the questions that could be plausibly raised on ethnic and other grounds, removal of the danger of East-West war for the time being has meant that these inhibitions against change are reduced.

The response that appeals most readily to the liberal mind is to leave the frontiers where they are and ensure that the states sovereign within them observe the high standards embodied in the various charters that have been drawn up in recent years or that enjoy new currency in the aftermath of the Cold War. In some instances the relative benignity of governments and the pressure of opinion, perhaps backed by economic and other sanctions and inducements, may produce success on those lines. In all too many others, it is hard to believe that they will do so. Many factions within states obviously interpret their rights and desires in exclusive, absolute, and nonnegotiable terms. In some instances their preferences seem to include a positive desire to see other groups suffer.

Moreover it is far from clear that all the currently vaunted principles are themselves mutually compatible. There are, for instance, obvious practical problems in some cases in attempting to reconcile rights for the individual with rights for adjacent minority groups. In addition, those who have lived in areas where minority languages have political status can readily point to ways in which that arrangement can become virtually oppressive for others. An added danger is the implication that where a minority in one state is part of a group that occupies a dominating position in a neighboring state, that second state has some *droit de regard* over its relatives abroad. Such a principle proved less than benign in the hands of Hitler and could well have a similarly dangerous effect if invoked on behalf of the famous 29 million Russians who live outside Russia.

Although this is not the place for a full-scale discussion of the Yugoslav crisis, there are good grounds for believing that confusion about the competing claims resulting from respect for the inviolability of boundaries, on the one hand, and for the rights of minorities on the other—as well as the mixed hopes and fears of neighboring states—have contributed to making a bad situation worse. While the case is far from irrefutable, it could be argued that Croatia and Slovenia were recognized precipitately, violating the frontiers of Yugoslavia to effect a measure of self-determination. Bosnia was thus virtually forced into separate existence and its frontiers given sanctity by the international community, even though its internal ethnic composition was untenable. The Vance-Owen plan, it could be argued, then proceeded to freeze the frontiers of the new state in the name of inviolability, but also to fragment it into an unworkable confusion of sub-entities in the name of ethnic separatism that render the external borders a nonsense.

The only concession to reality in all this is the carve-up engineered between Croatia and Serbia, a carve-up quite likely to be extended in due course across Bosnia. Moreover, to be even more brutally realistic, the reason why that carve-up has some plausibility is that it has been arrived at by force and power exerted by people on the scene, and not legislated by remote theorists. Rather similar realities, one might

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suggest, have made the new arrangements in such places as Bangladesh and Eritrea among the more successful and stable outcomes of peacekeeping operations in situations of ethnic conflict.

The Cost of "No Losers"

THAT INTERVENTION in such cases as Bosnia tends to be prolonged is not, of course, surprising. What the United Nations is doing in effect is refusing to let the weaker side lose. Public sympathy and consequent UN intervention will indeed probably always be on the weaker and thus, according to a common popular presumption, the virtuous side. In practice, determining where the balance of virtue lies is rarely easy and often impossible. But the simplifications of the media and the sense of moral certainty that the public finds comforting drive debate toward black and white conclusions. As a result Croatians and Muslims have quite literally got away with murder in recent months, though there is no need to dispute that opportunity has almost certainly given the Serbs the chance to behave even worse.

If those who are thought to be in the right are not to be allowed to lose, however, or if the principle is simply that no-one must win, then intervention will clearly prolong rather than curtail agony. Intervention will produce stalemate rather than solutions—unless, and it is an immense unless, the interveners are prepared to defeat the stronger side. Even then, of course, the underlying tensions will probably remain, to erupt later if and when the international police forces retire.

Now there is no reason why the United Nations or some other legitimizing body should not decide to undertake such a venture. Such a body, and all the more so the individual nations that alone can provide the requisite forces, should, however, clearly recognize the substantial costs likely to be entailed. These are of various kinds. Financially the cost of UN peacekeeping operations is soaring: from about $1 billion per annum a couple of years ago to $3 billion or more today. While this is still a small portion of world defense expenditure, it is not negligible. It is large enough, in fact, to have brought about a significant change in the pattern of financing for peacekeeping operations. Hitherto these had normally been funded from a common UN budget, but the latest tranches of expenditure in Yugoslavia are being met by the contributing nations. In Somalia, Japan picks up the Belgian bill. This change not too subtly shifts the leverage and responsibility further toward the richer nations, something that is more practicable now that the end of the global, bipolar, ideological structure has removed the necessity for the great powers to stay aloof, for fear of East-West collision.

Costs have risen, not only because the number of PKOs has risen more in the last four years than the previous forty, but also because the military environment has become much more demanding. This has occurred for two reasons. With the element of consent attenuating, the "natives" are more hostile. In addition, the level of local armament is rising. Both factors demand greater sophistication in the peacekeeping forces if they are to minimize the risk of casualties—partly by enjoying better passive protection, partly by possessing (though so far rarely by using) greater deterrent offensive power.

The most serious cost would be heavy casualties. So far, the most dramatic instance of large-scale fatalities is those suffered by the American and the French in the ill-fated—non-UN—Beirut operation. Such episodes illustrate how in civil wars the typical kind of guerrilla-terrorist tactic is both difficult to contend with under any rules of engagement and capable of producing a sudden and unpredictable rise in the casualty tariff. We have no evidence of how Western public opinion and their media sources would handle another such sudden increase in bloodiness. In Britain, the first fatality for a British soldier in Yugoslavia (there had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been only two by April) produced a sharp but brief reaction. The "friendly fire" episode in which British soldiers were killed in the Gulf War by U.S. aircraft demonstrated how inter-allied relations could be strained. That happened in an acceptedly fiercer environment, regarded as virtually a limited war, and the remarkably successful containment of overall allied casualties created a context in which the incident in question was of only temporary public interest. Nevertheless, in both episodes it was clear that the public was applying what one might call peacetime, civil disaster, rather than wartime, standards to what its military should suffer. Reaction might be very negative if such episodes occurred in continuing operations that were not generally accepted as being in the conventionally defined national interest.

The Iraqi case also serves to remind us that the costs of getting more deeply and violently involved in war-like operations are not merely the obvious ones, suffered directly by the intervening powers. There are also some significant moral balances to be struck. In public debate these are usually cast in terms of the duty to relieve the suffering of the losing side. There is a generally accepted moral imperative to do what one can in this humanitarian vein. Once that task involves using force, however, there is at least something to be set against that in the balance, and this is rarely considered. For some of us there is a palpable difference between the moral burden of failing to do one's utmost to relieve suffering and that of beginning to inflict it directly oneself. It is a subtle art to weigh the sins of omission against those of commission. Most of us are more deeply concerned when we find ourselves doing positive injury. Thus, not stopping Serbs from injuring Muslims is distinguishable from injuring Serbs oneself, especially when one is not sure the latter will stop the former.

Since the Gulf War, a frequent response to this kind of concern is to proclaim our capacity to wage war relatively painlessly these days, with the kind of precision-guided weaponry used against Iraq. If, as seemed possible in mid-April, the NATO powers were to undertake offensive strikes against Serbian communications and military bases, it might well be that all would go with surgical neatness and that NATO losses would be few. The record suggests, however, that this certainly cannot be relied upon in all cases. Quite apart from the kind of collateral damage familiar in many recent operations, there are also less direct consequences of going on to the offensive. Often the measures taken to reduce one's own casualties—taking to the air rather than the ground, action at a distance rather than at close quarters—increase those suffered by others. According to one American source, the Center for International Studies at MIT, the "clean" Gulf war killed 56,000 Iraqi military personnel and 3,600 civilians in immediate combat operations. (Other estimates vary widely: a May 1991 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) calculation was of 100,000 killed in action; a recent article by a former DIA analyst puts it as low as 2-8000 killed.) The MIT-sponsored study also suggests that, by October 1992, excess civilian deaths resulting from the effects of damage to infrastructure—and, presumably (though MIT does not say this), from sanctions—amounted to 111,000. The truth obviously remains elusive, but it seems certain that a large number of people lost their lives.[1]

The Gulf War was a big one and the harm done has to be measured against the good achieved. Nevertheless it is salutary to recall how uncertain and uncontrollable are the effects of war. It is well to bear this in mind before assuming that the moral arguments always lie on the side of taking more decisive and positive action on behalf of the supposed victims. Above all, we need to appreciate all the possibilities as we decide to exchange the role of concerned observers,

[1] From Beth Dupont, *Iraqi Casualties from the Gulf War and its Aftermath* (Cambridge, October 7, 1992).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doing what we can by way of humanitarian aid, diplomatic help and pressure, for that of joining in the killing ourselves.

Taking on ever-increasing peacekeeping operations will also impose another indirect but nevertheless real cost that is easy to overlook. The military environments and scale of such operations as Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Cambodia are beginning to tax the overall military capabilities of such countries as Great Britain, to the point of distorting the structure best designed to meet the core security needs of the nation. For Britain with its Irish problem, the possible burden of Yugoslavia has clearly led to an unacknowledged skewing of force posture toward the army and away from the navy. Germany is spared a role in Yugoslavia by its constitutional hang-up and, more justifiably, by its unfortunate historical legacy in that area. But if peacekeeping demands grow, Germany and other nations that have good political reasons to preserve a conscript system will face considerable difficulties in assembling expeditionary forces for actual combat. The military challenge thus extends well beyond the simple one of finance.

NATO as Peacekeeper

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL of NATO himself is an enthusiast for the alliance taking on the operational responsibility for managing its members' contribution to PKOs at least in Europe. The motive is clearly to make NATO seem relevant to what is actually happening, rather than appear increasingly to be a semi-mothballed relic of the past, preserved against the possible resurgence of a direct military threat to the Atlantic powers that now seems remote.

Once again there are undeniable arguments in favor of this approach. It may well be true that NATO is unsustainable on a purely standby basis. Nor is it necessarily impossible to play both the stand-by and the on-call local (and not so local) fire brigade roles at once. And if PKOs are to be undertaken in Europe, this approach also makes practical sense to use NATO, given the existence of mature command structures and practices, together with much-needed intelligence facilities.

There are, however, dangers. One is the distortion of force structures already indicated. This would be less serious if NATO and its members displayed more attention to preparations for the "reconstitution" envisaged in its official strategy for dealing with the possibility of Russian recidivism. Perhaps a more insidious danger is that of the various members of NATO falling out over specific cases as candidates for PKOs. On the whole NATO has had a poor record of inter-allied agreement over out-of-area problems. Nor has NATO been an effective forum for debating policy toward global issues. It is true that if the allies are going to take very different approaches to important questions it may strain their cooperation in NATO anyway. Still, placing issues—and even belligerent operations—that are not part of the core self-defense of the members within the alliance itself may well prove additionally disruptive. It is particularly difficult to be sure how this new interaction will relate to the important and hitherto not unhopeful evolution of relations between NATO, France and the emerging defense identity of Western Europe, especially given French reluctance to yield the United States a permanent leading role in European politics.

Whether or not the employment of NATO as the operational arm of peacekeeping and more forceful actions legitimized by the UN in Europe would strengthen or weaken the Alliance can be debated. The urgency of this question depends on how seriously one takes the need for a residual structure to provide a sense of security against traditional threats to Western—and if only by implication, to all of—Europe. In measuring this need one's thoughts return again in part to the subject of peacekeeping. What, many ask, are we to think of the peacekeeping problem in the Former Soviet Union? One of the reasons for concern about Yugoslavia has been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the fear of bad precedents being set and lessons being learnt with regard to the FSU. In practice the scale of the problems in the FSU suggests that they are likely to be driven primarily by their own dynamics and not by external examples. There is no doubt however that analogies can be drawn. On the one hand, Russia quite genuinely finds itself surrounded by a periphery of instability, particularly to the south, that would be unsettling for any neighbor. On the other hand, there are the 29 million Russians outside Russia, and the 20 percent of the population inside Russia that is not Russian. The Russian army has already mounted some quite heavy-handed operations on the Russian periphery, both within and without Russian frontiers; some Russian officers cite the role of the 14th Army in Transdnestr as one of the few recent successful examples of peacekeeping.

If the Western powers are going to make a virtue of forcible peacemaking, do they propose to extend this role to the FSU, building on the existing instances of UN and CSCE missions to troublespots such as Moldova and Tadjikistan, to the extent of sending Western forces, or is this to be an area only for the Russians and a few token local associates? President Yeltsin has already made one much-noted suggestion that Russia should be recognized as the arm of the Commonwealth of Independent States for legitimate peacekeeping operations, with overall CSCE/UN blessing. (It seems that by doing so he was as much looking for financial subsidy as political license.)

It will clearly take a long time to work all this out, but there is an obvious danger that such a process could create a framework for a kind of revived Brezhnev doctrine or of resumed Russian imperialism. It is hard to believe that the West would dare get involved in most of this except by way of exhortation, and the manipulation of economic levers in extreme cases. There are, however, some areas, especially Ukraine, the Baltic states and perhaps the marches of Turkey, where indifference could scarcely be preserved. In such cases, the way the West reacted might indeed be very much affected by whether the NATO apparatus had been preserved as an effective instrument for bolstering European security in the old sense of deterring external threats. Meanwhile, the possibility of political collision with Russia, even to a degree falling far short of any notion of armed conflict, at least seems to raise questions about the wisdom of subordinating more and more foreign policy to a concept of "world order" increasingly made dependent on the UN for legitimacy and consequently on an absence of Russian—or Chinese—vetoes in the Security Council.

Pas Trop de Zèle

NEITHER THE dangers of allowing a vague general benevolence to recommend all and every proposal to intervene in conflicts around the world nor the many grounds for caution that can readily be identified justify an equally simplistic policy of universal inaction. In all cases of conflict and suffering there is a legitimate humanitarian cause for concern and in some instances the national interest of many nations may be very much involved. What does need to be recognized is that there are no universal panaceas, that effective policies are likely to be specific in application, and partial and frequently provisional in effect. The more drastic and intrusive the intervention suggested, the more careful the analysis of likely causes and effects in the case in question should be. Where, as seems to be often the case, there is no substantial degree of assurance of success, then inaction needs to be recognized as a legitimate policy, and governments need to learn how to resist media pressure and educate publics to that effect.

Clearly there will usually be a strong *prima facie* case to afford what humanitarian aid can be inserted in conflict areas. There is also usually a case for persistent diplomatic effort to facilitate the agreement between parties to a dispute that alone can provide the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

basis for an organically durable solution. Precisely because of this desirability of arriving at solutions with some spontaneous rooting in local circumstances, very careful consideration is needed before diplomacy is reinforced with sanctions. Even sanctions intended to end military activity, rather than to dictate ultimate settlements, often have partisan effects and may therefore be counterproductive in terms of longer-term stability.

It is, of course, when the use of force is contemplated that the need for caution is greatest. Given the moral and practical considerations briefly sketched above, peacekeeping and, even more so, "peacemaking" and enforcement operations need to be approached in the spirit embodied in the old doctrine of just war. Any use of force should be highly discriminate, strictly proportionate to the merits of the intended purpose and, above all, undertaken only when there is a high probability of achieving an intended and justifiable effect. For all the difficulties of meeting the first two criteria of discrimination and proportionality, it is in the last respect of practical consequences that so much that has been proposed in the Bosnian and other cases falls short. It cannot be right to approach peacekeeping in the anachronistic spirit of "*on s'engage et puis on voit*"; if one must use a French aphorism, "*pas trop de zèle*" would seem more appropriate.

Given the difficulty of being sure what results one can achieve, especially in domestic conflicts, it may be salutary to realize that it is the external effects of domestic developments rather than their inherent nature that matters most, not merely from the prospect of the national interest of would-be interveners but also for the benefit of the international system. Admittedly this implies some hard-heartedness from time to time on human rights issues. It may be that it also pays less attention than theoretically desirable to the possibility that regimes that behave badly at home may also behave badly abroad. It does, however, recognize the great increase in complexity and intractability that policy faces when it extends beyond external consequences to domestic circumstances; the gradual erosion of the Western post-Gulf-War policy toward Saddam Hussein offers an apparent case in point.

The principle of external effects would also be of great help in approaching the problem of the former Soviet Union. The world can scarcely hope to police dealings between the members of the CIS in general, let alone the domestic affairs of the Russian Federation. But there are issues, such as the inviolability of Ukraine and the Baltic states, that are much more easily defined and where a deterrent policy—though even in those cases one probably falling short of actual military response—could be relatively clearly defined. Well-established frontiers exist at which to make a stand and the stakes for the interested parties are convincingly high. Similarly the fairly clear-cut existence of Macedonia makes the early and preventive deployment of UN observers eminently sensible.

A case-by-case approach, based on cautious interpretation of what is possible and on an ultimate basis of national interest, falls short of what those who believe in the "indivisibility" of peace and justice would like to achieve. It does, however, have a greater chance of practical success, both by concentrating effort on manageable issues and by giving greater assurance that efforts once mounted will be pursued. Such a case by case approach permits the costs to be clearly related to the self-interest of those paying them. To ask more is to demand in effect a global government to manage all the areas of the world that cannot govern themselves to standards satisfying those who affect to speak for that government. We are surely far short of consensus on what should be done, or of the wherewithal to do it, that alone could render such a system plausible. And, short of that, the goal is more dangerous than desirable. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Why Maastricht Will Fail

Martin Feldstein

ONLY A YEAR AGO there was widespread agreement that the European nations were marching inexorably toward monetary union and, through monetary union, to a political union that would gradually replace the twelve nation states of the European Community with a centralized form of continental government. Jean Monnet's dream of a United States of Europe looked as if it would become reality before the end of the century. The Maastricht treaty embodied and extended the strategy of gradualism that Monnet had advocated nearly a half century ago for shifting power from national governments to European institutions.

In this process of European unification, monetary union was far more important as a political symbol than as a substantive economic reform. Replacing national currencies with a single currency for all of Europe would promote a popular perception that Europe had become a "single nation." Replacing national central banks with a European Central Bank would shift the real locus of economic power away from national governments and would eventually lead to a centralization of budget and tax decisions along the lines already proposed by EC President Jacques Delors. The Maastricht treaty made the political goals explicit by combining monetary union with a commitment to a political union that would have responsibility for the domestic and international policies that are now decided by the individual national governments.

In the last year, the perceived prospects of European monetary and political unity have fluctuated widely. In 1992, the initial optimism faded rapidly under the impact of two major events: the crisis in the European system of exchange rates and the 1992 Danish referendum rejecting the treaty. The collapse of the European Monetary System (EMS) left the British and Italian currencies floating outside it, and thereby destroyed what many regarded as a major step along the way to monetary union. The initial Danish rejection of the Maastricht treaty was particularly striking because it occurred despite support for it by the leaders of both the government and the opposition parties. And while some advocates of monetary union dismissed the first Danish vote as a reflection of the opinions of only a handful of voters in a continent of more than 200 million people, subsequent testing of opinion in France, Switzerland, and Britain showed that the Danes were not alone in having serious reservations about the desirability of monetary union in general and the Maastricht agreement in particular.

In the French referendum, only a 1 percent majority favored the Maastricht treaty despite massive pro-treaty government advertising. The Swiss referendum, which overwhelmingly rejected membership in the European Economic Area, showed how far the

Martin Feldstein is professor of economics at Harvard University and president of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Swiss are from joining the European Economic Community. And the problems that John Major had with his own party indicated the lack of support for European Monetary Union (EMU) in Britain.

More recently, there has been something of an apparent recovery in the Maastricht treaty's prospects. In May of this year, the Danes ratified it in a second referendum. Immediately afterwards, the Major government succeeded in having the treaty approved by the House of Commons (by 292 votes to 112, with no fewer than 246 members abstaining and with 41 conservatives voting against their leadership).

There is less to these recent developments than meets the eye, however, and their impact is destined to be rather superficial. Among informed private individuals, and even among government officials when they speak privately, there is widespread agreement that the prospect of monetary and political union remains remote, and will continue to be so even if all twelve countries of the EC should eventually ratify the treaty. As a practical matter, countries that do ratify the Maastricht treaty will have ample opportunity to reconsider the substance of their decisions. The treaty explicitly grants Britain the right to decide later whether to accept the single currency. Even more significant exemptions were explicitly given to Denmark in order to induce the Danes to ratify the treaty. The German parliament has made it clear that it also reserves the right to decide later whether it will abandon the deutschemark, even though it has not been explicitly given that right in the treaty. It is unthinkable that France would not demand for itself a right given to others, and indeed President Mitterrand's televised statement to the French nation that European monetary policy would not be left to European central bankers but would be under the control of national politicians implies a fundamental French reinterpretation of monetary union.

Apart from these reservations, only three of the twelve current members of the European community now satisfy the "convergence conditions" on inflation, interest rates, and budget deficits set forth in the Maastricht plan as preconditions for joining the monetary union. There is substantial reason to doubt that all twelve will satisfy a literal interpretation of those conditions anytime in the next decade. And before the end of the century the European Community is likely to add several new members who will have their own problems in achieving these preconditions for monetary union.

Beyond the Treaty Process

SO RATIFICATION of the treaty by all twelve of the current EC countries would still leave Europe far from monetary and political union. To assess the likelihood of monetary union, it is important to look beyond the treaty process to the forces that will determine whether or not EMU is actually implemented.

The most important recent change that has diminished the likelihood of monetary union has been the collapse of the Soviet Union. The threat of Soviet aggression no longer provides a driving force for European political union that is powerful enough to overcome the natural reluctance to sacrifice national sovereignty and independence. The early history of the United States is instructive. Despite the similarity in the backgrounds of the individual colonies, there was substantial reluctance after independence to go beyond the very weak form of association embodied in the Articles of Confederation. The subsequent decision to substitute the stronger central government of the Constitution for the weaker association under the Articles of Confederation was motivated primarily by the desire to provide for a common defense against foreign alliances and foreign intervention in the former colonies.

Perhaps even more fundamentally, the generation of Europeans who dreamed of a United States of Europe as a way of preventing a repetition of the horrors of World War II by containing Germany in a larger political entity

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is shrinking rapidly in both size and political influence. For most young people, the prospect of German militarism is not a palpable concern that justifies sacrificing national identities. Although the argument that Germany must be "contained" in a broader European government to prevent a repeat of German military aggression is made by Germans as well as non-Germans, it is demeaning to the German people and contrary to the past half-century of German history. It is unlikely to provide a powerful motive for political union in either Germany or elsewhere in Europe.

Those who still share Jean Monnet's dream of creating a United States of Europe as a way of preventing a return of German militarism will also have to deal with those critics who remind them that, as the American Civil War and other intramural conflicts have demonstrated, a devastating war can occur even within a single political entity. This is particularly relevant to those who are concerned by the recent tendency of German officials to refer to World War I and World War II as "European civil wars." Indeed it would not be difficult to argue that the American Civil War would not have occurred if the North and South had been separate countries from the time of American independence.

To the best of my knowledge, history offers no precedent of one country merging with another as a way of protecting itself from the other country's future aggression. Similarly, there is no precedent for a country voluntarily giving up its sovereignty to prevent itself from acting aggressively in the future. In contrast, history offers many examples of countries that pursue and promote political union in order to increase their power over their neighbors. One need look no further than Prussia's nineteenth-century merger with the previously independent areas of Germany as a way of achieving Prussian hegemony over their territories. It seems unlikely that Britain, France, and the other countries of Europe will want to form a continental government in which Germany has the largest population and the strongest economy as a way of limiting Germany's future power or the military exercise of that power.

If I am correct that containing possible future German militarism will not be a decisive force for European monetary and political union, the future political evolution of Europe will depend on the more mundane issues of the economic benefits and costs of monetary union and the desirability of maintaining national control over domestic and international policies. The most basic reason for doubting the viability of the Maastricht plan is that the potential economic benefits of monetary union are small at best while the political consequences involve a fundamental loss of national self-determination.

These adverse consequences are clearly not strong enough to persuade the current European leaders to abandon the quest for monetary and political union with which they have long been associated. There will, however, eventually be an end to the era of François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, as well as to the already shaky-looking term of Prime Minister John Major. The next generation of European political leaders will not have the same personal commitment to the Maastricht treaty and to the goal of European monetary and political union as did Mitterrand, Kohl, and Major. The political reputations and personal egos of the new leaders will not be tied to the success of monetary and political union, and they will not equate the future of EMU and European Political Union (EPU) with their own personal places in history. The new political leaders will see that public support of EMU and EPU is weak at best and that there is greater political advantage in pursuing other goals.

Questionable Economics

THE MOST immediate reason for the weakening of public support for monetary union is that the process of economic change required to satisfy the "convergence" criteria that are specified in the Maastricht treaty is very painful. The Maastricht agree-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment specifies target levels for inflation, interest rates, and budget deficits that a country must satisfy before it can join the monetary union. Reducing inflation rates, budget deficits and public debt ratios requires contractionary monetary and fiscal policies that have contributed to the depressed levels of economic activity throughout Europe and the resulting double-digit unemployment rates.

Attempting to achieve the explicit convergence targets specified in the Maastricht agreement would probably mean that economic weakness would continue for the remainder of the decade. The recent statements in national capitals and in Brussels about the need for a "growth strategy" based on fiscal expansion and easier German monetary policy indicate an unwillingness to pursue such deflationary monetary and fiscal policies.

The collapse of the exchange rate mechanism in September 1992 was the most visible evidence of the high cost of the Maastricht program. The attempt to sustain the exchange rates that had prevailed since 1987 collapsed because inflation differences and other domestic conditions had made those rates unsustainable. Italy and Britain had current account deficits that were large in relation to their foreign exchange reserves. Higher inflation in those countries than elsewhere in the EC implied that their trade imbalances were likely to deteriorate further. While the real exchange rate adjustments that were needed to eliminate the trade imbalance could in principle have been achieved without nominal exchange rate changes—by dramatic cuts in domestic prices and wages, or by sustained reductions of domestic inflation to a level lower than that in France and Germany—the suppression of domestic demand that would have been required to achieve such deflation was politically unacceptable.

Even after the devaluations that have occurred, it will be very costly for several of the EC countries to maintain fixed exchange rates relative to the deutschemark. Now that financial capital is very mobile within Europe in the very short run, even countries that do not have trade deficits or high inflation are forced by the European monetary system to maintain interest rates that are higher than the rates paid in Germany, in order to compensate financial investors for the risk of a future devaluation. The high real interest rates set by the Bundesbank, in order to offset the inflationary pressures caused by German unification, therefore force high real rates on the other countries of Europe, even when such rates are not justified by their own domestic conditions. The resulting high unemployment rates and sluggish growth may eventually cause other countries to follow Britain and Italy in allowing their exchange rates to float.

The high cost of transition might be politically acceptable if the public saw sufficient long-term economic gains from achieving monetary union. But even the long-term benefits of that union are at best questionable. Put briefly, European monetary union is not needed to promote trade within Europe and is more likely to raise European inflation than to lower it. Moreover, the loss of separate national monetary policies that would result from the creation of a European Central Bank would be likely to increase cyclical problems and thus raise the average unemployment rate. Finally, the process of monetary centralization would ultimately require a parallel centralization of tax and spending decisions that is neither necessary nor desirable.[1]

Consider first the link between trade and monetary union. The European Commission argues that a single currency is needed to facilitate the increased trade that could result from the new "single market" rules, summarizing this view in the title of its report: *One Market, One Money*. More modestly, some European businessmen favor a single European currency because it would lower transaction costs and reduce the variability of profits caused by

[1]My views on the economic consequences of European monetary union are discussed more extensively in "The Case Against EMU," *The Economist*, June 13, 1992.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

short-term currency fluctuations, without the need for explicit hedging actions.

The Commission's idea that free trade requires fixed exchange rates is certainly contrary to all standard economic analysis. Economists understand that the benefits of free trade can be obtained in a world of floating exchange rates. Indeed, unless the domestic prices of goods and services and domestic wage rates respond rapidly to changes in market conditions, the benefits of free trade are enhanced by exchange rates that adjust freely.

Although volatile exchange rates might in principle inhibit the volume of trade, the economists who have tried to find statistical relations between the volatility of currency fluctuations and the volume of trade have identified no convincing statistical evidence that the first reduces the second. On the contrary, the ability of trade to flourish when exchange rates are volatile is demonstrated by several readily available examples. Canada's imports and exports each exceed 20 percent of Canada's national income despite its floating exchange rate. Again, sharp currency fluctuations have certainly not limited Japan's ability to expand its trade with the rest of the world.

Although proponents of monetary union argue that it would result in a lower inflation rate in Europe, there are at least four reasons for doubting this. First, the experience in France, the Netherlands, and elsewhere has shown that inflation can be virtually eliminated without abandoning national currencies by adopting a policy of linking the currency to the deutschemark.

Second, low inflation can be achieved even without such an exchange rate policy by a country that really wants low inflation; witness the experience in such otherwise different countries as the United States and New Zealand.

Third, the major countries of Europe other than Germany have made it clear that they would like to see a less restrictive German monetary policy at the present time. A European central bank that reflected the views of most European countries would undoubtedly favor a less anti-inflationary policy now than the one being imposed on the members of the European monetary system by the Bundesbank.

Fourth, despite all the talk about the independence of the European Central Bank, there is a substantial risk that the *de facto* authority for monetary policy would shift to the politically controlled Council of Ministers. The locus of effective control is obscured in the technical issue of who determines the international value of the ECU (European currency unit). The Maastricht treaty can be interpreted to mean that the Council of Ministers, rather than the European Central Bank, would determine the basic policy changes that affect the external value of the ECU. A decision of the Ministers to reduce the value of the ECU relative to the dollar or yen (similar in spirit to the decisions made at the Plaza in 1985 or the Louvre in 1987) would force the European Central Bank to pursue an easier and more inflationary monetary policy. Perhaps this is what President Mitterrand had in mind when he reassured the French public that politicians rather than central bankers would be responsible for European monetary policy.

In addition to this inflationary bias, the shift to a single European currency would also increase cyclical instability and raise average unemployment rates. This increase in cyclical instability and unemployment occurs not only because the shift to a single currency denies national governments the ability to tailor monetary policy and exchange rates to national economic conditions, but also because it prevents natural market forces from changing long-term interest rates and market exchange rates when conditions warrant such a change.

With a single currency for all of Europe, there obviously cannot be different interest rates and different monetary policies in different countries. National governments unambiguously lose the ability to adjust national monetary policies and interest rates to offset shocks to economic demand that are greater in their own country than in the EC as a whole. Those who favor EMU usually reply to this last

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

point by arguing that demand shocks are not likely to differ substantially among the European countries, and therefore that the lack of separate monetary policies is not a serious problem. Although few demand shocks are localized to a single nation, there are enough differences between countries like Spain and Denmark or Britain and Italy that it would be wrong to minimize the usefulness of national monetary policies and adjustable nominal exchange rates.

Abandoning individual currencies in favor of a single European currency would make it literally impossible to shift the relative prices of products in different European countries by changing exchange rates. Even defenders of monetary union recognize that this loss of flexible nominal exchange rates would make it more difficult for countries to respond to shocks in demand that create local unemployment. In addition, real exchange rates must adjust to balance trade when there are national differences in technology, tastes, and in rates of income growth. The inability of nominal exchange rates to adjust would mean that real exchange rates would have to be adjusted by altering domestic wages and prices, a process that could involve substantial and prolonged unemployment.

There is one further aspect of the economic gains and losses from the Maastricht arrangement: the transfers from the high-income countries to the lower-income countries. The original Delors proposal for such transfers was a bribe, designed to strengthen support for the treaty in low income countries. The Irish government, as part of its campaign for referendum votes in favor of treaty ratification, emphasized the transfer that Ireland would receive. The prospect of such transfers still remains a major source of the appeal of economic union in Portugal and Spain. It is unlikely however that in the end any country would actually sacrifice its political and economic independence in order to obtain a temporary transfer equal to 2 or 3 percent of its national income. Moreover, the higher income countries, including Britain and Germany, have already made it clear that they are unwilling to support more than minimal transfers.

In summary, my analysis of the economic consequences suggests that the process of transition to monetary union would be long and painful, and that, once there, the trade gains from a stable currency would be relatively small and more than offset by the adverse effects on inflation and unemployment.

Political Consequences

THE POLITICAL consequences of the Maastricht treaty would be even more important than its economic effects. A political union would shift responsibility for international and domestic policies from national capitals to European institutions. For most purposes, the proposed location of the decision-making within the European political system (the Commission, the Council, or the Parliament) is less important than the fact that the decision authority would be shifted away from national capitals.

In trying to assess the likely political consequences of moving ahead with the Maastricht program, Europeans will have to consider not only the changes that are explicitly called for by the Maastricht treaty but also the additional changes that may flow from it in the future.

The recent experience with Denmark shows that the treaty cannot be regarded as a legally binding document when a strong majority of countries wishes to expand the role of the European institutions at the expense of national governments. The Maastricht treaty is formally a revision of the original Treaty of Rome which states explicitly that any treaty revision must be unanimous. After the initial Danish "No" vote, many European political leaders asserted that Denmark did not have the right to block the treaty revision proposed at Maastricht. Those political leaders indicated that they expected to go ahead with the Maastricht treaty even if Denmark rejected it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Denmark might have been forced to leave the Community, losing the trade benefits of being part of the single market. Although the Danes have now ratified the treaty, other governments will undoubtedly worry that if they were to reject some future proposal to revise the treaty they too might be forced to leave the European Community at that time.

It is thus clear from the Danish experience that anything agreed to as part of the Maastricht treaty, whether it is about technical matters like the role of the European Central Bank or more fundamental issues like the division of responsibility between the Council and the Parliament, is *de facto* subject to change in the future without the unanimous consent of the member countries, even though unanimity is supposed to be required to change the treaty.

There has been substantial discussion in recent months about the principle of "subsidiarity," i.e., about the division of authority between the European central government and the national and local governments. Although there is great ambiguity about what this would mean in practice for domestic issues, there can be no ambiguity about the implication of political union for foreign policy and military policy. If it is accepted that the European Community will eventually have a single foreign policy and a single military policy, there is no room for national governments to have independent positions.

The political union envisioned in the Maastricht treaty would eventually mean that decisions about military actions in Eastern Europe, in the Middle East, or in North Africa would be made collectively for Europe. Individual countries could not veto such collective decisions, and individual countries could not abstain from participating in military actions even if they were unpopular domestically. That these military decisions were made democratically by an elected European Parliament or a Council of Ministers would not alter the fact that nations might find themselves drawn into wars that they believed to be contrary to their national interests or moral principles.

Although this issue has until now received less attention in the public debate than the question of domestic subsidiarity, at some point it may become a major focus of concern. If it does, the people of Ireland or Portugal (to name just two countries) might well object to a political union that involves an irrevocable commitment to fight wars in Eastern Europe or the Middle East. And since this is a treaty without limit of time, the possibilities for future military conflicts cannot be judged by current military and diplomatic configurations.

Domestic issues of "subsidiarity" are of course more immediately visible to the public. The Brussels bureaucracy made itself unpopular last summer by what many regarded as excessive meddling in matters that should have been left to national or local governments. The Commission initially attempted to defuse this criticism by asserting that the Commission and its bureaucrats would be made more accountable to the European Parliament. This appeal to increased democratization failed to reassure people who rightly recognized that the loss of sovereignty and national self-determination could not be corrected by increasing democracy in a system that did not permit national vetoes on European decisions.

The problem is not bureaucratic power but a loss of national sovereignty. The principle of "subsidiarity"—assigning decisions to the lowest appropriate level of government—has therefore been emphasized by those who favor monetary and political union, in an attempt to reassure people that they and their national governments will not lose control over important issues. There is however so little practical content to the idea of "subsidiarity" that it cannot provide comfort to anyone who worries about a pan-European assumption of authority for rules affecting local lifestyles and national fiscal decisions.

Americans are accustomed to the gradual drift of authority from state governments to Washington that has taken place over the years, despite our Constitution's seemingly unambiguous Tenth Amendment that reserves

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the individual states all powers not specifically vested by the Constitution itself in the central government. It is hard for someone who is not a lawyer to reconcile this straightforward constitutional language with the fact that Washington effectively sets the maximum speed limit on local roads and the minimum age at which young people can purchase beer. The federal government sets the rules that govern safety in the workplace and discrimination in hiring. It is not clear why the American subsidiarity principle does not leave these decisions to the states or localities.

If this shift of power to the central government has happened in the United States, despite the apparently explicit prohibition of the Tenth Amendment, what comfort can Europeans take in the vague promise that decisions will be made "at the lowest appropriate level of government"?

As a traveler to Europe, I am occasionally struck by the things that take place in individual European countries that do not happen elsewhere in Europe and that would not be allowed in the United States. The bull fights that are a central part of the national culture in Spain are certainly not permitted in the United States. How long would the public slaughter of bulls for sport be permitted in Spain if the decision were taken in Strasbourg or Brussels? The European Commission's recent decision to ban the use of rabbits to test cosmetics does not bode well for bullfight aficionados.

The American protectors of animal rights have also been successful in preventing Americans from consuming the *foie gras* that the people of France enjoy despite the discomfort that it apparently imposes on French geese. How long would a pan-European parliament tolerate the force feeding of geese? The decisions of the Brussels bureaucracy to limit the flavors of potato chips made in Britain suggests a willingness to meddle in every aspect of personal consumption.

Subsidiarity affects major issues of fiscal policy as well as more personal lifestyle issues. The original Delors plan would have limited the ability of member governments to have fiscal deficits. Many European economists who favor monetary union think that a balanced budget requirement must eventually accompany monetary union. National tax authorities are already being forced to restructure their value added taxes to conform to European guidelines. Although the European Community as such still has little revenue of its own, there is nothing in the Maastricht arrangement to stop the evolving transfer of fiscal power and resources to the center if a majority of nations wants to do so. Nor is there any limit to the extent to which such a European tax could be used to redistribute income among countries and individuals.

The ultimate protection of national sovereignty is of course the right to withdraw from the Community. It is significant therefore that neither the original Rome Treaty nor the Maastricht plan contains any provision for unilateral withdrawal by a member country. What would happen if a country felt that its national interest and way of life were so threatened by the rules of the centralized European government that it wanted to leave the Community, even if that involved foregoing the trade benefits? Could the Community government prevent secession by military force as the United States did when South Carolina wanted to leave the Union some seventy-five years after ratifying the American Constitution?

As Europeans start to focus on the political consequences of the European union envisioned in the Maastricht treaty they are likely to conclude that the risks and uncertainties are too great, and the potential political changes too unsatisfactory, to go forward with monetary and political union. Even if monetary union were possible without political union—something that apparently neither Germany nor France wants—the adverse effects of monetary union for price stability and employment would outweigh the small advantages of trading with a single currency. It would be surprising in light of all of this if Europe began the twenty-first century with a monetary union and a single currency. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rethinking Asia

Chalmers Johnson

PEOPLE AROUND THE world, particularly those in the United States and the rich capitalist countries of East Asia, seem to be having great difficulty in understanding how radically different the world has become after the Cold War and the end of superpower bipolarity. Americans continue to fantasize about being the "lone superpower" without realizing that unipolarity renders the global dimension of strategic competition irrelevant. All conflicts are now regional. The Japanese continue to believe that what Donald Hellmann has called their "grotesquely unbalanced 'partnership'" with the United States is still viable and that free trade can be maintained, even though Japan itself refuses to budge on its closed agricultural market and does nothing about its "fortress" (*yosai*) economy, to use the name applied to it by Sony chairman Akio Morita.

Meanwhile, major changes challenge almost all received wisdom. The Republic of Korea, for example, has gotten its military back into the barracks after thirty years of what Frank Gibney has described as "hard-as-nails authoritarian government." Just as Japan is recognized as the economic model for the rest of East Asia, South Korea may become the political model for the democratization of these so-called miracle economies.

Korea's achievement in managing the transition to democracy is comparable to Spain's transition from fascism to democracy, both of them involving changes of a revolutionary magnitude. Similarly, China after the 14th Party Congress of 1992 has a political economy that is structurally similar to that of Park Chung Hee's Korea—authoritarian politics combined with market economics—and produces similar rates of growth, except that a Chinese economy growing at 10 percent a year will very quickly alter both the regional and the global balance of power. These developments are conceptually difficult, their implications almost unfathomable without a new framework of understanding. The "vision thing," as George Bush so notoriously put it, is a bigger problem than ever.

In this essay I propose, first, to sketch in some of the things that the end of bipolarity logically entails in America's relations with Japan, Korea, and China; second, to offer a few theoretical generalizations about the related phenomena of transnational economic integration and subnational ethnic fragmentation; and third, to review some of the scenarios for the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific in an era of fundamental structural change.

IT IS TODAY a cliché to say that the global political economy presents troubling options for the United States. Americans do not know any longer how to order their priorities, but without some new basis for doing so they are in danger of following the former USSR

Chalmers Johnson is the Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations at the University of California, San Diego.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into domestic chaos. The demands of the Cold War led what is now Russia into imperial overstretch and disintegration of its empire, and those same demands weakened the United States, turning it into the world's biggest debtor nation. Neither former superpower could have maintained the old priorities even if the Cold War had continued. The pretensions of superpowerdom are absurd in a period in which Russia, even if it still has nuclear weapons, has become an underdeveloped hinterland, and in which the nature of power has shifted radically from coping with short-term military threats to long-term technological threats. During 1989-91 the United States did not so much "win" the Cold War as jump from the frying pan into the fire. Soviet communism set for the United States a low standard of economic comparison; Germany and Japan have raised the economic stakes considerably.

The Southern Center for International Studies in Atlanta recently set five questions for the Clinton administration as it begins to address the United States' new external environment.[1] Should the U.S. concentrate on solving its own domestic problems or should it concentrate on the United States' global role and position? What role should the United States play in the global economy, the choices ranging from what Alan Tonelson calls an "intelligent economic nationalism," to a revivified international free trade regime, to North American economic regionalism as a response to the EC and to massive Japanese investment in Asia? Under what conditions and circumstances should the United States intervene militarily overseas? To what extent should the United States act unilaterally, or in concert with the United Nations and other multilateral international institutions? And, finally, what kind of a new international order is desirable and what kind is possible, ranging from a unipolar conception of renewed American hegemony, to a G-3 of regional trading blocs, to a polycentric world in which peace is maintained, if at all, only by the *balance* of power? These questions are interesting today because the answers that made sense in the Cold War are now irrelevant.

Bilateral Changes

LET US BEGIN with some salient aspects of United States' relations with Japan, South Korea, and China. State Department officials freely concede that our bilateral economic relations with Japan are "out of control."[2] With the trade deficit running at around $50 billion per annum and every arrow in the economists' quiver already fired—Action Plans, MOSS Talks, Plaza Accords, Maekawa Reports, and Structural Impediments Initiatives—nobody knows what to do next. It is increasingly apparent that what the Japanese call "excess competition" (*kato kyoso*)—caused by cartels, male job security, administrative guidance, and other features of the Japanese economy—results in Japan's exporting the unintended consequences of its rigged economic structure. It does not produce the "mutually beneficial exchange" of the economists' textbooks. For Japan actually to change would mean changing Japan's political structure, ending the vested interests and bureaucratic careers devoted to perpetuating the postwar developmental system. However, the end of the Cold War opens up the possibility of a new solution.

Throughout the Cold War the United States exerted consistent *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure) on Japan to keep the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in power and to keep the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) out. The reasons for this were obvious. The JSP had never evolved into a reliable supporter of democracy against communist totalitarianism, as did the Social Democratic Party of Germany. The JSP has remained committed to neutralism and the end of the Japanese-American Security Treaty. However, with the end of the Cold War, none of this matters any more. A Socialist government in Japan would do a lot to break up the cozy relationship that now exists among politicians, bureaucrats, and insider industrialists,

[1]Daniel S. Papp, *The Global Review* (Winter 1993), pp. 2-4.

[2]Don Oberdorfer, *Clinton and Asia: Issues for the New Administration* (New York, 1993), p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and to correct the inequities of the "rich Japan, poor Japanese" syndrome.

There is another reason why the United States should cool its support of the LDP. As a report of the Australian Senate on Japan's defense policy recently put it,

> The only conceivable quarter from which political support for a resurgence of an independent military role for Japan might come is the large number of ultranationalist associations. These groups, estimated to have an active membership of around 23,000 and often having their origins in the patriotic societies of pre-war Japan, share many if not all of the following objectives: the revision or abolition of the Constitution; restoration of the pre-1945 imperial system; the development of a more powerful military force, including nuclear weapons; a strong belief in the racial superiority of Japanese; fierce anti-communism; and a resentment of foreigners and foreign involvement in Japanese affairs. The criminal underworld provides these associations with much of their funding, facilitating their persistent and vocal campaigns on issues which offend their beliefs.[3]

Unfortunately, the report then proceeded to dismiss the influence of such groups on the grounds that "These ultranationalist groups have no systematic links or support within the government, the bureaucracy, business, or other power elites in Japan." This is not true. The Nomura scandal of 1991 revealed the major influence that *yakuza* (mobsters) had on Japan's largest financial securities firm, and the Sagawa Kyubin scandal of 1992 detailed the close ties between virtually all members of the LDP and both the criminal underworld and right-wing groups.[4] An end to the LDP's monopolization of Japanese political power might help break up these affiliations.

American relations with South Korea also face an equally changed landscape. Beginning in 1950 and continuing to the present time, American military involvement on the Korean peninsula was always based on the United States' global concerns, never on Korea itself. We became involved in the Korean conflict because of that war's potential impact on the worldwide balance of power. With the end of the Cold War and China's opening of diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea, the United States' interest in Korea as a global issue no longer exists. For this reason alone the American ground forces, stationed in Korea for the past forty-three years, should be withdrawn. However, there are also other reasons.

First, those ground forces have no further military purpose. The threat from the north, to the extent that it exists at all, is today nuclear and not conventional. It can be countered by American nuclear forces available to the Seventh Fleet, and ultimately removed only through inspection, negotiation, and political reunification. In my opinion, North Korea is probably developing a nuclear option only as a bargaining chip, as leverage to obtain aid for the development of an atomic power capability. Russia's cut off of petroleum supplies and China's requirement that it be paid in hard currency have created an acute energy crisis for the north. The nuclear threat also keeps open channels of communication to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Seoul, Tokyo, Washington, and the private Americans who travel to Pyongyang under the pretense of negotiation. A North Korean use of atomic weapons is unlikely, particularly in the face of Chinese opposition, but the idea that it might possess such weapons keeps Cold War bureaucracies working a little longer.

Second, to leave American ground forces in Korea makes them hostage to a possible future conflict and threatens the stability of

---

[3]Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade, *Japan's Defense Policy and Current Defense Development and Debates In Japan and the Region* (Canberra: Official Hansard Report, December 7, 1992), p. 18.

[4]See, in particular, Akihiko Nakanishi and Tatsumi Ito, "Seijika to yakuza no kenkyu" (A Study of Politicians and Mobsters), *Bungei shunju*, January 1993, pp. 118-31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States' relations with Japan. As one of Japan's most seasoned diplomats, Hisahiko Okazaki, recently observed, "If a war were to occur on the Korean peninsula, Americans would shed their blood, but Japanese would not be willing to do the same."[5] Actually there is no need for either American or Japanese soldiers to get involved. South Korea has a population of 43 million, as against North Korea's 22 million, and is fully capable of defending itself.

Beyond these military considerations, the U.S. troops should be removed because they are an obstacle to Korean democratization. The United States has applauded the progress toward democracy and civilian rule that began with Roh Tae Woo's declaration of June 29, 1987, leading to the election of Kim Young Sam as president on December 19, 1992. But the United States tends to forget that its own toleration of both Chun Doo Hwan's coup d'état and his massacre of civilians at Kwangju in May 1980 is one of the reasons why democracy took so long in coming in Korea. As Frank Gibney puts it,

> The Kwangju bloodletting was the Korean equivalent of China's Tiananmen massacre—no less ruthless for having been perpetrated by an ally....More than any other factor or event, it set in motion an undercurrent of anti-American feeling, which persists among Korean students to this day, for America's passive acquiescence in the massacre was held by many Koreans to mean active support.[6]

The errors of both the Carter and Reagan administrations cannot be corrected at this late date, but the American troops should be withdrawn as a small, belated gesture toward the consolidation of civilian rule in Seoul. The end of the Cold War makes it possible and the future importance of Korea in an emerging Asian balance of power makes it desirable.

China offers further variations on these post-Cold War themes. In 1989, China had a per capita income of $547, or 2.6 percent of that of the United States; and a total GNP of $603.5 billion, or 11.6 percent of ours. China's population of 1.1 billion people is more than four times that of the U.S. These numbers mean that China could fairly easily produce an economy the same size as the United States' while still having a relatively low per capita income. If China achieved a per capita GNP even one-fourth that of the United States—approximately the level of Korea's today—it would have an absolute GNP greater than that of the United States. With the high growth and savings rates achieved in recent years, matching the per capita income of South Korea today is not an unrealistic goal for China.[7]

Americans like to believe that economic growth is desirable in and of itself, regardless of the natural resources that may be destroyed in the process. They also believe that economic growth inevitably leads to democratization—important because it allegedly makes people happier and because democracies are said to go to war with each other rarely, if at all. The conservative Heritage Foundation states it as if it were a Newtonian law: "The law of supply and demand is as immutable as the law of gravity: as a country moves up the economic ladder, political freedoms almost always follow."[8] Let us not dwell on the fact that the law of gravity does not operate in the "almost always" realm. What is interesting about this remark is that it is explicitly directed to the East Asian newly

---

[5]Hisahiko Okazaki and Tatsumi Okabe, "Subete wa Nichi-Bei domei atte koso" (Everything Depends on the Japan-U.S. Alliance), *Gaiko Forum*, October 1992, p. 7.

[6]Gibney, *Korea's Quiet Revolution: From Garrison State to Democracy* (New York, 1992), pp. 75-76.

[7]These calculations are from Richard K. Betts (Columbia University), "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia After the Cold War," unpublished paper, January 1993, pp. 30-32.

[8]Andrew B. Brick, 'The Yankee Traders' Message to Clinton: Trade Begets Democracy in China," *The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum*, No. 346, December 2, 1992.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industrialized countries, even though most of them are anything but democratic. When they do advance toward democracy, as in the case of South Korea, their economic growth tends to slow down.

What these American ideologues fail to understand is that democracy is a peculiarly effective way of making decisions under conditions of significant heterogeneity. Since economic development will normally produce greater social differentiation, democracy is a logical response to these conditions. But if the heterogeneity can be mitigated—through fairly equitable income distribution, restrictions on immigration or emigration, or an overarching ideology of uniqueness and exceptionalism—democracy may not be necessary for effective government, and the tradeoff between economic growth and democratic development can then be postponed.

In the past the Chinese Communists have been wary of using market mechanisms for economic growth precisely because they feared that the Americans were right, and that it would lead to the collapse of communist authoritarianism. One reason why in recent years they have accepted those mechanisms is that evidence from the high-growth economies of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, suggests that authoritarianism (sometimes disguised by a facade of democracy) is compatible with high levels of per capita income.

During the Cold War it made sense for the United States to promote China's economic development because it reinforced the strategic triangle with the USSR. Today, by giving China most-favored-nation access to the American market, the United States is actively helping China to become as big as the United States itself—but with no guarantee that its people will be satisfied with a per capita income only a quarter of America's, or that democratic government will become unavoidable in the Chinese context. It may well be that the United States should promote Chinese development anyway, but it is time to start thinking about the need to balance China's future power, and to recognize that the presumed relationship between economic development and democracy is not as certain as the law of gravity.

The Global Context

AMERICAN RELATIONS with Japan, Korea, and China appear in a very different light when seen only on their own terms, omitting any thought of a global, bipolar conflict. The United States no longer needs to support a corrupt and isolationist party in Japan just because it is anticommunist. The United States no longer needs to intervene in a Korean civil war. The United States no longer needs a unified, economically viable China as a counterfoil to a hostile USSR. But the United States still has a vital interest in a peaceful, stable East Asia—where its three biggest wars of this century began—and in mutually beneficial economic relations with the world's main manufacturing center. How, then, should it alter or maintain its current relations in the area?

Before addressing that question, one needs a clear understanding of the direction of global change and the forces driving it. It seems to me that there are two general tendencies in international relations in the wake of the Cold War. The first trend is the spectacular growth of transnational economic integration, caused by technology, the validation of capitalism by the outcome of the Cold War, the shift from the primacy of military to economic power, and the desire of lagging parts of the world to compete with East Asia. This integration takes the form both of new regional markets—the European Community, NAFTA, the ASEAN free trade agreement—and so-called "borderless economies," multinational corporations, the global communications village, and the wired world of capital flows from one market to another. Many believe that this integration contributes to the unification of the world and is therefore an unqualified good.

The second trend is toward social fragmentation—the phenomenon of a single political unit dividing into several, as in the former USSR, former Czechoslovakia, and former Yugoslavia. Fragmentation also involves a sharp

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rise in the politicization of ethnicity in many parts of the world, leading to what some have called a "retribalization." Examples include the Serbian campaigns of "ethnic cleansing" against their former Muslim and Croat fellow citizens, attacks by Hindus against Sikhs and Muslims, and persistent rural-urban warfare in Cambodia. Georgie Anne Geyer has called this trend the "death of citizenship," a malady not unknown in the United States.

These two trends are interrelated, through their combined effects on the state. The end of the Cold War has produced a crisis for the old state system and its particular distribution of sovereignties. Old borders are coming down—producing integration—while new ones are being built—leading to fragmentation. The Institute for the Study of International Politics in Milan sums it up well in its annual report:

> It is true that economic and financial integration weakens (or, better, makes relative) the divisions between states, but rather than unifying the world this causes new divisions to arise....The extension of economic relations simultaneously guts both sides [of an existing state]. On the one hand it knocks down the division between states because it unites that which in their universe would be divided: citizens and foreigners. On the other hand, the fall of the outer division cancels exactly that element which permitted the internal divisions among groups (national, ethnic, or racial), living next to each other under the same rules, to remain unseen....The multiplication of economic relations not only increases the interconnection of peoples, but at the same time diminishes the political solidarity of each people.[9]

Several implications follow from these trends. One is that the powerful movements toward economic regionalism are also generating two equally powerful counterreactions: fears of the strongest partner and fears of being left out. Europeans fear German dominance, Latin Americans fear United States' dominance, Southeast Asians fear Japanese dominance. Even within some integrated markets, such as that being forged by ASEAN, there is a fear of "Indonesianization"—dominance by the largest partner. But the fear of being left out is equally strong. It lies at the heart of Australia's promotion of APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation) as against Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir's EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus). The latter would exclude the English-speaking nations, Australia and New Zealand as well as the United States and Canada, because NAFTA excludes Southeast Asian nations.

There is no way to know how this process of integration and fragmentation will resolve itself. The former superpowers have been reduced to armed impotence. The United States alone certainly does not have the resources to establish its own hegemonic order. The new political configuration of the world will probably not be known for decades. Meanwhile we are likely to see high levels of conflict because of weakened foundations for both domestic and international order. The world will also witness many attempts at reaggregation, in the form of movements toward political union (e.g., the Maastricht treaty), or cultural unity (e.g., the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran), or semi-imperial hegemony (e.g., "Greater China," or some sort of new Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere). Finally, global commerce will acquire the logic of war. This has always been true for the developmental states; it will now become true for all states. The most logical way to promote peace, stability, and continued prosperity under these conditions will be through some form of the balance of power.

Choices

IN A RECENT interview published in the house organ of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, former ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki commented, "I think that China will never be truly close to Japan even in the future." Even though Japan has been court-

[9]Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), *1992: The Illusory Peace* (Milan, 1992), pp. 13-14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing China in recent years with a soft stance on human rights, an imperial visit, and the full range of economic inducements, Okazaki is probably right. This means that a new version of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, even one not forged at the point of a bayonet but based on real prosperity, is not in the cards. China appears unwilling to become another goose in Japan's notion of the Asian economies flying in formation behind Japan, the lead goose. Equally important, barring extensive institutional reform and rejuvenation of its political system, Japan is not truly capable of offering leadership in Asia, even if China acquiesced.

Donald Hellmann argues that "Japan's affluence is accompanied by a Midas-like incapacity for international leadership that is rooted in a reluctance and/or inability to define in a credible way a national purpose beyond narrow economic self-interest."[10] Kenneth Pyle suggests why this is so:

> Harmonizing Japanese institutions with international practice recalled U.S. Commerce Secretary Baldrige's assertion to the Japanese: 'You will have to change your culture.' The century-long pursuit of equality with the West had left its mark on all of Japan's institutions. They were designed to promote a uniform and disciplined national effort to achieve this goal. They were also designed to insulate Japan from direct foreign influence by foreign companies and individuals. To reform these institutions and practices would constitute a challenge to central features of Japanese culture, social relations, and political structure.[11]

None of this means that China and Japan will not continue to enjoy a flourishing commerce, but there will also always be political tension between them. Could this be overcome through some form of collective security arrangement in which neither nation clearly took the lead? This, too, seems highly unlikely for various reasons. First of all, the very concept of collective security rests on dubious logic. In cases where it has been said to work, such as NATO in Europe, hegemonic and balance of power considerations operated beneath the rhetoric of collective security.

Equally important, East Asia has had almost no experience with what Richard Betts calls "integrative organizational forms," certainly nothing like the experience of Europe from the time of the Marshall Plan. Whereas virtually all American policies in postwar Europe were multilateral, in Asia they were normally bilateral and did not contribute to a web of relationships that might persist once the Americans are gone. Interestingly enough, the Clinton administration seems prepared to propose a "Pan-Asian Security Organization" to the ASEAN sub-ministerial conference in May 1993 in Singapore. This would apparently be modeled on the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and appears to be in answer to Japan's calls over the past two years for an Asian security "dialogue."

However, there is no consensus in Asia on norms, or on what a supranational order in the region should look like. In ASEAN, for example, nations close to Vietnam, such as Thailand, favor cultivating China as a counterweight, whereas those further away, such as Indonesia, favor cultivating Vietnam as an obstacle to Chinese influence. Where nations cannot agree on who constitutes a threat, collective security is unlikely to work.

The remaining security alternatives all hinge on the role of the United States. Richard Ellings and Edward Olsen consider three scenarios.[12] The first they call a "new multilateral constabulary," which turns out to be not multilateral at all but a continuation of the current

---

[10]Donald C. Hellmann, "Japan and America: Through an International Looking Glass," unpublished paper, c. 1992, p. 13.

[11]Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era* (Washington, 1992), pp. 81-83.

[12]Richard J. Ellings and Edward A. Olsen, "A New Pacific Profile," *Foreign Policy*, No. 89 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 116-36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Japanese-American Security Treaty. One of its main purposes, in fact, would be not so much security *cooperation* with Japan as continued American engagement with Japan in order to see that Japan does not rearm, continues to transfer military technology to the U.S., and contributes to security in an acceptable way. The intent is to perpetuate the American role in the Pacific much as it was during the Cold War but with some slight savings in American costs. Whether it would be acceptable to Japanese public opinion, to the other nations of the region, and to the American public are all open questions. Its greatest weakness is that it perpetuates the American military's artificial separation between the military and economic aspects of security and leaves the United States in the untenable position of defending nations to whom it is simultaneously going into debt.

The second Ellings and Olsen Asian security alternative is a complete American withdrawal from the region. This could be justified on grounds that the area is sufficiently stable to do without an American presence; and the logic of the Cold War, never very well formulated for the Pacific in any case, no longer applies. The main issue that destabilized the region and gave communists an opening was the dismantling of colonial empires. That issue is now history, and new problems that might develop—caused by the integration and fragmentation that the end of the Cold War has unleashed—are not solvable by the United States.

The objection to U.S. withdrawal is precisely that America's security threats have become economic and technological; if the U.S. is not totally to lose control over its own national security, it must regain its economic competitiveness, and in order to do so, it must remain active in the world's economic center of gravity. Thus, it is argued that the U.S. should use its unique ability to project military power to influence events in Asia, and that to withdraw from the area would, through evolutionary economic changes, pose the greatest possible threat to its own security.

The third Ellings and Olsen alternative is a balance of power, with the United States cast in the part of "engaged balancer," somewhat like the role Britain played in the nineteenth century. Under such a policy the United States would be committed not to any particular Asian nation or subregion, but to ensuring that no single power could achieve hegemony. It would exert influence primarily though its good offices, but would have the capacity to use force in cooperation with other nations when necessary. Normally this force would not be based in the region but would be of the sort supplied by a carrier task force.

Commentators differ on the elements in such a balance of power. Ellings and Olsen see the major players as China, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States, but it seems to me that India and Russia will not have political influence until they have some economic clout. They are also among the states most affected by the twin post-Cold War trends of integration and fragmentation, and are likely to be internally preoccupied for a long time. Richard Betts has a similar conception, but sees the need for a balance only among China, Japan, Russia, and the United States.

My own conception is somewhat more complicated. I would seek a balance among China, Japan, and ASEAN, with the United States shifting its strength in order to achieve and maintain it, while supporting Korea and Vietnam as the two most important buffer states in East Asia. Such a policy would obviously require American recognition of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as soon as possible, greatly enhanced American attention to ASEAN, and a new commitment to the intrinsic, not just the derivative, importance of Korea in the Asian balance of power.

In all of these places the United States desperately needs new policies. In Vietnam the U.S. should participate along with Japan in the country's debut into high-growth capitalist Asia. The U.S. also needs to provide whatever external reassurances are appropriate to ease Vietnam's relations with, and possible membership of, ASEAN. With regard to ASEAN itself, the U.S. should offer it access to the American market at least equal to that enjoyed by Japan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and China. NAFTA need not be an obstacle to American-ASEAN relations, and it could evolve into an instrument for helping to ensure ASEAN's prosperity. The U.S. also needs to support the economic development of the Philippines, not for nostalgic reasons but to ensure that the Philippines is not dumped by foreign investors, and that it becomes a healthy member of ASEAN.

Korea requires particular attention. While it no longer needs American ground forces, it may require American assistance in managing unification with the north, including reassuring China, the power with the greatest stake in the Korean peninsula, that a unified Korea will not adversely affect it. The United States can help ensure that China's stake is recognized. China has always had trouble living with one Korea. Korea will also need financing to integrate the two economies, and the United States knows how to create the international syndicates that can supply this.

We can also help both Korea and ourselves in other ways. Korea needs to regain its economic dynamism. To do so it needs above all to achieve greater equality in its distribution of wealth. As the World Bank puts it,

> The perception that the economic gains of Korea's rapid growth have not been fairly enough distributed is...causing difficulties in the labor market, where workers are not merely trying to capture productivity gains in their wage settlements, but are also trying to appropriate a portion of the gains they feel have eluded them in the past.[13]

This is perfectly just. A more equitable distribution of wealth correlates directly with high rates of growth and savings, and is the main reform that Korea must undertake. Americans could help by joining in strategic alliances to produce new products and to fight against Japan's structural trade surpluses.

Korea's Minister for Science and Technology, Kim Jin Hyun, recently observed in a speech delivered in Washington:

> The United States and Korea...have much to offer each other through mutually beneficial cooperation. If the basic sciences and advanced high technologies of the United States are grafted onto the production and manufacturing technologies of Korea, it will make both of our countries competitive technologically as well as industrially. [This will lead] to balanced trade relations in the Asia-Pacific region, especially with Japan, which is the common challenge facing our two countries.

An American move to take up Minister Kim's proposals for technological cooperation would be an important signal to Japan, perhaps causing it to become more internationally responsible.

In 1955, not long after the U.S. occupation of Japan had ended, the Communists had defeated the Kuomintang in China, the Korean conflict had come to a halt, and the French had been driven from Indochina, Edwin O. Reischauer—then a professor at Harvard and later to become ambassador to Japan—published a book called *Wanted: An Asian Policy*. He did so, he wrote, because "We take a frantic interest in individual crises when they develop, but appear strangely indifferent to the basic ills that have caused them. Worse still, we are easily diverted from our problems in Asia to more trivial matters." Much the same could be said today. The costs of an American failure to change, either due to myopia or the influence of vested interests in the system as it presently exists, could be catastrophic. At the same time the possible benefits of a stable, developing Asia are as great today as they were in the decades after Reischauer wrote. □

---

[13]D. M. Leipziger et al., *The Distribution of Income and Wealth in Korea* (Washington, 1992), pp. xi-xii.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Clinton and Trade

Franklin L. Lavin

WHEN THE CLINTON administration arrived in office, it provoked concern in some quarters about the approach it would take toward trade, which in one sense is easy to understand. Rarely has a president assumed office with as little in the public record on trade policy as Bill Clinton. To compound this concern, the Clinton administration contains no experienced trade professionals in its senior trade-related positions. Both Trade Representative Mickey Kantor and Commerce Secretary Ron Brown are regarded as intelligent and capable, but neither has a trade background. As well, the arrival of the Democratic Party in office raises concerns in itself because many constituencies of the party, organized labor and various environmental groups among them, have been historically unsympathetic to trade liberalization or even openly protectionist.

While there are grounds for concern, and even some incipient dangers, there is also ground for optimism. First, there is Clinton himself. Clinton approaches trade issues as an economic rationalist from a left-of-center perspective. During the presidential campaign, he was careful to distance himself from his protectionist adversaries such as Nebraska Senator Bob Kerry. In fact, the time during the campaign that he addressed the issue of trade most comprehensively was when he endorsed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), albeit with some reservations.

Clinton has also selected advocates of liberalization for most of the key economic policy positions in his administration. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, National Economic Council Director Robert Rubin, and Labor Secretary Robert Reich all favor freer trade. The international policy institutions such as the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Defense Department also favor such moves. As it is unclear where the Trade Representative or the Commerce Department stand philosophically, opponents of liberalization will look primarily toward the Council of Economic Advisors for support.

So there is good news along with the bad. But there are two dangers. The first danger is that the Clinton administration will not have a coherent trade philosophy. The second danger is that it will.

The most apparent problem to date is an ad hoc, even incoherent, trade approach which is characterized by a lack of philosophical underpinning. Clinton calls for movement on liberalization, but says not so fast on NAFTA. One week the administration indicates it will retaliate against the EC because of its procurement policies. The next week it demurs. Clinton admonishes other countries not to subsidize industry sectors which they deem to be strategic but the same day he calls for the U.S. to support one of its key industry sectors. Clinton stated in the campaign that foreign airlines should not be allowed to invest significantly in U.S. airlines; now his Transportation

Franklin L. Lavin was deputy assistant secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1991-1993.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Department states that they should.

Kantor has shown an ability to convey unhappiness with Japan because it is unenthusiastic about opening its market and with Mexico because it is enthusiastic about opening its market. Is Kantor *simply* angry, the John Sununu of international trade, or is there a method to his madness? Most troubling, Mickey Kantor seems to take pride in the administration's incoherence, stating, "It does not matter what you are called or how you are labeled. It matters what we get done. The idea is not to engage in endless debate about whether someone is a free trader, a protectionist, a managed trader, or results-oriented."

Some of this reflects the fact that the Clinton campaign embraced a wide coalition, ranging from free trade technocrats to traditional Democratic constituencies, and the young administration has not yet been able to reconcile these diverse views. Some of these contradictions are to be expected with a new administration, but the cumulative impression is of an administration which perceives trade problems almost completely in terms of domestic constituencies, and is more interested in "fixing problems," i.e. helping these constituencies, than it is in helping open markets.

It is this conflict between specific constituency groups and the general goal of trade liberalization that is at the center of the Clinton administration's ambivalence. Although trade liberalization helps the economic welfare of the United States, there will inevitably be less efficient industries and workers that suffer from a trade opening. Clinton must be prepared to stand up to these constituencies in order to move his presidency ahead.

The lack of a coherent trade philosophy makes it difficult for both our trading partners and our business community. Our trading partners cannot fully evaluate our complaints and decide how accommodating they should be if they do not understand our overall goals. Is the administration posturing for a domestic audience? Does it think all trading partners should cease unfair trading practices with no reciprocal obligation from the United States? The difficulty for the U.S. business community is that in the absence of an established policy and approach to resolve trade disputes, any complaint appears as valid as any other. A business cannot estimate how the administration will deal with the complaint and there is an incentive to complain as loudly as possible, on the squeaky wheel theory.

Lurching Towards Intervention

THE SECOND, graver, danger of the Clinton administration is that, because of misguided economics or misguided politics, it may lurch towards a coherent policy: an interventionist trade approach. Laura Tyson, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, has emerged as the leading proponent of an interventionist policy trade within the administration. Although the term "interventionist" embraces several overlapping schools of thought—strategic trade, industrial policy, and results-oriented or managed trade, to name the more prominent—we can sum up some of the common elements.

In its simplest form, the argument for government intervention in trade matters stems from a belief in imperfections in the market, as well as a belief that government programs can compensate for these imperfections. Tyson contends the strategic behavior of certain exporters, made possible because of support from their governments, has allowed them to become successful. In manufacturing, for example, there are frequently increasing returns to scale. Therefore a producer who enters the market first and moves most rapidly to high-volume, low-cost production will dominate the market. So shouldn't governments help pick these winners? This could be done directly, though government support of an industry, or indirectly, by such techniques as funding research and development.

These "technology-based" trade theories first became popular in the 1960s when it appeared that trade patterns did not reflect what trade theory predicted would occur.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Modern ("Neoclassical") trade theory postulated that trade would tend to flourish between countries at different stages of development because those countries had different factors of production such as wage rates and levels of technology and would therefore enjoy different comparative advantages, or would excel at making different products. Yet trade statistics showed that trade tended to be greatest among the developed countries, which enjoyed relatively comparable levels of technology, education, wage levels, and so forth.

Innovation and consumer preferences explain most of this phenomena. As Tyson notes, innovating firms enjoy a temporary monopoly at home and can increase production and drive down costs. The likely export markets for these new products are countries with similar consumer preferences, i.e. those countries with similar populations. If this is the way international trade "works" why shouldn't the government jump in to help its companies be the first to introduce a new product? Why shouldn't Americans make the next compact disc player, rather than the Japanese? This approach complements Clinton's support for a domestic industrial policy, which would target certain industries as strategic (i.e. deserving of government largesse).

One can indeed cite historical instances of a government picking a winner, MITI being the most frequently used example. But in fact these examples do not prove that governments usually, or even frequently, picks winners. It simply proves that not every single pick has been a loser. The same MITI that was in Tyson's calculation helpful with semiconductors encouraged Honda to stay out of international trade and wasted millions of dollars on an outdated high-definition television (HDTV) technology.

If one looks at industrial policy or strategic trade over the long run, not just focusing on a few success stories, a more complicated picture emerges. Japan's current economic woes might be enough to give pause to the argument that the U.S. should model itself along Japanese lines. However, the country which has embraced strategic trade and industrial policy the most comprehensively in recent times is France. When the Mitterrand government came to power it launched an ambitious series of initiatives designed to promote French technology. Some, such as high-speed rail (TGV), achieved global recognition as a technological phenomenon. As an economic phenomenon, the TGV might deserved to be parked along the Concorde, for it is unclear if the economic benefits derived from the train will ever justify the funds spent to develop it. Additionally, its utility has been substantially eclipsed by the Swedish tilt-train which allows high-speeds over conventional railroad tracks. The Swedish train, in turn is facing stiff competition from a lower-tech Spanish train. After a decade of industrial policy, the French have the slowest-growing economy in the G-7. This year per capita GNP will slip behind Hong Kong's. But they do have some very fast trains.

This illustrates the main problem with strategic trade: Governments, like businesses, have imperfect knowledge, and their decision-making can be faulty. The extent of the problems will be greater with government employees, however, because relatively fewer of them will have actual business experience. Additionally, they will have to contend with the political biases inherent in government decision-making. Finally, because reward and punishment in government are so much more attenuated than in the private sector (government employees will not be "playing with their own money," nor will they see the stock market rapidly vote on their wisdom), the normal market constraints on behavior will not be present. The U.S. government *might* help invent the next compact disc player, but it also *might* help invent the next eight-track tape player or quadraphonic stereo.

The other major problem with strategic trade is the opportunity cost. To the extent the Clinton administration favors certain industries, it is discriminating against all other sectors. As it devotes funds and technology to certain industries, it makes those resources that much harder to obtain for other industries. The seemingly anomalous position of France

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

having both interesting technological achievements along with flat economic performance is actually a predictable pattern. Instead of looking at ways to get all American businesses moving again, to lower the cost of capital, to decrease business regulation, to make it easier to employ people and make a profit, the Clinton administration is adopting domestic policies that make doing business—any business—more difficult, and then will bestow favors upon a few select sectors. On one hand, the administration wants to make the United States the leader in "data highways" by funding research and development and perhaps other support for the industry. On the other hand, the administration refuses to deregulate the industry so that existing telecommunication companies can undertake the initiatives they would like. Indeed, the administration could establish a first for America, simultaneously adopting both an industrial policy and an anti-industrial policy.

A variation of the interventionist school is the national welfare argument, that the United States "needs" a high technology base, and unless the government intervenes, we will lose it. These arguments sound eerily like the ones of a decade or two ago that because we "need" our heavy industry such as steel and automobiles, government subsidies or protection are necessary. Interestingly, it was only as the government reduced its intervention in the auto and steel sectors that those industries began to thrive again. Auto and steel both went through an at-times wrenching modernization in the 1980s. Now they are not only internationally competitive but by many indicators they lead their fields. Our unit labor cost in steel, for example, is currently less expensive than Japan's. Meanwhile, Mercedes and BMW are each establishing U.S. manufacturing facilities, joining the many Japanese plants already in operation. So the best way to help a sector, be it manufacturing or high tech, is to force it to be internationally competitive.

The most severe interventionism is that of the managed-trade or results-oriented school, in which the end is not a fair, reciprocal, transparent trading system, but a predetermined market share. In contrast to the normal U.S. goal in negotiations of a "level playing field," the goal of results-oriented trade is a demand of guaranteed touchdowns per quarter. Instead of insisting that we must be allowed to compete fairly, we insist that we must win, be it fair or unfair. It is interesting to contemplate the foreign policy consequences if the United States transforms itself from the world's leading exporter to the world's leading trade bully. Our trade policy would be reduced to saying: we want a certain share of your market, not because your rules are necessarily unfair, nor because our products are necessarily better, but because we are a powerful country and we can get away with this type of show of force. The Clinton administration might call it managed trade, but the world will see its true nature: managed extortion. In fairness to the Clinton administration, the Bush administration dabbled in this area once or twice, but never adopted it as a general policy goal.

Beyond the political and moral dimensions of such a policy is the practical objection to intervention: it will undermine the market-based rules of international trade of which the United States is the prime beneficiary. Instead of international markets being determined by the desirability of the product, the competitiveness of the price, the creativity of the entrepreneur, the convenience and certitude of sales and service, and the appropriateness of the financing, the market will be determined by GS-14s in Washington. One result of this policy would be to encourage the U.S. business community to give up the fight for market share abroad. Why work to earn a share of the market when one can more easily get the U.S. government to demand the share? Indeed, a successful foreign sales effort could hurt the company's ability to complain. Companies would be better off shrinking their sales force and hiring lobbyists in Washington.

This gets us to the central paradox of trade policy: Although political leadership around the world and economists of almost every stripe agree that trade liberalization is benefi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cial to the participants, countries only move to more open markets after enormous time and difficulty. Protectionism retains a substantial, if latent, populist appeal. Although protectionism rarely gets votes, it frequently gets applause. Additionally, domestic interest groups frequently attempt to frustrate moves to liberalize or demand additional protection. In the United States, it is usually the executive branch, with its national constituency that favors liberalization, while the legislative branch, with local constituencies, hosts bastions of protectionism. Thus it typically requires sustained and determined leadership from the president to move forward on trade. This is Clinton's dilemma. Will he deploy the political capital necessary to move ahead on this issue?

Trade policy is like bicycle riding. Either we continue to move ahead or we fall off. Trade openings result in substantial, but diffuse, benefits for the nation, along with minimum, but more acute, pain for the inefficient sectors. Because the benefits are diffuse, rarely does one particular group feel motivated to work for liberalization. On the other hand, as small as the pain of liberalization is, because it is concentrated among a handful of people, there is always a ready-made constituency to oppose liberalization. Clinton will have to be willing to take on these small groups to advance the national interest. In fact, the willingness to incur criticism to do what is right is frequently called statesmanship, and as gifted as Clinton is, it is not yet clear that he possesses this quality.

NAFTA and GATT

THE ABOVE points offer some guidelines as to types of policies Clinton should attempt to avoid. But this still leaves the questions: What should the Clinton administration do? Are there any beneficial areas of government activity in trade policy, or should we pursue a strictly passive approach, hoping that over time other counties also see the benefits in moving to a more open trading system? Are there any times when intervention makes sense, or should we do nothing against even the most egregious acts of foul play in other countries?

Before Clinton can fully establish his own policy, he will have to come to terms with two cornerstone trade matters left to him by the Bush administration, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Though not by design, George Bush left Bill Clinton two presents when he left office: NAFTA and GATT, potentially the two most valuable trade agreements into which the United States has ever entered. *The Economist* puts the value of the current GATT agreement at $100 billion a year for the world's economy. The Institute for International Economics has appraised NAFTA as worth some $15 billion annually for the U.S.

When Clinton took office, the NAFTA Treaty had been literally signed, sealed, and delivered, with a 2,000 page text agreed upon. GATT was agreed to only in outline form, but the U.S. and the EC had finally hammered out a compromise on the most controversial aspect of the Round: agriculture. The Round was perhaps only months away from being finished. Clinton took office in the enviable position of being able to wrap up the two agreements in short order, demonstrate foreign policy leadership, provide a shot in the arm for the U.S. economy, and clear the decks to pursue future trade agreements as he saw fit. Now five months after taking office, Clinton is farther away from consummating either agreement than he was on January 20.

When he publicly endorsed NAFTA during the presidential campaign, Clinton called for unspecified "side agreements" on labor and environmental issues. If he needed to refine the NAFTA agreement because of campaign promises, fine, but he is letting refinement turn into a delay. This ambivalence illustrates Clinton's approach to trade: a general belief, or a claim to believe, in liberalization in recognition of the economic benefits, but an unwillingness to take on political constituencies in his party. (To his credit, Labor Secretary Reich forcefully

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defended NAFTA in his address to the AFL-CIO, the most powerful group opposed to the treaty.)

Although Clinton is moving ahead with NAFTA ratification this year, he appears to be doing it in such a way as to dissipate much of the benefit he would have accrued from moving quickly on the issue. Rather than displaying leadership on trade, Clinton continues to attempt to accommodate domestic interest groups, some of which are purely protectionist and want to see the agreement undermined. Worse, the attempts at accommodation can be self-perpetuating. As opponents of NAFTA see that Clinton is willing to make deals, they simply increase their demands. Beyond the bilateral benefits, Clinton has foregone an easy opportunity to display foreign policy leadership, send a positive message to Latin America, and show the Europeans that he means business on trade issues. Want the EC to improve its offer at the GATT talks? Sign an agreement with Mexico, talk about signing follow-on agreements with other countries, and the EC will see that time is not on their side. OMB Director Leon Panetta's statement in April that NAFTA was dead might turn out to be a blessing in disguise, provoking its supporters into action. Clinton needs to assert his authority and tell the interest groups that oppose NAFTA they will get so much, but no more. He needs to get Democratic Congressional rank-and-file behind him by making this a litmus test of party loyalty. If he can punish Democratic members of Congress over wayward votes, he can certainly raise this prospect again with support of NAFTA. Finally, Clinton will need to directly take on NAFTA opponents such as Ross Perot. (Why not tackle the issue in Perot's home state of Texas where NAFTA enjoys overwhelming support?)

On an encouraging note, Clinton told Mexican President Carlos Salinas when they met in December 1992 not only that he wanted to move ahead with NAFTA, but that he also endorsed Bush's proposal to extend NAFTA south of the border once the pact with Mexico was ratified, so that eventually free trade would encompass the entire hemisphere. Thus NAFTA, which covers three countries and approximately 30 percent of world GNP could well embrace three dozen countries and one third of world GNP by 1996. It is unclear how much importance should be attached to Clinton's discussion with Salinas, but it is worth noting that, to their credit, Mickey Kantor and Treasury Undersecretary Larry Summers have also discussed expanding NAFTA across Latin America and into the Pacific.[1] To a far more serious degree than with NAFTA, the new administration faces a number of bureaucratic and political impediments to moving on GATT in the near future. Simply familiarizing itself with the issues involved is no small order for an agreement involving 108 countries and all manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Merely to get up to speed on the negotiations and to consult with industry groups and Congress takes several months.

Second, as a new President who had campaigned by stating he could do more on trade than Bush, Clinton will be under pressure to produce an agreement which represents an "improvement" over the Bush version. For if all Clinton does is dock the ship of which Bush had been the captain, then what is the need of the Clinton presidency? Hence the Clinton team attempt to renegotiate parts of the agree-

[1]Clinton could define his own approach to trade and promote market opening by promoting Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a 15-member organization formed in 1989. APEC—which includes Japan, China, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, and other growing Asian countries as well as Canada, Australia and the United States—has accomplished little so far because of the diversity and conflicting interests of its members. Rather than allow APEC to be merely a smaller version of the OECD, the Clinton administration could encourage progress toward trade liberalization by promoting nondiscriminatory trade pacts among groups of APEC members even in the absence of unanimity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment, over the strenuous objections of the Europeans.[2] It will take several additional months to probe for concessions and experiment with different threats and compromises.

Third, it is always difficult to bring negotiations to closure with GATT because (a) an agreement can always be improved and (b) there is no firm time constraint. The first point implies that unless the agreement is perfect, there will always be an aggrieved industry which ranks as the most serious unaddressed problem. Particularly if the administration's approach is driven by the complaints of interest groups rather than a philosophical approach, there will be a temptation for the Clinton administration to spend forty-eight months always improving the agreement, but never consummating it. For better or worse, the Reagan and Bush administrations focused pointedly on agriculture, so that at least there was recognition among industry groups, the media, and Congress, that if an acceptable accord were reached in that sector, the U.S. would go ahead with the entire package. From an economic sense, that very well might not have been the best sector to have picked, but from a political standpoint, it was very helpful because it allowed a broad consensus to form in support of the administration as the agricultural terms were met.

This lack of a firm time constraint is nefarious as well. If you are quiet for a moment you can almost hear an aide in the West Wing arguing, "Bush had four years with GATT and never got any place with it. What's wrong with taking a year or two to see what we can do?" That type of logic is as seductive as it is erroneous. Whatever George Bush's shortcomings might be, it is difficult to see Bill Clinton establishing a better rapport with European leadership. However gifted an attorney Mickey Kantor might be, it is difficult to envision him as a more effective negotiator on this issue than Carla Hills. Whatever marginal gains Clinton might achieve by reopening the agreement, it is unlikely they will be as valuable to the U.S. as having consummated the original agreement this spring. One Democratic friend likened the administration's strategy of delaying and renegotiating GATT to a self-defeating tactic sometimes adopted by labor unions during a strike. The union might gain a marginal increase in their wages because of the strike, but the increase never compensates for wages foregone because of lost work days.

The final package will look substantially like the current package, with the main difference being that the agreement will be in Clinton's handwriting and not Bush's. Will it be better than the Bush package? Perhaps. Will it have been worth the delay, when the meter is running at $100 billion a year? Doubtful. And we will only be able to complete the Round in 1994 if we assume Europe's position does not deteriorate as the U.S. comes to terms with the above issues. With Italy's instability, John Major's unpopularity, the arrival of a more protectionist government in France, and a stalled economy in Germany, this assumption might be over-optimistic. Clinton needs to take a long, hard look at what's on the table, with an eye to wrapping up GATT as soon as possible.

The Ultimate Weapon

OVER THE NEXT twelve months, NAFTA will be ratified, and GATT will either be ratified or dead. This will give the Clinton administration broad flexibility in its approach to tackling trade issues. Clinton will no longer be painting by numbers to Bush's design, but he will have his own canvas and the opportunity to paint

[2]U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor has publicly insisted "that the Clinton administration will seek major changes in a draft Uruguay Round agreement in the areas of antidumping, subsidies, intellectual property, dispute resolution, and the creation of a Multilateral Trade Organization" *Inside U.S. Trade*, March 5, 1993.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. trade policy in any style he chooses.

U.S. trade policy is currently a mosaic of thousands of laws, regulations, and practices that range from regulating dual-use material to surge protection for imports. But there are a few major elements. First, we have used purely protectionist quotas and "voluntary restraint agreements" which limit imports, most significantly in the textile, steel, auto, and agricultural sectors. Second, the U.S. employs export subsidies, theoretically designed only to keep our exports to third countries competitive with the subsidized products of other exporting countries. Export subsidies are confined almost entirely to agricultural products. Third, there are anti-dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) laws designed to allow the U.S. to counter unfair efforts on foreign exporters to enter the U.S. market. Finally are "market-opening" mechanisms that allow the U.S. to unilaterally impose sanctions on other countries' exports if we deem them to engage in unfair trade practices. These procedures are generally referred to by the section of the Trade Act of 1988 under which they were established, Special 301 or Super 301.

The purely protectionist elements of our trade policy have no economic justification. They cost U.S. consumers and businesses directly, and indirectly they make our industries less competitive by adding to production costs. However, other aspects of our trade policy have a certain justification, and if employed intelligently can result in more open markets.

For example, U.S. export subsidies are costly and distort world trade, but they are an effective mechanism in convincing the European Community to do away with its export subsidies. We are, in effect, in an arms race with the EC, telling them that we are prepared to put as much money as they are into export subsidies to destroy any value those subsidies might have for European farmers. The challenge for the U.S. is to maintain integrity in its export subsidies, by only applying them to counter-balance other countries' subsidies, and not simply to garner an unfair and costly advantage for our agriculture.

The AD/CVD measures are similar to export subsidies in that they are designed to counter other countries' unfair trade practices. The argument is made that the U.S. should not be concerned if a foreign country wants to subsidize an export to our markets as U.S. consumers would be the beneficiaries. This might be a tolerable, even desirable, short-term phenomena, but the long-term effects would be pernicious. If the U.S. abolished its AD/CVD measures, it would be an inducement to foreign exporters to seek whatever subsidies they could, and a bidding war would open up for the lucrative U.S. market. No "honest"—unsubsidized—business could succeed, be it foreign or domestic. As with export subsidies, the challenge with AD/CVD policy is to maintain its integrity and ensure it does not become protectionism in disguise.

The most controversial trade tool the U.S. possesses is one which no other country in the world has: the ability to improve or degrade other country's access to the U.S. market. All countries can employ sanctions, of course, but no other country has the market the size of the U.S., giving Bill Clinton a powerful weapon. This is one reason why Special and Super 301 are broadly unpopular with our trading partners: degradation or denial of market access can be painful. The other reasons the 301 provisions are unpopular is that they are unilateral and intrusive. They are premised on a U.S. determination that a country is imposing unfair barriers to trade, and they require the U.S. to retaliate by imposing sanctions if those barriers are not eliminated.

The argument against unilateralism per se is specious, because in most cases only the U.S. has the market size to make unilateral sanctions an effective tool of trade policy. So hostility to unilateralism is frequently disguised hostility to an aggressive U.S. trade policy. We should be reminded of the putatively philosophical complaints the Soviet Union voiced in the late 1970s about the neutron bomb, when only the U.S. had the capability to deploy the weapon. The criteria of policy evaluation should not be whether the U.S. is acting unilaterally or in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concert, but whether the U.S. actions are justified.

Retaliation is the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) of trade policy because when implemented it decreases U.S. economic welfare as well as the target country's, as it cuts U.S. businesses and consumers off from their preferred suppliers. As a result, it is usually inflationary, as costs are raised, and it disrupts the financial markets since it signals a move from trade friction to trade war. Retaliation can be effective in disrupting trade and inflicting economic hardship. Because of this, there can be a sharp political reaction and substantial media interest. However, it is less clear to what extent retaliation helps rectify the original problem.

Not only is there a central paradox in trade, there is a central paradox in trade retaliation. Although implementing barriers to trade will reduce America's and the world's economic welfare, threatening to do so can help trade negotiations and improve America's and the world's economic welfare. If moving to liberalize on its merits were sufficiently attractive, we would have all done so long ago. If the benefits of liberalization are not sufficient, we can at least raise the cost of not moving. The specter of retaliation can be a helpful part of the discussions, although it carries with it the risk that we might indeed have to retaliate.

Bush and Clinton have each recently employed the threat of retaliation successfully in dealing with the EC, Bush with oilseeds and Clinton with government procurement.

Retaliation is a particularly tempting tool for the United States because of the substantial size of our home market. Almost by definition, the countries with which we have the greatest trade problems tend to be those with which we have a substantial trade imbalance. For example, China is one of the most difficult markets in the world for U.S. exporters. Some 25 percent of China's exports go to the United States, but not even 2 percent of U.S. exports go to China. This asymmetry gives the U.S. a pronounced advantage in pursuing retaliation. China can always threaten counter-retaliation but it is difficult to see China having an appetite for a trade war given the enormous disparity in trade patterns.

Beyond decreasing national welfare, there is a second objection to retaliation: it often must be designed so that it punishes the innocents in the target country. If a country engages in unfair trade practices in a particular sector, it usually shows that the sector is inefficient and is not involved in international trade. Therefore, we can impede some products from the target country but frequently not from the industry sector in question. For example, if we are unhappy with Thailand's lack of intellectual property protection for U.S. pharmaceutical exports, we can only retaliate by blocking Thailand's exports to the U.S. of processed seafood and electronic components. Or if we have to retaliate against China, we would punish independent businesses in South China and Hong Kong, rather than bureaucrats and state-owned enterprises in Beijing.

A third concern with retaliation is that it can be merely a form of protectionism. Clinton's criticism of the U.S.' lack of high tariffs on Japanese minivans falls into this category. It is sometimes difficult to analyze why a particular U.S. product has not met with success in a foreign market. Is it because of indigenous consumer preferences? Mediocre U.S. business practices? Or unfair trade practices? The U.S. needs to ensure that it is only tackling legitimate issues if it targets someone for retaliation.

A fourth concern is that broader U.S. interests would be negatively affected if we engage in retaliation. So if we retaliate against Thailand, to continue the example, Thailand would be less inclined to work with us in the UN, or to be helpful in the Cambodian peace process. True, the facility of State Department desk officers in putting forward this argument regardless of the issue or the country would lead one to conclude that the only instance in which the State Department might consider retaliation would be if Iraq were to engage in unfair trade practices. As a country with global interests, the U.S. typically desires good politi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cal relations with our trading partners. There is always, in the abstract, some other issue in our bilateral relations which could hold trade issues hostage. We need to recognize that our trade partners cooperate with us on these other issues because they perceive such cooperation to be in their self-interest, independent of our trade relationship. Countries are unlikely to cease cooperation on an independent issue if they have already determined there is a particular reason to work with us. In general this argument that trade friction could pollute other bilateral issues does not hold up, but there is a related point.

Although trading partners are unlikely to let trade disputes affect unrelated policy decisions, we should realize that retaliation can result in political problems. Countries do not enjoy being threatened, so the prospect of retaliation can produce a sharp reaction. Local political leadership can find its position enhanced by rebuffing the U.S. and appealing to nationalist sentiment. Although retaliation will likely not lead to problems in other areas of bilateral relations, it can make it more difficult for a country to move our way on trade. Mickey Kantor will collide with this principle as he issues public ultimatums to Japan.

What conclusions can we draw about the use of retaliation? First, it works much better as a deterrent than in actual practice. We should be reminded of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on nuclear arms, which argued that although the use of nuclear arms was immoral, the use of nuclear arms as a deterrent was indeed moral. So the first rule of retaliation is: let the possibility of it happening register in negotiations, but be prudent about implementing it.

The second rule of retaliation is that because it is a clumsy and potentially counter-productive tool, the use should be highly selective and discrete. Clinton must be prepared to lose friends in the possibility that he might influence people. Retaliation should be used against only the most egregious violations, and we should be fully aware of the political repercussions. Again, the use of retaliation has parallels with the use of force. There should be clear goals to be met, a proportional use of sanctions, and means to allow the adversary to move our way without suffering domestic political repercussions.

The third rule of retaliation is that the threat will be more effective if put forward in conjunction with a positive alternative. A trade policy premised largely on punishment will not meet as positive a response as one premised on reward, with the regrettable possibility of punishment held in reserve. In the absence of such a policy, our use of retaliation will appear to be bullying and petty.

For example, an effective way of demonstrating to a protectionist country how harmful its policy is would be to liberalize with a third country. If the target country chooses the path of economic inefficiency by maintaining a protectionist policy, it would suffer the full cost of that inefficiency if remaining countries liberalize among themselves. Rather than trying to change the protectionist views of certain of our trading partners, the U.S. should move forward with those partners who already share its views.

Rather than engage in the frustrating and often fruitless exercise of lengthy negotiations with Japan over its many and intricate non-tariff barriers, why not just establish a free trade relationship with Taiwan? This would make Japan a less significant market for the U.S., but most importantly it would send a shock-wave through Japan's political leadership: work with the U.S. and enjoy the benefits, or maintain your barriers and become increasingly marginalized. Indeed, at least some of Japan's concern about NAFTA seems to be based on fears that as other countries move to increasingly open trading systems, Japan's protectionism will be more visible and more anachronistic.

One for All or One for Two?

THE PREFERRED mechanism for the United States to advance trade liberalization in the post-war era has been GATT, the institution founded in 1947 which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

now embraces 108 members. In seven negotiating rounds through 1985, GATT has been the system for providing a more open world trading system. However, the success of the GATT might carry with it the seeds of its own destruction. For as trade volume increases and virtually every trading nation has joined, the ability to move on subsequent liberalization has become increasingly difficult. GATT is premised on consensus, so progress is held prisoner by the slowest member. Round eight, the Uruguay Round, began in 1986 and will not reach agreement before 1994 at the earliest. This slow-down has caused some to question whether there are alternative mechanisms which the U.S. should explore.

With the advent of NAFTA and the follow-on hemispheric free trade, the U.S. could be well down an alternative road. But the Clinton administration has not yet articulated a policy. Should we pursue free trade agreements with Asian and East European countries as George Bush proposed last year? Should we help stabilize the Russian economy by pursuing a U.S.-Russia FTA? What about a NAFTA-EC-FTAs proposed last year by Margaret Thatcher?

These are all interesting alternatives to pursuing U.S. trade policy solely through the GATT, and they are all designed to foster free trade by augmenting NAFTA membership. That is, rather than liberalize as broadly as possible through the generally-inclusive GATT, liberalize as rapidly as possible through bilateral and regional arrangements. In its ideal form, this trade policy would allow us to pursue liberalization with any country which wants to move with us, with a few general operating principles. One, we should offer to open our markets on a reciprocal basis with any country that will grant us the same privilege. Two, any participating country would have these same privileges with all other participating countries. In other words, the U.S. would not be establishing a hub-and-spoke series of unconnected FTAs, but one large FTA. Three, the FTAs must be all-inclusive, involving manufactured goods, agricultural products, and services and embracing all tariff and non-tariff barriers.

This idea is more evolutionary than revolutionary. If Clinton is serious about hemispheric free trade, NAFTA would be expanded across Latin America to include some three dozen countries and almost one-third of the world's GNP. Not only would this get the world substantially along the path to free trade, but it would be a serious challenge to Japan and the EC to move with us, or risk losing out.

The ingredients are present for Clinton to make more progress on trade than any of his predecessors. If he defines his policy as purely negative, with his goal being punishment of countries with whom we have trade problems, he will meet with limited success. If he defines his policy as positive, to move as rapidly as possible to open markets around the world, he will not only do more good for U.S. trade policy, but he will probably have more constructive influence with the "problem countries" than if he followed the negative policy.

This would be U.S. world leadership in its finest tradition: global and far-sighted in its vision, based on a combination of enlightened self-interest and magnanimity. The attraction of trade policy is that if implemented wisely, it does not pit one country against another, but allows all to enjoy a higher standard of living.

This is a role the United States is uniquely suited to play, because only the United States has the economic weight to serve as the center of gravity of this global move to free trade. Of all the major industrial countries, only the United States has the orientation and belief in the future to tackle this challenge. The question is, do we have the political leadership? □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Vatican's Foreign Policy

James Kurth

THE MOST ANCIENT and enduring of European institutions is the Roman Catholic Church. For much of the past two millennia, it was a central presence that shaped and defined European life. For the past half-millennium or what we know as the modern age, it has been a target of all the great movements of European history—the Renaissance, the Reformation, the French Revolution, the industrial revolution, communism, and fascism. Through it all, the Catholic Church has endured, and at times even prevailed.

Now on the eve of the third millennium, Europe is entering into yet another era in its long history, brought about by the collapse of the Soviet empire and communism in Eastern Europe, by the disintegration of Yugoslavia, by the integration of the European Community, and, above all, by the reunion of the two half-Europes—Western and Eastern—for the first time in a half-century. In doing so, Europe once again is having great consequences for the rest of the world.

Recognizing these changes and the potential that they bring for even more changes in the future, Pope John Paul II in 1991 promulgated a new papal encyclical, *Centesimus Annus* (the title of the English-language edition is *On the Hundredth Anniversary*) which presented a distinctive Catholic conception of a just social order for the new Europe and the new world, and he has continued since to advance this conception on many occasions. Thus, the ancient Church addresses the new era, the premodern institution addresses the post-modern age. But the Catholic Church not only addresses the new era; it will again help to shape and define it too.

As the center of a transnational institution which will help shape the new, the Papacy will have significant consequences both for Europe and for the United States. But there will be different perceptions of these consequences on the two sides of the Atlantic. Europeans, who have been dealing with the Papacy for centuries, will more readily understand this new chapter in an old history. Americans, in contrast, have had almost no dealings with the Papacy in the course of their national history, and accordingly some misunderstandings are sure to arise.

A Legacy of Opposites

THE UNITED STATES is the most powerful actor in international affairs. The Roman Catholic Church is the oldest. They are the two most pervasive organizations in the world today. They are sure to connect, and on occasion to conflict.

It has always been exceptionally difficult for Americans to comprehend the nature of the Papacy. Both the Protestant origins and the contemporary liberalism of the United States have given rise to perspectives that are very different from those of the Catholic

James Kurth is a professor of political science at Swarthmore College.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Church, and from the Papacy that is its head. But beyond these familiar differences grounded in theology and ideology are differences grounded in international roles.

The Papacy's role in international affairs is shaped by three essential features:

(1) As the Vatican, it is a small state, indeed the smallest state in the world. (2) As the Holy See, it is the representative of a universal (i.e., catholic) church in a world of nation-states, of one faith composed of many nations. (3) As the Pontiff (*Pontifex Maximus*, or the Master Bridge-Builder), it is the bridge, the mediator, between the secular world and the spiritual one.

Each of these three essential features of the Papacy makes it extremely difficult for Americans to understand, for the United States is in a large measure the opposite in each of these aspects: (1) The United States is a superpower, indeed it is the most powerful state in the world. (2) The United States is one nation composed of many faiths. (3) The United States is an unusually secular society, with strict separation of church and state and with virtually no official recognition of the claims of the spiritual world.

Despite these differences in perspective, the United States and the Papacy clearly have had common interests in international politics, and there have been many points of convergence between their policies. The convergence was most pronounced in the 1980s, during the presidency of Ronald Reagan and the Papacy of John Paul II. The central axis of agreement, of course, lay in their common opposition to Marxism and especially to Soviet power.

During the first half-century after the Russian Revolution of 1917, the United States and the Catholic Church shared a common resistance to the expansion of Soviet power, but the emphasis and the timing varied. At some times—during the 1930s, the Second World War, and the late 1950s— the Catholic Church was more opposed to the Soviet Union than was the United States. At other times—for example, the 1960s—the United States was more opposed to the Soviets than was the Church.

During the last two decades, however, there was increasing convergence between the perspectives of the two. The 1970s were the period of greatest accommodation with Marxism on the part of both the United States (the policy of detente) and the Catholic Church (the rise of liberation theology). Conversely, the 1980s were the period of greatest resistance to Marxism on the part of both, with the most anti-Soviet president and the most anti-Soviet pope at least since the late 1940s.

With the decline of Marxism and the end of Soviet power, it is natural enough to think that we now live in an era defined by the almost-universal acceptance of American liberal ideals, including liberal capitalism, an era defined by the "end of history." But the disappearance of the Marxist and Soviet threat has also meant the disappearance of the central axis of convergence between the United States and the Catholic Church. We are likely to see a growing awareness of fundamental differences between the liberal and the Catholic ideals and between U.S. and papal foreign policies. This would represent not only the return of history; it would be something of a return of antiquity as well.

Transfigurations and Resurrections

FOR MUCH OF the past half-millennium, the history of Europe and especially Central Europe was defined by the grand alliance between the Catholic Church and the Habsburg monarchy. Together, these two great transnational institutions shaped the society, the culture, and the lifestyle of Central Europe into distinctive forms, sometimes summed up in the idea of *Mitteleuropa*. This half-millennium, which corresponds to the modern era, is often seen as the story of the rise of secular national states, whose prototypes were France and England, to be followed in the nineteenth century by Germany and Italy. Seen from the other side of the coin, however, it is the story of the decline of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two great transnational institutions, the Catholic Church and the Habsburg monarchy.

For the Habsburg monarchy, it was a decline that culminated in its destruction in 1918. For the Church, however, it has been a decline that has been punctuated by a long series of reforms and revivals, of transfigurations and resurrections, so that it remains a vital transnational institution even today.[1]

During much of this time, the Papacy had its own territorial domain, a small but still significant realm known as the Papal States. These stretched across central Italy and included the area around Rome and also Umbria, Emilia-Romagna, and the Marches (about 16,000 square miles in all).

The military protector of this realm was, of course, not the famous Swiss Guards but the Habsburg army. When this army was defeated, as in Napoleon's conquest of Italy in 1797 and Napoleon III's support of Italian unification in 1859, the Pope's territories were threatened with extinction. But for a decade from 1860 to 1870, Napoleon III himself became the military protector of the last remaining Papal State around Rome (in order to gain political support from French Catholics). When he in turn was defeated in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, the new Italian state annexed the Papal State, putting a decisive and complete end to the Pope's territorial domain. At the time, a great Church Council was being held in the Vatican (it would be known as Vatican I; Vatican II would be held in 1962-1965). It was this Council that declared the dogma of papal infallibility. Thus the moment of the total extinction of the Pope's temporal power coincided with that of the most extreme expansion of his spiritual claims.

Pope Pius IX retreated into the Vatican, never to leave it again (thus becoming known as "the prisoner of the Vatican"). The estrangement between the Roman Catholic Church and the secular (and usually liberal) Italian state was to last for almost sixty years. It was brought to an end in 1929 with a treaty and a concordat known as the Lateran Agreements. Concluded between Mussolini and Pope Pius XI, they established the Vatican State (all one-sixth square mile of it) as an independent state recognized by Italy and by international law.

Despite the Agreements, it was not long before the Catholic Church and the fascist regime were in dispute over a range of issues, especially over education in Catholic schools. But Italy was no longer the secular power that seemed to pose the greatest threat to the Church. That was now the power that had arisen out of the Russian Revolution.

Revolution and Holocaust

THE GREAT DIVIDE between the Catholic Church and the Russian state goes back almost a thousand years, to the Great Schism between the two halves of Christendom, Western and Eastern, Latin and Greek, Roman and Orthodox. Ever since, there have never been many Roman Catholics among the Russian people themselves. But the Russian Empire of the Czars, that "prison of nations," ruled tens of millions of Catholics in Poland and Lithuania. When that empire collapsed with the Russian Revolution and with the peace settlements after the First World War, Poland and Lithuania became independent. Thus, the new Soviet state contained almost no Catholics at all. It was clear, however, that any expansion of Soviet power toward the West would immediately bring millions of Catholics once again under the rule of a deeply anti-Catholic regime, one that this time was not only hostile to the Catholic faith but was militantly atheist as well.

Beyond this possibility of Soviet territorial expansion to the West, there was also the possibility of Soviet-supported communist revolutions in Europe, as had happened briefly in 1919 in Bavaria and Hungary, those two very Catholic countries. Of course, in the

[1]A comprehensive account is Eric O. Hanson, *The Catholic Church in World Politics* (Princeton, 1987).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1920s and 1930s, the Soviet Union for the most part withdrew from any significant efforts to encourage revolution in European countries; this was particularly the case after Stalin came to power and imposed the conception of "socialism in one country." During this period, the domestic threats to the Catholic Church came not from Communist parties but from Socialist ones (e.g., in Spain and France) or even from bourgeois parties with a long traditional of anti-clericalism (e.g., the Radicals in France).

Ironically, it was during the time of the greatest cooperation between the Soviet Union and liberal democratic parties, the period of the Popular Front (1935-1939), that the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to the Catholic Church. This was in the Spanish Civil War. Here the Spanish Communist Party, under the firm guidance of the Soviet Union, insured that the Spanish Republic continued to respect bourgeois property and norms. At the same time, however, the bourgeois and socialist parties in the Republic were relentlessly anti-clerical. In 1937, at the height of the Spanish conflict, Pope Pius XI promulgated a major encyclical which vigorously condemned communism (*Divini Redemptoris*; its English-language title was *Atheistic Communism*). This document articulated a coherent conception of the containment of communism, a decade before the famous article by George Kennan in *Foreign Affairs*, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct."

The Catholic Church was also threatened by the Nazi regime in Germany and even by the fascist regime in Italy. In 1937 Pius XI issued an encyclical condemning Nazism (*Mit Brennender Sorge* or *With Burning Concern*) and was about to issue one against fascism, when he died in 1939. The Papacy clearly judged each of those totalitarian movements to be grave threats to the ideals and the interests of the Church. Still, at the time, the Soviet Union and communism seemed to be the greatest threat. After all, both Nazi Germany and fascist Italy gave substantial military support to the Franco or pro-Catholic forces in Spain.

The successor to Pius XI was Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli, who became Pius XII. He was the papal Secretary of State and had spent years as the leading diplomat of the Holy See. Indeed, he saw one of his greatest achievements to have been the conclusion of a concordat between the Holy See and Germany, which had been opposed by many of the political parties in the Weimar Republic but which was quickly accepted in 1933 by the new Nazi regime. (From the perspective of the Vatican at the time, this was rather like the recently concluded concordat between the Holy See and Italy. That too had been opposed by many of the political parties during the liberal era in Italy, but was eventually concluded with the fascist regime.) Upon becoming Pope in 1939, Pius XII was immediately confronted with the outbreak of the Second World War and soon after with the mass murder of the Jews by the Nazis.

The response, or non-response, of Pius XII to the Holocaust is the greatest historical burden that the great and terrible events of the twentieth century have placed upon the Papacy. It has been an ongoing issue in Catholic-Jewish relations for three decades. The silence of the Pope at the time of the Holocaust appears either incomprehensible or all too comprehensible, in light of two millennia of hostility between Catholicism and Judaism. The issue is sharpened because it was the protests in 1941 of Catholic bishops in Germany itself that caused Hitler to halt the program of euthanasia: the single most effective case of opposition to a policy of the Nazi regime. In fact, the Vatican did make diplomatic protests against the persecution of Jews, as well as of other peoples. Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop boasted that he had a drawerful of such letters from the Papal Nuncio, which he had left unanswered. But Pius XII did not make public protests against the killing of the Jews. In part this was because he did not protest anything publicly, not even the Nazi killing of three million Polish Catholics. His reasoning was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not that of a moral prophet but of the career diplomat that he had been. As he told a group of Cardinals in June 1943:

> Every word which we have sent to the respective authorities about such matters and each of Our public pronouncements must be the object of long and thoughtful deliberation in the interests of the suffering peoples themselves, lest involuntarily their position should be made worse, more difficult and unbearable.[2]

The Christian Democracy Solution

THE SOVIET EXPANSION westward at the end of the Second World War amply confirmed the Papacy in its judgment of the Soviet Union and communism. The newly-installed Communist regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Lithuania (the latter annexed into the Soviet Union) ruthlessly and brutally persecuted the Catholic Church in these countries. In addition, there seemed to be a high probability in 1946-1948 that domestic communist parties would come to power by electoral means in several West European countries, including Italy, the territorial center of the Catholic Church itself. The specter of the Spanish Republic was haunting the Vatican. At this moment, there were obvious common interests between the Papacy and the United States in the containment of Soviet power and communist parties. And there were virtually no conflicting interests between them. It was true that there were rather different views of the Franco regime in Spain. But when the Eisenhower administration concluded a mutual defense treaty with Spain in 1953, even this difference between the Papacy and the United States disappeared.

The political form that best expressed the common interests, the grand alliance, between the Papacy and the United States was the Christian Democratic party. In the special conditions of post-war and Cold-War Western Europe, Christian Democracy appeared to be a perfect embodiment and a stable equilibrium of these common interests, although the Christian aspect was more important to the Papacy, and the Democratic aspect more important to the United States. The political institution of the Christian Democratic party seemed the ideal solution to the problem of how to bring stable democracy to countries which had large Catholic populations, which had only recently been receptive to fascist regimes (Italy, Germany, even France) and which now had large communist parties (Italy and France). The Truman administration gave substantial support to Christian Democratic parties, including covert financial aid to the Italian party in the crucial election of 1948. And indeed the Christian Democratic formula was a striking success in Italy and in West Germany, from 1948 until the early 1960s.

When the United States and the Papacy both became concerned in the mid-1950s about the growing threat of Marxism in Latin America, it appeared sensible to transport the Christian Democratic formula from Europe to that new continent. This was especially the case in regard to that Latin-American country whose political traditions were most in accord with liberal democracy and whose multi-party political system was quite similar to that of Italy, i.e., Chile. From the mid-1950s to 1970 and under the leadership of Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democratic party of Chile seemed to be a model not only for that country, but perhaps for other Latin American countries as well. The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations gave it substantial support, again including covert financial aid in the crucial election of 1964.

Christian Democracy was an unstable equilibrium, however. In West Germany, where only half the population was nominally

[2]Quoted in John S. Conway, "The Vatican, Germany and the Holocaust," unpublished paper, 1991; originally quoted in W. Bussmann, "Der Papst und die Diktatur," *Der Monat* (May 1963), p. 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Catholic, the party had to reach out to other groups for a wider political base. These became big business interests and middle-class Protestants. The Christian content of the party faded away, and it became largely a conservative, pro-business party like any other in Western Europe. In France, where roughly half the population had been anti-clerical since the French revolution, the Christian Democrats (known as the Popular Republican Movement or MRP) never became more than a minority party, and they disappeared into the ranks of the Gaullist party with the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958. In Italy, the Christian Democratic formula had its greatest and most enduring success, and the party has been the dominant party in the national government for forty-five years. Even here, however, the Christian Democrats have been simply the largest of the political parties in a multi-party system, ordinarily gaining 35-40 percent of the votes in national elections. By the early 1960s, this meant that they too needed to reach out to other groups or parties to provide support in parliamentary coalitions. This occurred in 1963 with the then-famous "opening to the Left," which was an opening to the Italian Socialist party, with its long-time anti-clerical traditions. Finally, in Latin America, with its underdeveloped economies and its military regimes, Christian Democratic parties were successful only in Chile (and there only briefly), Venezuela (the richest country in the region), and El Salvador (a melancholy success indeed).

In short, Christian Democracy fell between two stools. A Catholic (or Christian) party could not gain a majority of the votes in a democratic election. The voters who would be willing to cast their ballots according to their Catholic identity added up to no more than a third of the electorate in any country. Thus, the parties had to make compromises with non-Catholic groups and parties.

These compromises made the Christian Democratic parties more "democratic" and therefore more attractive to the United States. But they also made the parties less Christian and therefore less relevant to the Papacy, which saw the parties as very lukewarm vehicles of Catholic ideals and interests. Indeed, it is probably fair to say that, within the arena of democratic politics, the Papacy never has found a satisfactory replacement for the Christian Democratic parties as they existed from the late 1940s to the early 1960s. In the past three decades, the Catholic countries of Western Europe, which once contained both large Catholic parties and large Communist ones, have steadily moved away from both of these great political institutions and have conformed themselves more and more to the image of the liberal, secular United States.

The critical issues involving the Papacy and the United States during these three decades were found outside Western Europe.[3] The focus in the next sections will be on three areas: (1) Eastern Europe; (2) Latin America (with reference also to what might be called Latin Asia, i.e., the Philippines); (3) the United States itself.

The Polish Model

THE PAPACY OF John Paul II greatly reflects the experience of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland. For this Papacy, the model of a coherent and vigorous Church, supple and resilient in its resistance to secular powers, has been the Polish Church.

We earlier observed that it has always been difficult for Americans to comprehend the nature of the Papacy. Similarly, it has been difficult for them to comprehend the experience of Poland. Like the Vatican, Poland is in many ways the opposite of the United States. At the very time that the United States was gaining its independence in the 1780s, Poland was losing its independence in the famous Partitions. While Americans have hardly ever known foreign occupation (with the interest-

[3]A succinct overview of this period is J. Bryan Hehir, "Papal Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1990), pp. 26-48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing exception of the South during Reconstruction), Poles have hardly known anything else (the exceptions being the period 1919-1939 and the period since 1989).

The collapse of the Soviet bloc was in large part initiated by the Catholic Church in Poland and by a Catholic Pope from Poland. In Poland (as in Ireland), because of the long history of foreign occupation and persecution of both the Catholic Church and local nationalism, there has long been a greater unity between the hierarchy and the society than in most other Catholic countries. From 1945 to 1989, the national state was rejected as a foreign imposition, while the local branch of a universal church was accepted as the fullest embodiment of the national ideal. Conversely, the Polish nation was probably the most Catholic in the world, in a sense the fullest embodiment of the Catholic ideal. For several decades, the Polish Church has been the most perfect example of that "integral" Catholicism that was the Catholic project in Latin Europe (Spain, Portugal, and Italy) in the first half of the twentieth century.

The Polish hierarchy and John Paul II readily developed the conception that the real Poland was represented by the Catholic Church, social solidarity (expressed in the union Solidarity), and "civil society," while the communist state merely represented the formal, or even phony, Poland. In the peculiar conditions of a nation subjected to a foreign power, a transnational church could become the most authentic and dynamic national institution, more so than the national state itself. Thus over time, the civil society or real Poland relentlessly hollowed out the communist state or formal Poland, until in August 1989 the Polish regime became the first communist government to give up power to an anticommunist movement.

For a variety of reasons, the Polish Church is unique among the Catholic countries of Eastern Europe. The historical experience of Czechoslovakia and Hungary resulted in churches that were less robust and resilient in their resistance to the communist state. In both countries, the Catholic Church was identified for centuries with Habsburg rule. The Church was seen as especially alien in the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia, which by the late nineteenth century had a highly developed movement of secular nationalism. Still, even in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the Catholic Church was the most resilient of non-communist institutions.

What will be the role of the Church in the post-communist era? There have been efforts to establish Christian Democratic parties on the model of Italy, West Germany, and France in the post-war era after 1945, but these parties have not yet become strong and successful. Eastern Europe is still in a period of reaction to state socialism, of promotion of unregulated markets, and of a wild variety of political parties. It is likely, however, that the Catholic countries of Eastern, or now more accurately Central, Europe will eventually settle down to a system dominated by a strong conservative party and a strong labor party, like the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties of Western Europe, especially of Germany and Austria.

Catholic Social Teaching

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH and any allied political parties in Central Europe will be guided by what is known as Catholic social teaching. This has been articulated in a century-old tradition of papal encyclicals. The first encyclical on social questions, *Rerum Novarum* (whose English title is *The Condition of the Working Classes*), was promulgated in 1891 by Pope Leo XIII. It has been followed since then by a half-dozen comparable encyclicals, each focusing on the social questions of the time. They include *Quadragesimo Anno* (*Social Reconstruction*, 1931) by Pius XI, *Mater et Magistra* (*Christianity and Social Progress*, 1961) by John XXIII, and *Laborem Exercens* (*On Human Work*, 1981) by John Paul II. To commemorate this centennial and to direct the application of this Catholic social tradition to the new Europe and to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world, Pope John Paul II designated 1991 as the Year of Catholic Social Teaching, in which he promulgated the new encyclical on contemporary social questions, *Centesimus Annus* (*On the Hundredth Anniversary*).

The papal encyclicals and the social teaching of the Church have consistently criticized both socialism and liberal capitalism as incomplete and flawed ideologies. In their place, the Church advocates such conceptions as society's need to have both business organizations and labor unions, but also the "principle of the priority of labor over capital" ;the need for meaningful work and a "just wage" for the full development of the human person; and the need to limit state power to its proper role by the "principle of subsidiarity," which devolves power and responsibilities to intermediate institutions between the state and the individual.[4]

The most recent encyclical of John Paul II continues and expands on this tradition. *Centesimus Annus* celebrates the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989. But it also condemns two forms of capitalism, the "national security state" (such as existed in Latin America from the 1960s until the 1980s) and "consumer society" (such as exists in the United States and increasingly in Western Europe). Instead, the Pope praises "a democratic society inspired by social justice" (such as that pursued in much of Western Europe for most of the period since the Second World War). As John Paul sees it, such societies

> endeavour to preserve free market mechanisms, ensuring, by means of a stable currency and the harmony of social relations, the conditions for steady and healthy economic growth in which people through their own work can build a better future for themselves and their families. At the same time, these attempts try to avoid making market mechanisms the only point of reference for social life, and they tend to subject them to public control which upholds the principle of the common destination of material goods. In this context, an abundance of work opportunities, a solid system of social security and professional training, the freedom to join trade unions and the effective action of unions, the assistance provided in cases of unemployment, the opportunities for democratic participation in the life of society—all these are meant to deliver work from the mere condition of "a commodity," and to guarantee its dignity.[5]

The papal encyclicals and the social teaching of the Catholic Church will fit the economic needs and realities of the countries of Central Europe for many years to come. They could provide an intellectual order, political legitimation, and policy guidance to governments after the collapse of state socialism and out of the turmoil of liberal capitalism. Catholic social teaching helps to make Catholic capitalists more social in their economic activities, and it helps to make Social Democratic policies more acceptable to a Catholic population. The social teaching of the Papacy, which has provided a common denominator and ideological consensus for the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties of Germany and Austria, could do the same in the other nations of Central Europe in the immediate future. Obviously, this is most likely with the Papacy of John Paul II, the Pope from Central Europe. But it will probably be true under his successor as well.

It is thus the third nature of the Papacy, that of master bridge-builder, that could come to have the most importance for the United States. This is because it is this nature that

---

[4]A number of American Catholic writers, of whom Michael Novak is the most well-known, have sought to interpret the Pope's statements on the economy to be a defense of American-style liberal capitalism. This is a new version of an old phenomenon, in which American commentators appropriate—and oversimplify and misinterpret—European authors to serve immediate American purposes and to obscure complex European understandings.

[5]*On the Hundredth Anniversary* (Boston, 1991), pp. 28-29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

could come to have the most meaning and consequence for the peoples of Central Europe, that region which is so central in so many ways. They are peoples who for a half-century have been particularized, atomized, and pulverized and who now live among the ruins and ashes of extinguished secular faiths. What they now most seek are the builders of bridges—bridges between their occupations, classes, and nations; between their past, present, and future; and between their material, intellectual, and spiritual selves.

Latin America and Liberation Theology

THE VAST REALM of Latin America is of central importance to both the United States and the Papacy. Latin America is the foreign region of most long-standing U.S. influence and presence. In many instances a U. S. approach toward the world has been prefigured by an earlier U. S. approach toward Latin America. For example, the pattern of U. S. foreign economic relations with Latin America before the Second World War was generalized to other regions after the war, and the Rio Treaty of 1947 was recapitulated in the NATO Treaty of 1949. Thirty-five years later, President Reagan in 1983 stated that if the U.S. could not prevent a Marxist victory in El Salvador, it would lose credibility in every other part of the world, and the Reagan Doctrine of aid to anticommunist insurgents was first developed for the *Contras* in Nicaragua.

For the Papacy, Latin America is that region where there are more Catholics than anywhere else. Of the some 900 million Roman Catholics in the world, 370 million or not far from a half are in Latin America. (Europe contains 260 million, Asia 80 million, Africa 95 million, and North America 90 million.) With the relatively high Latin American birth rates, the weight of Latin America within the Catholic Church will continue to increase. Indeed, it might be said that there are three great geographical realms or pillars within the Catholic world—Europe, the United States, and Latin America—and that each makes its own distinctive contribution to the Church. Europe provides the tradition and the institution, the shepherd as it were; the United States provides the financial resources or the pasture; and Latin America provides most of the faithful or the flock.

In Latin America, the United States and the Papacy has each faced a double threat. Until the late 1980s, the United States confronted Soviet-supported Marxist movements but also the rather more subtle yet substantial threat of radical nationalism, which in the Latin-American context meant radical anti-Americanism. Marxism probably has disappeared for good, but radical nationalism almost surely will return, as it has many times before.

Similarly, the Vatican also confronted Soviet-supported Marxist movements, but it also confronted and continues to confront the more subtle and substantial threat of liberation theology and the "popular church," which in the Latin-American context often means opposition to the Vatican and to the institutional Church. Liberation theology poses a threat to the U.S. in regard to the capitalist economy, and it poses a threat to the Papacy in regard to the traditional hierarchy. In this vast realm of such importance to both the United States and to the Papacy, therefore, there can be points of convergence in perspectives and policies.

There are important differences, however. The U.S. ideal in Latin America is a series of countries which are liberal in their politics and capitalist in their economies. Current examples are the Menem government in Argentina and the Salinas government in Mexico. Indeed, since the mid-1980s Latin America has come closer to the U.S. ideal than ever before, even more than at the time of the Alliance for Progress, in the early 1960s.

The Vatican perspective is rather different. The Catholic Church is much closer to the people of Latin America than are the agencies of the U.S. government, be it the Peace Corps on the one hand or the CIA on the other. The social teachings of the Catholic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Church, most authoritatively expressed in the papal encyclicals, place little faith in *political* reforms by themselves. The Church has seen numerous times when liberal regimes have collapsed under the pressure of economic crises and social conflicts. This happened in many Latin-American countries from 1963 to 1973 (and in many European countries from 1922 to 1936). The Vatican ideal in Latin America would be a series of countries which undertake serious and sustained *social* reform, including major reform in the capitalist economy, with the reform under the guidance of the national conferences of Catholic bishops.

Overall, the papal analysis of the international political economy is from the perspective of the dependency theory developed by the Third World, rather than the neo-classical theory of the First World or the Marxist theory of what was once the Second World. Not long after the creation of dependency theory by Latin-American political-economists (often associated with ECLA, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America), Pope Paul VI incorporated many of its conceptions into his encyclical, *Populorum Progressio* (*The Development of Peoples*, 1967). This provided a sort of papal imprimatur to much of the radical economic program of liberation theology. Twenty years later, John Paul II continued these themes in his own encyclical on the international political economy, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (*Social Concerns*, 1987), in which the Pope critiqued the negative consequences of liberal capitalism for underdeveloped countries.

Underdevelopment is not just a feature of the Latin-American economies; it is also a feature of the Latin-American hierarchies. In this region especially, the Church confronts a condition in which there are a large number of (nominal) Catholics, but a small number of priests. The priestly mediation between the Papacy and the laity is too thin a reed on which to build a robust Church. Therefore the Church has turned to a new ecclesial form, *comunidades eclesiales de base* (literally ecclesial communities of the base, but often referred to in English as basic Christian communities). These are small groups of lay people who gather together to discuss the Bible and the ways in which their faith can apply to their lives.

Not surprisingly, a typical basic Christian community will be found at the base of the socio-economic pyramid, i.e., among the poor. In such communities, some parts of the Bible will be especially meaningful. These are Exodus and the prophetic books of the Old Testament and the gospels of the New Testament. The story of the Hebrews' deliverance from captivity in Egypt and the Sermon which Jesus delivered on the Mount are two central texts.

The basic Christian community is a place where a person's Catholic faith becomes enriched through discussion of the Scriptures and their application to one's life. As such, it is a place where the life of the Church is renewed. It is difficult to imagine an ecclesial form more appropriate to the conditions of Latin America and more conducive to revival of the Church in that region, or in the Third World more generally.

On the other hand, as the Bible and the history of the Church themselves suggest, in every ecclesial institution there is a tension between the spiritual and the temporal, the sacred and the profane, the universal and the particular. The organizational form of the basic Christian community, a Bible study group without priestly leadership, has much in common with Protestant conceptions. The Protestant Reformation, and the rise of new Protestant denominations within older Protestant churches, arose out of similar groups. The Vatican has thus been concerned that basic Christian communities might become the embryo of a new church, a "people's church," which breaks away from the authority of the hierarchy and from communion with Rome.

Similarly, the social teaching of the basic Christian community, with its focus on social justice, the deliverance of the poor, and the displacement of the rich, has much in common with Marxist ideals, and liberation theology has even more in common with Marxist

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ideology. The various communist revolutions arose out of similar ideas. Again, it is not surprising that the Vatican has been concerned that basic Christian communities combined with liberation theology might become the incubator or transition stage for the passage of the devout poor from Catholicism to Marxism.

The combination of theology and communities, then, has the potential for a new version of the Protestant Reformation, just as the combination of Marxist ideology and Leninist organizations until recently had the potential for a new version of the Russian Revolution. Indeed, at one time, there was even the potential for the conjunction of the two combinations, for the simultaneous existence within the same country of (1) basic Christian communities inspired by liberation theology becoming a people's church and (2) a Marxist-Leninist movement becoming a hostile revolutionary regime, i.e., the conjunction of the Protestant Reformation and the Russian Revolution. These were the great issues at stake in the little country of Nicaragua during the 1980s. The Papacy had an even greater interest than the United States in reducing the power of the Sandinista regime.

There remain some countries in Latin America where the Catholic Church has been largely untouched by the vitality of basic Christian communities and liberation theology, where the Church for many years has followed a path of accommodation with the powers-that-be. A prominent example is Argentina. Although such situations do not raise the world-historical issues that were posed in Nicaragua, they are not the preferred state of the Church from the perspective of the Papacy. Such churches can do little more than maintain a ritual Catholic presence in their locale. They can provide none of the resources (e.g., a vigorous community of the faithful, candidates for the priesthood, or material assets) which the Papacy needs to draw upon in order to meet its challenges in the 1990s and beyond.

From the Papal perspective, rather, the preferred state of the Church in Latin America is best represented in Brazil. In Brazil there is the most extensive and most experienced network of basic Christian communities in the world. There is a vigorous development and exposition of liberation theology (so much so that the Vatican had to take special measures to correct it). But there is also a strong and confident national conference of Catholic bishops, which has been distinguished by progressive social and political action, by inspiring and effective leadership (such as Bishop Dom Helder Camara), and by the maturity and experience that came from resistance to the authoritarian military regime that ruled from 1964 to 1984. Similar developments occurred in Chile under the Pinochet regime of 1973 to 1989.

The most dramatic example of effective Church leadership bringing an end to an authoritarian regime has not been in Latin America but in what might be called Latin Asia—the Philippines. The Philippines shares a number of features with countries in Latin America: The Spanish colonial past; the weighty American political influence and economic presence; a socio-economic system based upon extreme inequality and export agriculture; and under Ferdinand Marcos, a dictatorship very much in the mode of the *caudillos* of Latin America. Not surprisingly, the Catholic Church in the Philippines also has much in common with that in Latin America. There has developed an extensive network of basic Christian communities and a lively engagement in liberation theology, as well as a strong Catholic bishops conference under the leadership of Cardinal Jaime Sin.

A pastoral statement of the bishops conference after the election fraud of February 1986 carefully and systematically laid the groundwork for large-scale, wide-spread civil disobedience against the Marcos regime. The statement closely followed the principles of the Catholic theory of Just War (as articulated, for example, in the pastoral letter on nuclear war issued by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops in 1983) and extended these

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

principles into the arena of domestic conflict. As such, the statement developed a sort of prototypical theory of Just Revolution.

The cases of Brazil and the Philippines demonstrate that the Church can play an essential and constructive role in bringing about transition from a decaying authoritarian regime to a new democratic one. The United States and the Catholic Church, each in their own way, can influence crucial supporters of the old regime to make their great transition. The U.S. government will have its familiar points of access with the upper levels of the local military, but in itself this is unlikely to result in much more than a palace coup. It is the Church, with its closeness to the people, that can touch the hearts and change the minds of large numbers up and down the class and bureaucratic ladders. These include the ordinary citizens who can engage in non-violent demonstrations and the ordinary soldiers who can refuse to fire upon them.

The Critique of America

FOR MOST OF its history, particularly from 1867 to 1984, the United States did not have diplomatic relations with the Holy See. Indeed, during much of this period the United States and the Soviet Union were the only great powers without such relations. From time to time, a President would try to upgrade his "personal representative" to the Vatican to the level of a diplomatic official, but for many years, this was always prevented by a grand alliance of Protestant, Jewish, and liberal organizations who objected to "the establishment of a religion." In 1984, however, the Reagan administration at last effected the establishment of full diplomatic relations, at the level of an ambassador, with the Holy See. Secure in the support of evangelical Protestants on most other issues, President Reagan could at last transcend this ancient Catholic-Protestant dispute.

The Reagan administration had its own political reasons for establishing relations with the Vatican. During the Reagan years, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops promulgated pastoral letters on nuclear weapons (*The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response*, 1983) and the American economy (*Economic Justice for All: Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy*, 1986). These letters took policy positions that were in clear and coherent opposition to the policies of the Reagan administration (or indeed of any U.S. administration since 1945). The administration wanted the Pope to rein in the American bishops on these issues, and for a while it thought that this was possible, given the convergence of interests on other issues. This was a principal reason why it wanted a U. S. ambassador at the Vatican. In fact, however, the Pope's expressed positions on nuclear weapons (a series of strong public statements) and the capitalist economy (his encyclical, *On Human Work*, 1981) were much closer to the positions of the American bishops than to the positions of the U.S. government.

It is true that on the nuclear weapons issue, the Pope also had to take into account the positions of two other national conferences of Catholic bishops, those of West Germany and France. The West German and French Catholic bishops, like the Christian Democratic party and the West German and French governments, still insisted upon a strategy of nuclear deterrence. A decade later, however, the end of the Soviet threat means that at least the German bishops no longer see a necessity to support nuclear deterrence. The papal opposition to nuclear weapons is likely to deepen in the future.

In regard to the economic issue, the Pope's encyclical, *On Human Work*, offered an even more comprehensive critique of the capitalist world-view and a more comprehensive conception of an alternative Catholic economy than did the American bishops' letter. The most recent social encyclical, *On the Hundredth Anniversary*, continues this exposition of an alternative Catholic economy.

At first glance it might seem that the Clinton administration will issue in a new era

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of convergence between the foreign policies of the United States and the Vatican. The administration's plans to cut defense spending should reduce the differences over nuclear weapons, and its plans for economic recovery should reduce the differences over capitalist inequalities.

In fact, however, the Clinton administration has moved the points of contention between the United States and the Papacy to a sharper focus and a deeper level than anytime since at least the 1920s. For the Papacy, social and moral issues have always been more fundamental than military and economic ones, and it is on these issues, on abortion and sexuality, that the administration chose to make its first and most distinctive mark. The prospects then are for a deepening estrangement between the United States and the Papacy for a long time to come.

Into the Post-Modern Age

AT THE HEIGHT of the Second World War, Stalin made his famous and mocking jibe, "How many divisions has the Pope?" At the time, no one could have imagined that in less than a half-century the Pope, even with only his Swiss Guards, would have more divisions than the Soviet Union, which, since it had ceased to exist, would have no divisions at all.

At the height of the Cold War, thoughtful authors wrote that the great struggle between liberalism and communism and between the United States and the Soviet Union was likely to go on for centuries, like the earlier great struggle between Christianity and Islam and between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. At the time, no one could have imagined that in less than a quarter-century the prophets of liberalism would write about the end, not just of communism, but of history itself, and that the Soviet state would have expired after hardly more than the biblical human lifetime of three-score-years-and-ten.

From the perspective of the United States and its liberalism, the two great struggles against the totalitarian state—against Nazi Germany in the first half of the twentieth century and against the Soviet Union in the second half—have come to a triumphant end. From the longer perspective of the Papacy and its Catholicism, however, the view is rather different.

For more than two centuries, the Papacy has been engaged in a great struggle against the most modern products of the modern age, the ideas of the Enlightenment and the secular powers that have promoted and imposed them. The great struggle of the nineteenth century was against France and its protégé, Italy, against the liberal nation-state. The great struggle of the twentieth century was against the Soviet Union, which, by carrying state power to its totalitarian extreme, represented the idolatry of the state. It is possible that the great struggle of the twenty-first century will be with the United States, which, by carrying liberalism to its individualist extreme, represents the idolatry of the self.

The Popes have believed that the modern age and its Enlightenment are not the culmination of history, but rather only a phase in a great cycle of error, disaster, repentance, and wisdom. The fatal logic of the modern age will drive the world into the post-modern one, and this will be an age when the pre-modern Church and its faith that transcends all ages will have far more to say than will all of the modern states and ideologies combined. By grounding itself in the deepest yearnings and highest callings of the human spirit, the Papacy has survived—and in some measure defeated—revolutionary France, liberal Italy, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. Now, at the height of their liberal triumph, Americans might reflect that the Papacy might survive the United States as well. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Dark and Bloody Crossroads

Where Nationalism and Religion Meet

Gertrude Himmelfarb

IT WAS IN a freshman history course shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War that I was formally introduced to the concept of nationalism. The war, the professor informed us, was the last gasp of nationalism, nationalism in its death throes. Nationalism had been a nineteenth-century phenomenon, the romantic by-product of the nation-state in its prime. It had barely survived the first World War and the second would surely bring it to an end, together with those other obsolete institutions, the nation-state and capitalism. The professor, a scholar of much distinction, spoke with great authority, for he had personal as well as professional knowledge of his subject; as a recent German émigré, he had intimate, tragic experience of that anachronism known as nationalism.

This was my introduction, not only to nationalism but to the kind of cognitive dissonance—the discrepancy between reality and ideology—that only truly learned and clever people can achieve. At the end of the war, another eminent historian, E. H. Carr, having just witnessed the most violent assault by an aggressive nationalism turned back by the heroic efforts and sacrifices of a defensive nationalism, predicted the imminent demise of nationalism and of nationality itself. America, he explained, was not so much a nation as a "melting pot." The Soviet Union had demonstrated a "comprehensive Soviet allegiance" that overrode the multiplicity of its "component nations." In Asia the demand for self-determination might still be heard, though "more faintly and less confidently than of late." And small nations would survive, if they did, "only as an anomaly and an anachronism."[1] (Within a year of this prediction, India was an independent nation; the next year Pakistan followed suit; and the year after that the state of Israel was created.)

Recently, the argument has taken a new turn, for it is now not only the future of nationality that is denied but its past as well. Again, it testifies to a peculiarly intellectual perversity that this view should have been most forcibly expressed by an American at the very time that the United States was enthusiastically celebrating its bicentenary—and by a historian whose specialty is the history of another nation. It was in 1976 that Theodore Zeldin called upon his colleagues to liberate themselves from the "tyrannies" that had held them in bondage: chronology, causation, and collectivity—the last including the idea of the nation.[2] Six years later he repeated his call for liberation. "A national perspective cannot be

---

Gertrude Himmelfarb's most recent book is *Poverty and Compassion: The Moral Imagination of the Late Victorians* (Knopf, 1991). This essay will appear in her forthcoming volume of essays *On Looking Into the Abyss*.

[1] E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London, 1945), pp. 36-7.

[2] Theodore Zeldin, "Social History and Total History," *Journal of Social History*, 1976, 242-3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sustained in historical study much longer." There is and never was any such thing as "national identity" because nations are not, contrary to the common impression, distinct entities. "All our instincts tell us that there is something different between a German and an Italian, but then all our instincts tell us that the earth is flat."[3] (The first of these pronouncements appeared just before the publication of the second volume of Zeldin's highly acclaimed history of France, and the second at the same time as his next book, *The French*.)[4]

THIS IS THE new "problematic" of nationalism: the "demystification" and "demythicization" of nationalism, and thus of the nation itself. Nationalism, it is said, was fostered throughout the nineteenth century and until the present by a series of "cultural artifacts" which sustain the "imagined communities" that we call nations or nationalities. Benedict Anderson, who coined the now modish term "imagined communities," does not intend it in any invidious sense. The communities are imagined not because they are contrived or false, but rather because the members of any nation can not possibly know each other and therefore relate to each other in "the image of their communion."[5] Similarly, the "cultural artifacts" are not artificially "fabricated" but rather the "spontaneous distillation" of complex historical forces; thus they command "profound emotional legitimacy." (Some newer nationalities, to be sure, are "pirated" versions of the old ones, modeled on the old and therefore "imagined" in a mechanical, derivative way.[6])

Anderson's is a subtle and nuanced version of this theory. More often, it appears in a coarser form, which emphasizes the artificial, manufactured character of the artifacts that generate and sustain nationalism. At the same time that Anderson introduced the term "imagined communities," Eric Hobsbawm coined another that has become even more popular: "invented traditions." These traditions, as Hobsbawm describes them, are for the most part "conscious and deliberate" creations designed for ideological purposes, "exercises in social engineering" intended to create a continuity with the past that is "largely factitious."[7]

---

[3]Zeldin, review of Robert Blake, ed., *The English World*, in *The Times Literary Supplement*, Dec. 31, 1982, p. 1436. It is curious to find this idea echoed by Michael Oakeshott, who rejects nationality as an organizing principle in the writing of history on the ground that it reflects a "practical" or "present-minded" approach to the past. "We may be offered 'A History of France,' but only if its author has abandoned the engagement of an historian in favor of that of an ideologue or a mythologist shall we find in it an identity—*La Nation* or *La France*—to which the differences that compose the story are attributed."(*On History and Other Essays* [Oxford, 1983], p. 100). One wonders whether Oakeshott would have found "A History of England" quite so ideological or mythical.

[4]The title of Zeldin's first work, *France 1848-1945*, manages to include two of the "tyrannical" categories that he denounces: nationality and chronology.

[5]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983), pp. 13-15.

[6]Ibid., pp. 78, 123.

[7]Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 2-3, 13, 263. See also Raphael Samuel, ed., *Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity* (London, 1989), I, lx and passim; Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London, 1964), p. 168. In a later book, Gellner denies the artificial or fictitious nature of these "inventions." (*Nations and Nationalism* [Ithaca, 1983], p. 56.) Anderson and Hobsbawm coined the terms that popularized this idea of nationalism, but not the idea itself. Two years before their books appeared, a survey of recent literature on nationalism described the "artificial or manufactured character" of nineteenth-century nationalities as the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By now we have an abundant literature devoted to the myths, symbols, rituals, festivals, ceremonials, souvenirs, and other "inventions" meant to stimulate—and simulate—nationalist sentiments and sensibilities. The effect, if not the purpose, of all this is to "problematize" nationalism and "demystify" nationality—which is to say, to belittle nationalism and belie nationality. It is not surprising to find Hobsbawm, in his latest book on the subject, assure us that nationalism "is no longer a major vector of historical development," that it is of "declining historical significance."[8] This was written in 1990, at the very time that the dissolution of the Soviet empire was generating powerful nationalist movements, when the Middle East was experiencing even more nationalist turmoil than usual, and when the number of states in the United Nations was at an all time high, and threatening, every day, to become even higher.

Nationalism invites this kind of cognitive dissonance, not only among Marxists like Hobsbawm, who have a stake in the theory of the "withering away of the state" (and of the nation—the "workers of the world" have no nation), but also among liberals and some conservatives. Liberals find it difficult to credit the fact, and the force, of nationalism because it violates some of their most cherished assumptions: that people are rational individuals with universal interests and aspirations; that nations are nothing more than an aggregate of individuals; and that nationalism is irrational, parochial, and retrograde. (A neo-liberal version of this doctrine has the nation-state being superseded by a "civil society" dominated by individuals, groups, and communities responsive to local and particular rather than national concerns.)

Some conservatives are respectful of nationalism, on the Burkean principle that the nation is one of the "contracts" that bind together "those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are yet to be born." But other conservatives, of a libertarian disposition, are distrustful of nationalism, partly because of their hostility to the state, and partly because of their suspicion of any kind of ideology or zealotry. Moreover, both liberals and conservatives have good reason to will away nationalism, to prefer that it not exist. After the experience of Nazism and the more recent carnage in Yugoslavia, it is quite understandable that the benign forms of nationalism should be discredited together with the malign forms.

IF NATIONALISM INVITES this denial of reality, religion does still more, and for some of the same reasons—because it defies the Enlightenment principles of rationalism, universalism, secularism, materialism. I am speaking now of religion not as a private, personal belief—this the enlightened world can tolerate as an individual idiosyncrasy protected by the principle of liberty. What is less tolerable, in this view, is religion as an organized, institutional force that presumes to impinge on the public realm. Religion in this sense is taken to be as obsolete as nationalism itself. After all, it was more than two centuries ago that the *philosophes* assured us that the last priest would be strangled in the entrails of the last king. (Or was it the other way around?)

Yet here we are, in defiance of all expec-

"accepted approaches" to the subject. (Geoffrey Eley, "Nationalism and Social History," *Social History*, January 1981, p. 90.)

[8]Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 163, 170. Another prominent English radical recently announced, at the risk of "virtual excommunication" from his circle (the *New Left Review*), that nationalism in this historical period "may on the whole be preferable to what went before." (Tom Nairn, "Demonising Nationalism," *London Review of Books*, Feb. 25, 1993, p. 5.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tations, confronting a lethal combination of nationalism and religion—and not in one region but all over the globe. The "national question," which not only Marxists but most enlightened intellectuals (again, conservatives as well as liberals) had consigned to the ashcan of history, is threatening to become *the* question of the present and future. And the national question, it is also becoming obvious, is intimately associated with religion. How else are we to understand what is happening in the Middle East (and not only the Arab-Israeli conflict but religious conflicts within the Arab world), or in the former Soviet empire, or in what was once Greater India, or in Yugoslavia, or—let us not forget just because it is so tragically familiar—in Northern Ireland? These are the realities of our world, "the bloody crossroads" where nationalism and religion meet.[9]

These realities too have eluded most historians. If my German-refugee history professor, shortly after the outbreak of the war, could be so blithely dismissive of nationalism, it is no wonder that others have been equally dismissive—or rather oblivious—of the religious component in nationalism. There are major works on nationalism, by historians of great distinction (and again, by conservatives as well as liberals), which hardly mention religion as a significant factor in its history.[10] A recently published *Encyclopedia of Nationalism* has entries on "Cultural Nationalism," "Dynastic Nationalism," "Economic Nationalism," "Humanitarian Nationalism," "Integral Nationalism," even "Music and Nationalism," but nothing on "Religious Nationalism" or "Religion and Nationalism." (It does have "Nationalism as a Religion," but "religion" here is used metaphorically, to suggest the emotive nature of nationalism.)[11]

Even the apparent exceptions prove the rule. A recent work by Linda Colley has British (not merely English) nationalism forged in the crucible of war and religion—and war, more often than not, in the service

[9]Lionel Trilling spoke of "the dark and bloody crossroads where literature and politics meet." ("Reality in America" [1940], in *The Liberal Imagination* [New York, 1950], p. 11.)

[10]E.g., Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London, 1960); Kenneth Minogue, *Nationalism* (New York, 1967); J. L. Talmon, *The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution: The Origins of Ideological Polarisation in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1981); Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*. Anthony D. Smith criticizes the "functionalist" explanation of nationalism as "religion politicized" on the grounds that this is a simplistic view of religion itself. But he himself gives religion only an "indirect, ambiguous and reactive role" in nationalism. (*Theories of Nationalism* [London, 1983 (1st ed., 1971)], pp. 54, 57.) Eugene Kamenka, on the other hand, predicted, as early as 1973, the emergence of "primary tensions" in that country because of religious differences that took the form of national differences. (Kamenka, ed., *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea* [London, 1976 (1st ed., 1973)], p. 13.) See also Salo Wittmayer Baron, who quotes Leopold von Ranke's observation, in 1872, that "in most periods of world history nations were held together by religious ties alone." (Baron, *Modern Nationalism and Religion* [Freeport, New York, 1971 (1st ed., 1947)], p. 20.)

[11]Louis L. Snyder, *Encyclopedia of Nationalism* (New York 1990). In the pioneer work on the subject, Carlton J. H. Hayes laid down the classic typology of nationalism: humanitarian, Jacobin, traditional, liberal, integral, and economic. (*Essays on Nationalism* [New York, 1926].) The exclusion of religious nationalism by Hayes is all the more interesting because he himself was a prominent Catholic layman. He believed, however, that the Catholic Church, as the leading spiritual force in the world, was a powerful force against nationalism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of religion. It was Protestantism in the eighteenth century that made "the invention of Great Britain possible."[12] In the Victorian period the Empire was seen as proof of Britain's "providential destiny," testimony to its status as "the Protestant Israel." But that was then. Now, Colley concludes, with the decline of Protestantism as a vital part of British culture and the absence of any Catholic enemy in Europe—indeed, with Britain committed to the European Community—the identity of Britons and the sense of nationalism is in "doubt and disarray."[13] At this point, Colley joins most of her colleagues who find little religion and less nationalism in the world today. (Colley excludes Ireland from her book. Had she included it, she might have found more evidence of both nationalism and religion.)

Another notable exception is Conor Cruise O'Brien, who finds a surfeit of nationalism and religion in the contemporary world. Most of *God Land* deals with the history of nationalist *cum* religious sentiments, starting with the Bible and going through the Reformation, Puritan America, and the French Revolution. Only the last chapter, "God Land Now," deals with the present, and there O'Brien testifies both to the enduring power of religious nationalism (or nationalist religion) and to his distrust of most forms of it. In Latin America, nationalism and liberation theology merge to produce a "holy nationalism" comparable to that of the early Puritans, while in the United States nationalism hovers between the idea of a "holy nation," which still retains some sense (although a too feeble one) of a nation under God, and the more extreme form of "deified nation," which recognizes no being or law superior to itself. To a "professed agnostic" like himself, both of these are cause for alarm—although less alarming, O'Brien adds, than a nationalism entirely in the service of technology. His own preference is for a nationalism that incorporates the least zealous form of religion, a "chosen people" whose national pride is mitigated by humility before God—or, better yet, Abraham Lincoln's version, "this almost chosen people." "That 'almost'," O'Brien concludes, "is not the least precious part of your [the United States'] great heritage."[14]

THERE IS A good deal of justification for the neglect of religion in respect to the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century, which were overwhelmingly secular, indeed in some instances anti-religious, a conscious effort to displace religion, particularly the universalistic religion of Catholicism, as the primary allegiance of men. The nineteenth-century French historian Jules Michelet said that the idea of the nation arose to fill the "immeasurable abyss" left by the extinction of the idea of God." This was certainly true of the nationalism generated by the French Revolution in France itself (although perhaps not of the nationalism inspired in subject nations resisting the encroachments of the Napoleonic regime). It was true of Italian nationalism, which was a secularist revolt against the domination of the papacy as well as a nationalist revolt against the domination of Austria.

---

[12]Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation (1707-1837)* (New Haven, 1992), p. 54. The religious component in English nationalism is sometimes traced further back to the English Reformation, when Henry was declared to be the Supreme Head of the Church. One historian has gone so far as to say: "The birth of the English nation was not the birth of a nation; it was the birth of the nations, the birth of nationalism" (Liah Greenfeld *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* [Cambridge, Mass., 1992], p. 23). But this is a distinctly minority point of view. The more common view has nationalism originating in the French Revolution, thus giving it an entirely secular character.

[13]Colley, pp. 368-9, 374, and passim.

[14]Conor Cruise O'Brien, *God Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), pp. 39, 81, and passim.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

And it was true of Germany, where nationalism expressed itself in the union of Protestants and Catholics.

Even in Ireland in the nineteenth century, nationalism appealed to political rather than religious sentiments. The Young Irelanders, the Fenians of the mid-nineteenth century, were republicans and democrats more than Catholics, and the militant Home Rulers of the late-nineteenth century (including Parnell) were as often as not Protestants. By the early-twentieth century, however, the vision of a united, independent Ireland foundered on the reality of the Protestant-Catholic conflict, which led to the division of Ireland after the war—a solution that solved nothing and that continues to bedevil England and Ireland alike.

As in Ireland, so in other parts of the world, religion began to emerge, after the First World War and even more after the Second, as a prime mover of nationalism. Yet historians, sociologists, political scientists, even journalists have not been properly appreciative of this, partly because of their ideological predisposition against religion (their inability to take it seriously as a force in modernity), partly because of their professional blinders (their commitment to "scientific" explanations of "unscientific" phenomenon). For them nationalism, in so far as it persists contrary to all rational expectations, does so as the by-product of modernization.[15] And religion, in so far as it plays a part in nationalism, does so as a stratagem of social and political elites who are themselves secularists but use the rhetoric of religion to mobilize the populace and assure their allegiance. Even among the populace, one eminent sociologist finds little evidence of either religious or nationalist sentiments in "day-to-day life."[16] Another, after asserting that nationalism does not have "any very deep roots in the human psyche," goes on to exclaim upon the "fascinating relationship between the Reformation and nationalism." But the Reformation he has in mind has to do with "literacy and scripturalism," "priestless unitarianism," and "individualism"—a Reformation, in short, that is not so much religious as anti-clerical and secularist.[17]

This view of modernity is sophisticated and plausible. But it hardly does justice to the experiences of the last half century, let alone to more recent events: the Arab-Israeli wars and the Intifada that is war by other means, the bloody conflicts between Hindus and Muslims in India, the atrocities committed by Iraq against the Shiites and by the Serbs against the Muslims in Bosnia. We are appalled to hear of the Serbian policy of "ethnic cleansing." But that is a euphemism—not only the word "cleansing," but "ethnic." In this case (as in so many others), ethnic means nothing more or less than religious. It used to be said that language is the distinctive criterion of nationality. Yet Serbs, Croats, and Muslims share the same language. What they do not share is the same religion. And what we have been witnessing is simple, old-fashioned religious persecution.

MUCH HAS BEEN said of the "End of History" thesis, but perhaps not enough about one aspect of it that is all too typical of contemporary thinking. Francis Fukuyama has been criticized for the ease with which he dismisses nationalism as a significant force in history. But what has not been sufficiently recognized is that in dismissing nationalism, he also dismisses religion. In his original article, religion and nationalism

[15]A notable exception is Greenfeld who reverses the conventional formula, arguing that nationalism is not the product but the precondition of modernization (pp. 18-21 and passim.) Colley has nationalism predating modernization in its origins, but, like most historians, assumes a radical diminution of nationalism as modernization progresses (pp. 369, 374.)

[16]Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, vol. II, The Nation-State and Violence* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 73, 218.

[17]Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 34, 40, 142.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

appear as the two remaining "contradictions" in liberal society. These, we are assured, have no "universal significance," because nationalism persists only in the Third World or in "post-historical" parts of Europe like Northern Ireland, and religion is a problem only in the form of fundamentalism.[18]

His book elaborates upon this thesis. "The desire for recognition based on nationality or race," Fukuyama explains, "is not a rational one."[19] Nor, apparently, is the desire for recognition based on religion. For he goes on to draw a parallel between nationalism and religion. He reminds us of the religious wars of the sixteenth century, when Europe squandered its wealth in the cause of religious fanaticism. In reaction against that waste of resources and out of sheer economic self-interest, religion was finally "taught to be tolerant" and "relegated to the sphere of private life." Thus it came about that "*liberalism vanquished religion in Europe.*" The same will happen to nationalism. "Nationalism can be defanged and modernized like religion." And domesticated and privatized as well: "The French can continue to savor their wines and the Germans their sausages, but this will all be done within the sphere of private life alone."[20]

Fukuyama, like his mentor Hegel, takes the long view. In that long view, nationalism (like Nazism and the Holocaust) have no "universal significance." They are blips on the panorama of history, a history that has come to an end without the knowledge of its victims.

Lionel Trilling once wrote, of other historians who prided themselves on taking the "long view," that "'the long view' is the falsest historical view of all"; seen from a sufficient distance, "the corpse and hacked limbs are not so very terrible, and eventually they even begin to compose themselves into a 'meaningful pattern.'"[21] Those words were written forty years ago when many enlightened, sophisticated liberals were taking a "long view" of Nazism and communism, looking upon Nazism as an ugly but ephemeral excrescence on the face of history, and communism as an ideal marred by an unsightly but fortunately temporary blemish, rather like teen-age acne, that would disappear with maturity. Both of these anomalies, as liberals then thought them, have now been vanquished, after exacting a cost in death and suffering that defies calculation and even comprehension. But many of us have yet to come to terms with the larger, "universal" significance of these phenomena—not with Nazism and communism as such, but with the "liberal imagination" that could not see them for what they were, because it itself has so enlightened, rational, progressive, and ultimately narrow a view of human nature.

It is this view of human nature that makes it difficult to accept the fact that nationalism and religion, in one form or another, in one degree or another, for good and bad, will be with us for the foreseeable future. (Not, perhaps, until the end of history, but then some of us are too unimaginative

---

[18]Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, p. 14.

[19]Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, 1992), p. 201.

[20]Ibid., p. 271. Almost half-a-century ago, Hans Kohn drew a similar parallel between religion and nationalism. The religious wars and the Enlightenment, he wrote, led to the "depoliticization of religion," the severing of the connection between religion and the state and the retreat of religion into the individual conscience. A similar "depoliticization of nationality" is conceivable now. "It [nationality] may lose its connection with political organization, it may remain an intimate and moving sentiment. If and when that day arrives, however, the age of nationalism, in the sense in which it is considered here, will be past." (*The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background* [New York, 1944], pp. 23-4.)

[21]Lionel Trilling, "Tacitus Now" (1942), in *The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and Society*, p. 201.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to conceive of such an end.) And it is the same view of human nature that makes it difficult to distinguish the various degrees and forms of nationalism and to pass judgment upon them.

The liberal imagination was not always so constrained, at least in regard to nationalism. In the heyday of what has been called "liberal nationalism"—the nationalism of liberation rather than domination—the preeminent liberal, John Stuart Mill, made just such distinctions and judgments. Mill was a great champion of nationalism which he saw as the corollary of liberalism and democracy. "Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a *prima facie* case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed." But the desire for unity and independence could be satisfied only under specific conditions: the country had to be "ripe for free institutions"; there had to be no "geographical hindrances" to unity (as in Hungary, for example, where the different nationalities were so intermingled that they had to "reconcile themselves to living together under equal rights and laws"); and the people had to meet one "purely moral and social consideration"—they had to have attained a level of civilization that made it advantageous for them to be independent. The last criterion disqualified those "inferior and more backward" peoples (such as the Bretons and Basques, the Welsh and Scottish Highlanders) who live amidst "highly civilized and cultivated" peoples and who should be pleased to be absorbed into those higher nationalities.[22]

Mill's three points were later superseded by Wilson's Fourteen Points, and a qualified principle of nationality by an unqualified "right" of "self-determination." The result has been a catastrophic failure of political imagination and political candor—the ability to think and speak realistically about peoples and nations, about what they might desire and what they were capable of achieving, about their will and capacity for free institutions, above all, about that ultimate "moral and social consideration," their level of civilization. It is almost impossible today to speak of higher and lower civilizations, let alone of "inferior and more backward" peoples. It has even become difficult to speak candidly about the "free institutions" required of those aspiring to self-determination, institutions designed to assure religious toleration, minority representation, and respect for ethnic differences. Now that such conditions are more pertinent than ever—certainly far more than in Mill's time—we are more than ever inhibited about discussing them. We cannot say what has become so painfully obvious. Not all countries are disposed or committed to free institutions. Not all nationalities are worthy of respect and recognition. Not all peoples have a "right" to independence and self-determination. In the post-cold-war world, as before, there is no moral equivalence among nations—or among would-be nations.

THESE ARE THE paradoxical realities of our time. In an international world, nationalism is rife. And in a secular world, religion is alive and well—and not only the kind of religion that is denigrated as "fundamentalist," but the time-honored religions that continue to command intellectual respect as well as pious devotion. There is no point denying these realities and every reason to admit them, if only to be realistic in trying to meliorate and conciliate them in

[22]John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (Ev. ed., n.d. [1st ed., 1861]), pp. 360-4. On the Breton or Basque, Mill was devastatingly candid. How much better it was, Mill said, for him to be absorbed by a higher nationality than to "sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the interests of a humane, pacific, civil order.

Being realistic means respecting the power and passion of nationalism even as we try to mitigate its excesses. There is something pathetic in the attempt to counteract a virulent nationalism with a vapid internationalism, or to substitute an artificial, bureaucratic "European community" for historic, organic nationalities. Here we may take a lesson from the American Founders, who, confronted with a similar problem, sought a solution commensurate with the problem: "a republican remedy," as the *Federalist Papers* put it, "for the diseases most incident to republican government."

So we should be inspired to seek a nationalist remedy for the diseases most incident to nationalism—not the denial of nationalism in the name of a synthetic internationalism, but the affirmation of nationalism "rightly understood," as Tocqueville might have said: a Western-type, civic-minded nationalism, complete with checks and balances, representative government, civic liberties, the rule of law (all of which happen to be the republican remedies for the diseases of republicanism.) And among these remedies (as both Tocqueville and the Founding Fathers recognized) is religion itself—or rather, a plurality of religions, religions that tolerate each other and that are themselves not merely tolerated but respected, and not merely as a private affair but as an integral part of public life.

It is one of the bitter ironies of history that now, when the newer nationalities are becoming more aggressive and brutal, the older ones are becoming more diffident and passive, reluctant to affirm the legitimacy of their own civic, pacific mode of nationalism, let alone to impugn the legitimacy of the despotic, tribal mode that is now emerging. During the Second World War, George Orwell observed that only in England were intellectuals "ashamed of their own nationality."[23] Today that might be said of intellectuals in all the liberal democracies, who "demystify" and denigrate their own nationalities as "Eurocentric," xenophobic, even racist, while at the same time giving legitimacy to nationalities in the Third World and elsewhere which are notably illiberal, inhumane, and not infrequently racist.

Yet the most egregious abuses of nationalism may give us ground for hope. If we can no longer deny the reality of nationalism, we may find ourselves making the kinds of distinctions and judgments that are congruent with that reality. The bloody spectacle of nationalism at its worst, a nationalism that degrades religion as well as itself, may teach us to appreciate nationalism at its best, a nationalism tempered and elevated by religion as well as by all the other resources of civilization. □

---

[23] George Orwell, *The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius* (1941), in *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*, ed. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (New York, 1968), II, p. 75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Loser

India in the Nineties

Ross H. Munro

NO NON-COMMUNIST country has been more traumatized by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War than India. Until the endgame began to unfold in the late 1980s, India had played the Cold War deftly. It enjoyed all the benefits of a de facto strategic alliance with the Soviets while giving little in return. The Soviet Union was the ultimate guarantor of Indian security, the supplier of cheap weapons that fed India's then grandiose military ambitions, and a huge, captive market for shoddy Indian consumer goods. For all this economic and military generosity, Moscow counted on New Delhi's support, or at least its silence, on major issues such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This was a small price to pay, particularly when it could be clothed in the self-righteous language of non-alignment. Otherwise, India proved adroit at keeping its distance from Soviet bloc machinations.

Soviet largess, combined in the 1980s with a borrowing binge rivaling Brazil's, enabled Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi, to pursue their vision of India as a Great Power—the equal of China in world councils, the predominant nation of the Indian Ocean basin, and the unchallenged hegemon of South Asia itself. They squandered much of India's false fortune of soft rubles and borrowed dollars on a massive military buildup that alarmed countries as far distant as Australia. Yet outside the Indian Ocean basin, India's distinction in the mid-1980s of being the world's leading arms importer and of having the world's fastest growing military budget was largely ignored. Emboldened and overconfident, India provoked armed confrontations with Pakistan and China; started a still costly pocket war with Pakistan on Kashmir's Siachin Glacier; financed covert insurgencies in at least four neighboring countries—Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma; and dispatched Indian troops to occupy northern Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Easy money also financed an orgy of new-middle-class consumerism, as well as glittering Festivals of India staged in major world capitals. All these phenomena had a common message: a powerful, modernizing India had arrived on the world scene and wanted to be taken seriously.

Today, India's reach for Great Power status is in shambles. The keystone of Indian power and pretense in the 1980s, the Indo-Soviet link, is history and India cannot count on Russia's economic, diplomatic, or military support. The dismissive byword among Western diplomats in New Delhi today is that, in the entire world, India has "no useful

Ross H. Munro is head of the Asia program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia. He has been conducting research on Indian security issues with a grant from the United States Institute of Peace and was *Time*'s New Delhi Bureau Chief from 1985-88.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

friends," a bleak assessment to which India's foreign secretary, J.N. Dixit, responds only that the condition will not prove permanent. India's consequent search for new and useful friends has led it to seek hurried rapprochement with China, Japan, Western Europe, and, most ardently, the United States. These efforts have yielded fulsome rhetoric on all sides, but few concrete results. "For the first time in its history," a U.S. official observes, "India is truly non-aligned. And the Indians don't like it one bit."

In its own region, India's relative military strength and security have declined significantly. Economic austerity has forced India to pare back its grandiose plans for a bluewater navy and wide-ranging air force that would have dominated the Indian Ocean basin. All three buffer states whose neutrality or good will imperial Britain considered crucial to the security of the Raj—the "outer ring" of Afghanistan, Tibet, and Burma—are now under the control of forces that do not wish India well. And neighboring Pakistan, now boasting a rudimentary nuclear capability, regularly defies India with apparent impunity.

India's 1980s arms buildup has saddled it with a large military machine whose upkeep it cannot afford. Readiness is being jeopardized by cutbacks in training and maintenance. The army and air force have been particularly hard hit by their dependence on the former Soviet Union for spares, parts, and replacements. Russian arms suppliers now sell to the highest, hard-currency bidder—often China—and ignore contractual commitments to New Delhi. Meanwhile, Indian Army morale has been battered by events at home and abroad. The Army's three-year occupation of Sri Lanka ended in humiliation when it failed to vanquish the Tamil Tiger guerrillas, who were earlier armed and trained by India's intelligence agencies. Back home, the seemingly inexorable rise in civil unrest and local insurgencies is taking its toll. As Indian authorities rely increasingly on the army to keep the country together, units are overextended and troops exhausted and demoralized.

Perhaps most ominous of all are the rapidly deepening religious fault lines being carved by India's surging Hindu nationalist movement. In full anti-Muslim flower, the movement has the potential not only of dangerously alienating India's 100 million Muslims but of antagonizing Muslim nations throughout South and Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. An India perceived as antagonistic to Islam could find itself, in the very near future, alone in a vast and hostile Muslim sea extending from Sumatra to Saudi Arabia. Last December, India got a possible foretaste of the future when officials in several Muslim oil-exporting nations discussed imposing an oil boycott on India, in retaliation for the destruction of a sixteenth-century mosque in the Indian town of Ayodhya by a mob of Hindu fanatics.

What is particularly dismaying is that India's small community of foreign policy thinkers is beginning to view the prospect of an internationalized Hindu-Islamic conflict as more of an opportunity than a danger. Recent interviews found many Indians excited about the possibility of a U.S.-India alliance founded on common opposition to militant Islamic states. A recent Carnegie Endowment report on U.S.-India relations points carefully but clearly in the same direction.[1] The report, reflecting the consensus of a veritable who's-who of U.S. India hands, declares that "the growth of militant Islamic fundamentalism in areas adjacent to India underlines the possibility that New Delhi and Washington will share common security concerns in the years ahead." But such an alignment would imperil U.S. interests, not advance them. India would bring many liabilities and few if any usable assets to such a relationship. To believe otherwise is to overlook not only India's relative strategic decline but also its growing domestic problems.

[1] "India and America: After the Cold War" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington, 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Timid Reform

THE CASE FOR optimism about India's future is founded mainly on the conviction that the economic reform program started by the Narasimha Rao Government in 1991 is "irreversible" and will, in the words of the Carnegie report, transform that country from a "shackled giant" into a "significant industrial power in the decades ahead." Another popular and complementary view is that India is on approximately the same path of economic takeoff as China, just several paces behind. This reflects a fundamental misreading of the recent history of both countries.

The major, political causes of India's current economic travails are by now well understood. Inspired by Britain's Fabian socialists and Soviet central planners, Jawaharlal Nehru imposed rigid controls on the Indian economy and deliberately isolated it from international trade and investment flows. But India's new leaders failed to transform a society that was predominantly rural, feudal, and autocratic. The Congress Party neither attempted radical change nor simply allowed market forces to do their revolutionary work. Instead, it allied itself with the society's most reactionary elements.

The results are well-known: a "Hindu rate of growth" that for decades barely kept up with population increases; a high cost economy unable to compete in world trade; and a stagnant society. Today, the countryside is still plagued by semi-feudal land-holding patterns and concomitantly low agricultural productivity. According to an informal estimate, at least 270 million Indians are "going continuously hungry" and illiteracy is still the norm.

The inevitable economic crisis was staved off, but ultimately made worse, by the Gandhis' borrowing and spending spree during the 1980s. But by 1991, India was facing debt default and economic collapse. The International Monetary Fund came to the rescue, demanding in return that the Rao government initiate an economic reform program. Since then, the reform program has been widely heralded, and widely misconstrued. India has adopted much of the standard IMF package: the rupee has been made convertible and devalued by more than 50 percent; some categories of government spending have been reduced; industrial licensing and other red tape has been cut significantly; and restrictions on foreign investment have been drastically reduced. Big business interests, both foreign and Indian, have broadcast their support for such moves in the international media. Indeed, the most visible response to the reforms has been a rash of joint ventures, typically grafting a multinational's manufacturing technology and marketing knowhow onto an existing operation of a big Indian business house. But for smaller and less powerful companies, doing business in India remains a nightmare. Obstreperous and bribe-seeking bureaucrats can still cite a thicket of regulations on the books. Transportation and communications problems abound. Energy and other input costs can be extortionate.

While New Delhi's economic reforms plays to an applauding foreign audience, few Indians even know the program exists. For good reason: the government is frightened of introducing any reforms that might provoke domestic political opposition. Hardly any attempt has been made, for instance, to privatize or even "marketize" sections of India's dominant, and money-losing, public sector. Nor have there been any layoffs in these overstaffed enterprises. Agriculture continues to be heavily subsidized while private industry's inefficiencies are sustained by a web of import duties and intrusive regulations. So far there is no sign of economic takeoff. Indian officials claim their economic reforms have boosted exports but, given India's low starting base and its drastically devalued rupee, the increase is unimpressive.

The China Comparison

TO GRASP THE magnitude of the obstacles India faces in achieving economic reform and rapid growth, compare it with Asia's other giant. Until the late 1970s, it was commonly argued (by this writer, among

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

others) that China's superior record in such basics as literacy, nutrition, and rural development could not justify the horrific human costs of Chairman Mao's revolution. But that has become a debate for academia. What is obvious now is that Mao unwittingly provided much of the foundation for China's still sizzling economic takeoff, which began less than three years after his death. If Mao had not liquidated feudalistic landlords and brutally rationalized agricultural production, his successor Deng Xiaoping would not have been able to transform China's peasants virtually overnight into efficient, small-scale farmers and rural entrepreneurs. If Mao had not ruthlessly destroyed China's old-style businessmen, whose profits often depended on corruptly obtained government favors and protection, then Deng would not have been able to offer virtually an open door to foreign and overseas Chinese investors. It is this unplanned sequence of events that explains why China today has a largely literate, adequately nourished population; a strong, rural economy; a rudimentary but functioning national infrastructure; and an economy well on its way to integrating profitably with the developed world.

China today stands in stark contrast to India. Its economic and military power already dwarfs India's, and the gap seems destined to widen as China heads, seemingly irrevocably, toward superpower status. This increasing imbalance between Asia's two giants has significant implications for U.S. policy. Clearly, China will continue to have a major impact, for good or ill, on U.S. political, economic and military interests; India in most ways will not.

Curiously, the Carnegie Report urges Washington to act as if the imbalance does not exist. It deplores "the American tendency to treat Beijing as more important than New Delhi" and calls on the U.S. government to treat the two Asian giants effectively as equals. While the report fails to reflect reality, it does reflect the deep resentment felt by Indians that the world treats the Chinese more seriously than them. China's military superiority particularly unnerves India, because New Delhi can no longer rely on Moscow as its ultimate strategic guarantor. Protected since the 1960s by the Soviet nuclear umbrella and still smarting over its defeat by China in the 1962 war, the Indian Government did little to improve relations with the country many Indians consider their permanent strategic foe. But Mikhail Gorbachev's pursuit of Sino-Soviet rapprochement sent Rajiv Gandhi scurrying to Peking in 1989. Although both countries now assert that their ties are closer, the evidence suggests otherwise.

Indian officials are particularly alarmed by the rapidity with which China has swept Burma decisively into its sphere of influence with a combination of trade, diplomatic, and military ties. China has made huge arms sales to the once besieged military regime in Rangoon. Recently China has helped construct two military installations—a small naval base at Haingyi in the Irrawaddy Delta, and a radar and listening post in the Cocos Islands capable of eavesdropping on Indian military activity in the Bay of Bengal. Although decades may pass before China requests access to these facilities, it has already changed the military map of Asia by leapfrogging across Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean.

To the west, India is also deeply concerned about China's strong links with the Islamic Republics of Pakistan and Iran. China's ties with Iran developed rapidly in recent years as it became one of Iran's leading weapons suppliers. China and Iran also share deep suspicions of Western, particularly U.S., motives. China's links with Pakistan are decades old. Diplomatic ties are strong with Islamabad and China is Pakistan's most reliable supplier of weapons systems. Peking has provided extensive assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons and missile programs.

A Nuclear Neighbor

IT IS PAKISTAN'S rudimentary nuclear weapons capability that has given it a key, new advantage against India. Pakistan's leaders have been claiming—unoffi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cially since 1987, officially since 1992—that they possess all the components of a nuclear bomb and the know-how to assemble one. Although the Pakistanis may have been exaggerating in 1987, there is little doubt today that they could quickly assemble a handful of nuclear devices. Pakistan still has far fewer, and far less sophisticated, nuclear devices than India could assemble, and fewer delivery options as well. Nevertheless, Pakistan's military leaders have endowed their small and simple arsenal with credibility by subtly cultivating their image as "mad Muslims," capable of suicidally lobbing a nuclear device at India if they were ever to face defeat in a war. Although they may well be bluffing, they have created just enough uncertainty to deter India from launching a conventional military offensive, thus altering the military balance in South Asia.

During the 1980s, India's quest for unchallenged hegemony in South Asia was focused on its oldest antagonist, Pakistan. Its military buildup was aimed first and foremost at acquiring the capability of inflicting a crushing defeat on Pakistan in the event of war. Its confrontational tactics on Kashmir's Siachin Glacier and during Operation Brasstacks of 1986-87 were intended to be intimidating demonstrations of military superiority. Since the 1960s, India's minimum position vis-à-vis Pakistan had always been that it would retaliate militarily if Pakistan went too far in supporting Kashmiri Muslim or Punjabi Sikh insurgents. But recently, Pakistan's leadership has increasingly ignored such warnings. Since 1989, it reportedly has intermittently allowed nominally non-government groups to step up their assistance to the insurgents, even beyond the levels that prompted India to go to war in 1965.[2] The Indians attribute their failure to retaliate to international restraint and India's own virtuous forbearance. But Pakistan's nuclear capability, limited as it might be, is clearly inhibiting. The fundamental and embarrassing fact is that India has burdened itself with a large and expensive conventional military force that can no longer confidently perform its primary mission of defeating Pakistan without the small but unacceptable risk that Pakistan will resort to nuclear retaliation.

What Washington fears is that the next major confrontation between India and Pakistan could rapidly spiral out of control. Both countries will be under immense pressure to deploy nuclear weapons—Pakistan, the better to deter a conventional Indian offensive; India, to make its threat of such a conventional offensive credible by matching Pakistan's nuclear threat. Once one country deploys its basement nuclear arsenal, the other will be compelled to follow suit. And because mystery surrounds both arsenals—India still officially denies it has a nuclear weapons program, even while claiming it can deploy at short notice—the danger of miscalculation would be high.

Whatever the circumstances, if India and Pakistan openly deploy their nuclear arsenals, they will set in motion a dangerous and destabilizing chain of events. The Indian bomb—or the Hindu Bomb, as it would inevitably be labeled—would crystallize suspicions shared by Muslim countries surrounding India. With India's ruthless suppression of the Kashmiri Muslim insurgents and the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque vivid in their minds, Muslims would view Indian deployment as directed at them. Nuclear deployment by Pakistan would create probably even more turmoil. Deployment of the first Islamic Bomb would propel that country, willingly or not, into the broiling center of Middle Eastern and Islamic politics. For example, neighboring Iran would be compelled to press Pakistan, with both implicit threats and generous bribes, to share both its nuclear umbrella and its nuclear weapons technology. In fact, there are persis-

[2]This is not to suggest that the insurgency in Indian-occupied Kashmir is Pakistan's creation. It has deep and largely indigenous roots.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tent rumors, unconfirmed by Washington and denied by Islamabad, that Pakistan has already assisted Iran's nuclear weapons program. Such a security pact would threaten India and, to its great peril, pull it even more deeply into the Middle East and Islamic conflict system. There are many other possible scenarios, but most end with South Asia and the Middle East merging into a single conflict system even more volatile and dangerous, and more charged with religious animosity, than they are today.

Hindu Nationalism

ALREADY, THE religious factor is exacerbating India's long festering conflict with Pakistan. For many years, the two antagonists expressed remarkably little animosity in starkly religious terms, even though their conflict pitted a secular, democratic regime, whose population was overwhelmingly Hindu, against a regime whose very *raison d'être* was its population's shared Muslim identity. Over the years, Pakistan's foreign policy has acquired an increasingly religious character, particularly so during the Afghan War years. But much more striking has been the rapid growth of the religious factor in Indian foreign policy in the 1990s, due to the rise of the Hindu nationalist movement.

The Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, the most powerful and most recent manifestation of this movement, is now the second largest party in the Indian Parliament. While the movement's adherents can not be described as Hindu religious fundamentalists—a contradiction in terms for such an undogmatic and inclusive religion—they nevertheless seethe with animus against Muslims, India's largest religious minority. BJP stalwarts have long advocated foreign policies that Muslims, both Indian and foreign, consider hostile to them and their religion: suggestions that population transfers be used to force Muslims into minority status in Kashmir; that India must view Muslim nations as implacable enemies of Hinduism; and that India must deploy nuclear weapons, specifically against Pakistan. Last December, BJP stalwarts and other Hindu nationalists provoked outrage throughout the Muslim world when they razed the Ayodhya mosque. In apparent retaliation, Indian Muslims with international connections have been accused of detonating terrorist bombs that killed 100 people in Bombay early this year. Although Indian authorities claim to have unearthed a plot involving Pakistani agents, the incident should be viewed more simply as evidence of the Indian Muslim community's readiness to resort to counter-terror if persecuted. A community of 100 million could harbor enough terrorists to create continuous chaos in India.

Meanwhile, the Rao Government is increasingly focusing its foreign policies on Muslim issues and how to deal with the Islamic world. It is uncomfortably aware that India is now on the agenda of virtually every meeting of Islamic foreign ministers. So India is attempting, with modest success at best, to reach out for friends in the Muslim world. For instance, it is trying to strengthen the secularist, anti-militant regimes of the former Soviet Muslim republics in Central Asia, offering technical assistance, tied credits, and barter trade arrangements.

At the same time, India's relations with Iran have been riddled with anxiety. Last year, Indian officials were working hard to develop political and economic ties with Iran, hoping to reduce the chances Iran and Pakistan would find sufficient common ground for an anti-Indian alignment. But earlier this year, Iran alarmed Indian officials by declaring that the destruction of the mosque and the safety of India's Muslims were no longer merely India's internal affair. Then this spring, India's Ministry of Defense identified Iran in its annual report as a security threat to India. While this seemed impolitic and premature, it seems consistent with India's pursuit of closer ties with Israel, including contacts with Israel's military and security sectors, during the past year or more.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The opposition BJP's enthusiasm for such ties seems unbounded.

Delhi and Washington

THE GREAT PRIZE, in the view of many Indian policy intellectuals, would be a security relationship with the United States founded on common opposition to militant Islam. As we have seen, such a vision has already found a sympathetic echo in the report issued earlier this year by the Carnegie Endowment. But looked at in terms of U.S. interests, this is a bad idea, probably a dangerous one. The reason is simple. As long as the anti-Muslim strain of Hindu nationalism continues its ascent in India, the Muslims of Asia and the Middle East would inevitably construe the establishment of strong security ties between India and the United States as hostile to them. While the United States may well clash with the forces of militant Islam for decades to come, U.S. alliances with other countries clearly founded on opposition to such forces would unnecessarily alienate many moderate Muslims and drive them toward militant Islam. Such polarization would be against our interests. Indeed, it is crucial that the United States retain the freedom to make case-by-case distinctions regarding the behavior of militant Islamic regimes.

Even if Washington unwisely concluded that an alliance with India based on common opposition to militant Islam was desirable, what could India contribute to such an alliance? Very little. India might possess an abundance of raw military manpower, but no-one would propose sending predominantly Hindu troops to the Persian Gulf to fight the Muslim soldiers of a militant Islamic regime. The religious overtones would inflame Muslims worldwide, including those in India itself. Indeed, an ally as weak and vulnerable—economically, politically and militarily—as today's India is not an asset but a burden. In fact, conversations with Indian policy analysts leave little doubt that they're hoping the United States will fill the role vacated by the Soviets: a superpower patron giving India a great deal and asking almost nothing in return. A few Indians are entertaining even more ambitious visions of India as part of a grand, Asia-wide balance of power—with the United States, Japan, ASEAN, and India on one side, and China, Iran, and Pakistan on the other. For both visions, the linchpin is a *de facto* alliance between India and the United States.

Right now, India is important to the United States for only one reason: it possesses the ability to deploy nuclear weapons, a step that would further destabilize South Asia and the Middle East, and feed the fires of religious conflict and hatred there. This would inevitably hurt the U.S. interest in limiting violent conflict in this large and vital area of the world, conflict that could once again directly involve the United States. What is more, given the potentially horrible synergy of religious hatred and regional instability, the deployment of nuclear weapons could prove to be merely a fleeting prologue to their actual use.

The conventional wisdom, to which nearly all U.S. India hands subscribe, is that India will never surrender its nuclear option. Indeed, the authors of the Carnegie Report urge Washington to abandon its attempts to roll back India's extensive and ongoing nuclear weapons program. Instead, the United States should push only for a policy of "restraint" that would freeze nuclear weapons development, production, and deployment in both India and Pakistan. The recommendations of the Carnegie Report are extremely unfortunate, for several reasons. First, they are impractical; a freeze of this nature would probably work only until the next India-Pakistan crisis stampeded one country or the other to deploy. Second, the report has understandably been widely interpreted—both here and in India—as a significant softening of U.S. opposition to India's nuclear weapons program. Third, this signal has been sent at exactly the wrong time. Apparently unnoticed by the report's authors, the elements and factors that could eventually lead to a rollback of India's nuclear weapons program have begun

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to gather.

For the first time, India is being subjected to concerted pressure not only from the United States but also from Japan, Western Europe and Russia, to surrender its nuclear option. The pressure includes threats by the industrialized democracies to halt all bilateral and multilateral assistance and cooperation if India deploys. Because of India's current economic vulnerability, this pressure is having a major impact. Recent interviews with members of India's foreign policy elite unearthed a consensus among them, including even BJP moderates, that India has already lost the freedom to deploy nuclear weapons, except perhaps in a full-blown crisis situation.

There is also a growing, albeit grudging, recognition among India's more realistic policy intellectuals that, right now, New Delhi would prove highly vulnerable to concerted U.S. pressure. Military affairs writer Manoj Joshi says the key military issue of the 1990s for India is the extent to which the United States can succeed in imposing restraints on India's "autonomous self-defense capability," a euphemism for the nuclear weapons program, the existence of which India doesn't officially acknowledge. Former Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey predicts that, if its economic reform program fails during the next two years (which is likely), the Indian government itself will find a way of rationalizing the surrender of the nuclear option. There is even concern among India's nuclear hawks that Prime Minister Rao, who makes little secret of his Gandhian revulsion for nuclear weapons, might surrender the nuclear option if he believed he could survive the domestic political fallout.

The United States should make it unambiguously clear that U.S.-India relations will not make any significant progress, and indeed will regress, unless India takes positive and concrete steps to roll back its nuclear weapons program. To give this tough message real shock value in New Delhi, it should ideally be delivered by a new U.S. ambassador well known for being consistently pro-India—someone very like former Congressman Stephen Solarz. Our allies will be willing to deliver a similar message. After that, Washington should be prepared to do something that is difficult for Americans—wait. Almost every discernible trend suggests that India's problems will continue to multiply, putting it under increasing pressure to act positively within a year or two.

Obviously India cannot unilaterally, and without assurances, give up nuclear weapons. But India must test the sincerity of Pakistan's many offers to negotiate mutual abandonment of the nuclear option. India also must recognize that China's rapidly growing conventional superiority means an Indian nuclear bomb makes sense in a Sino-Indian conflict only as a first-use weapon, something India claims to abhor. Above all, India must demonstrate its will to end South Asia's increasingly dangerous nuclear impasse. The sort of freeze advocated by Carnegie could be a first step, but only a first step. The goal should be to achieve progressive rollbacks and restrictions that will eventually make the deployment and use of nuclear weapons virtually impossible in South Asia under any conditions. That will not end the danger of religiously fueled international conflict in South Asia, but at minimum it would reduce the chances of a conflagrational merger of the South Asian and Middle East conflict systems.

There are other grounds for guarded optimism. For instance, an India that summons the will to make progress on the nuclear weapons issue may well prove to be an India that has the will to end its adversarial approach to its neighbors. An India that traded with its neighbors—bilateral trade between India and its larger neighbors is negligible—would soon have the economic leverage to assert its natural regional primacy. And an India able to defuse its international problems is one that could turn inward and begin to confront its lengthy domestic agenda. Such an India could be a good and valuable friend of the United States. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Poorhouse

Elliott Abrams

DURING THE Cold War no country was entirely inconsequential, for all had the potential to become U.S.-Soviet battlegrounds. Thus were blood and vast sums spent in hitherto inconsequential places such as Vietnam, Korea, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Angola. As the Cold War was a zero sum game, each victory for one side gave it a sense of momentum, while representing a defeat for the other side. This gave many small countries an importance far exceeding their economic weight, and elicited from the great powers high levels of attention and foreign aid.

During the Cold War the United States perceived a security interest in all the countries in this hemisphere in particular. If, for example, Che Guevara chose to fight for revolution in Bolivia, the United States would and did oppose communism there, just as it opposed the Allende government in Chile or the Arbenz government in Guatemala. But if any country had the potential to be politically significant, it is clear that not all the region's countries are economically interesting. Some have little in the way of resources, or tiny populations and land areas, or a high degree of domestic instability; others may have unsound current economic policies or poor economic conditions that result from past economic policy errors.

Elliott Abrams, a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, was assistant secretary of state from 1981 to 1989.

Countries whose geopolitical net worth during the Cold War was higher than their "natural" value to the great powers will now suffer the consequences. Aid levels will decline, and as economic questions become more central to bilateral relations, those relations will become a lower and lower priority to the richer countries. One contributor to the 1991 Council on Foreign Relations study "Yen for Development," economist Barbara Stallings, concluded that

> the focus of foreign direct investment and bank loans has undergone a significant move away from the Third World and toward the advanced industrial countries....Within the Third World itself, an analogous process took place. Japanese aid shifted away from those regions most in need of development assistance and toward those that were already doing well.[1]

This trend contributes to, and exacerbates, the differentiation among developing countries arising from their own economic records.

"The legacy of the 1980s is one of sharply differentiated performance among countries and regions," a World Bank staff report noted in 1991;[2] another World Bank

[1] "Comment" by Barbara Stallings, following "Japanese Banks and Third World Debt," by Shoji Ochi, in *Yen for Development* (New York, 1961), pp. 161,163.

[2] "Development Priorities for the 1990s and Implications for the World Bank Group," in *Development Issues* (No. 28), p. 22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

paper referred to "steadily increasing divergence in performance."[3] This differentiation appears with respect to debt, foreign investment, and trade.

Debt: On debt, relief efforts have focused on the larger debtors, which are usually the larger developing countries with the best economic potential. IMF Managing Director Camdessus has pointed out that:

> Reductions in the debt-service ratio for the developing countries [have] been particularly sharp for the group of fifteen heavily indebted countries, several of which have benefited from the Brady initiative; their debt-service ratio has fallen from 45 percent in 1986 to 31 percent in 1991. In contrast, the debt service-ratio has declined only slightly over the period 1986-1991 for small low-income countries....[4]

An IBRD/IMF staff report noted that this is partly because commercial banks are simply less interested in such small and poor countries: "banks may also be generally less interested in reaching agreement on operations with countries in which their exposure is relatively small and highly provisioned."[5] As to debt owed to foreign governments, progress on reducing it does not contradict the notion that industrialized country interest in the poorest countries is declining. Debt cancellation may reflect humanitarian concerns, or other foreign policy goals, as in the case of the U.S. government's cancellation in 1991 of part of the debt owed it by Poland and Egypt; or it may reflect, with respect to the smallest and poorest countries, despair about the chances of eventual repayment combined with a slackening interest in remaining involved with the economic and political development of the debtor in question.

Investment: As for foreign investment, it is rising—but not for everybody. Totals reflecting a $500 million increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) in 1990 over 1988, for example, represented an $800 million increase for the top twelve countries and a decline of $300 million for all others.[6] As the World Bank's *World Development Report* for 1991 put it,

> Flows of foreign investment are likely to grow in response to policy reforms. However, they will probably remain concentrated in globally integrated, middle-income countries with well-developed infrastructure...Just twenty developing countries, mainly in Asia and Latin America, accounted for 90 percent of the net flows between 1981 and 1990.[7]

The recent burst of equity investment (both foreign direct investment and portfolio investment) has followed precisely this pattern. A March 1993 article in the World Bank/IMF publication *Finance and Development*, showed that while resource flows to developing countries increased by 17 percent in 1992 over the previous year, the bulk of the increase was in investment, not loans or foreign aid. And the portfolio investment, estimated to have reached $27 billion in 1992, has "been concentrated in a few countries...Five countries—Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey—accounted for over two thirds of the cumulative gross total portfolio investment flows

---

[3]"Economic Issues for the 1990s," by F. Desmond McCarthy and Shakrokh Fardoust, in *Problems of Developing Countries in the 1990s*, World Bank's Discussion Papers Number 97 (Washington, 1990), p. 14.

[4]"External Economic Environment Affecting Developing Countries," by Michel Camdessus, in *Development Issues*, Number 29, (Washington, 1992), p. 19.

[5]"Progress Report on the Implementation of The Debt Strategy And Its Impact on the Development Prospects of All Severely-Indebted Countries," by the staffs of the World Bank and IMF, in *Development Issues*, No. 29 (Washington, 1992), p. 61.

[6]Annual Report, 1991, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, p. 7.

[7]*World Development Report 1991*, The World Bank, p. 24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between 1989 and 1992."[8]

U.S. investment follows that pattern, with large increases in flows to a few countries—and above all, to Mexico—but little new investment in most Western Hemisphere countries. This same phenomenon of highly varied performance exists with respect to trade as well. To take the polar examples, between 1983 and 1990 U.S. exports to Brazil increased by 141 percent, exports to Chile by 153 percent, and exports to Mexico by 266 percent. By comparison, exports to Peru decreased by 6 percent, and exports to Trinidad decreased by 35 percent in the same years.[9] In sum, when there was an external threat to American security in this hemisphere, there was a rough parity in the level of potential American interest in any Western Hemisphere country. On economic grounds such rough parity is inconceivable.

The concentration of investment on a relatively few developing countries will enlarge differences between them and the "stragglers." Equity investment—as opposed to aid or loans—lowers the cost of capital to the recipient, and brings additional benefits such as technology transfer, management know-how, and help in marketing.

Aid: In the current period, when the end of the Cold War renders political relations comparatively less significant, economic matters are dividing the developing countries into two groups. The poorer among them receive aid, not investment or bank loans, and the "leading" aid institutions have become the international financial institutions (or "IFIs") rather than the bilateral donors.

Thus one finds, for example, that aid to the poorest countries (those with per capita incomes under $750) as a percentage of total Japanese Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) falls each year: it was 18.5 percent of Japanese ODA in 1988 but only 11.2 percent in 1991, a remarkable 40 percent drop. Aid to all low income countries (all countries with per capita income under $1500) slipped from 74 percent of total Japanese bilateral ODA in 1988, to 62.2 percent in 1991; while aid to all middle income developing countries rose from 15.8 percent to 27.6 percent of the total. Aid to the upper middle income countries rose from 3.5 percent of Japanese ODA in 1988 and 1989, to 9 percent in 1990 and 9.7 percent in 1991.[10] "The United States and France allocate more than 40 percent of their aid to middle income recipient countries," the World Bank noted in its April 1993 report on *Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries*.[11]

Wards of the IFIs: The poorest nations are becoming not so much wards of any particular richer state but rather the responsibility of the IFIs, which exercise powerful influence on their affairs. The April 1993 World Bank report concluded that "Multilateral aid concentrated on the poorest, with about 90 percent going to low-income countries."[12] And the poorer the country, OECD data shows, the more of its ODA comes from multilateral agencies and the less from rich countries.

During the last decade, the IFIs have moved increasingly from involvement solely in project lending and balance of payments support, to longer term policy-based lending with strict loan conditionality. Such lending is typified by World Bank "Structural Adjustment Loans" (the first of which was made in 1980) and "Sectoral Adjustment Loans," and IMF "stabilization" programs, which are usually pre-conditions for World

---

[8]"Portfolio Investment Flows to Developing Countries," by Masood Ahmed and Sudarshan Gooptu, in *Development and Finance*, IMF/IBRD (Washington, March 1993), pp. 9-10.

[9]Data from *Latin America and the Caribbean: Selected Economic and Social Data*, USAID (Washington, 1992), p. 175.

[10]*Japan's ODA 1991*, Ministry of Finance, Tokyo: 1992, table II-6, p. 66; and *Japan's ODA 1992*, Ministry of Finance, Tokyo: 1993, table II-4, p. 76.

[11]*Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries*, The World Bank (Washington, 1993), p. 7.

[12]*Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bank Structural Adjustment Loans and sometimes for "Paris Club" reschedulings, where payment terms for debt owed to individual governments are negotiated. These IFI programs come with extremely lengthy and detailed lists of specific conditions involving major, national, macroeconomic policy changes, negotiation of which is a "process [that] may tempt [World] Bank staff to become increasingly interventionist, especially in small and poor countries..."[13] As David Glover of the International Development research Center in Ottawa has noted, "LDC trade policy is now largely negotiated with the [World] Bank and the [International Monetary] Fund....domestic aspects of a country's trade policy...are all included in Bank/Fund adjustment policies and are largely determined a priori."[14]

Thus a role that would in the past have been played by great powers directly, falls instead to IFIs; and a form of multilateral colonialism is the result. Since 1989 the Bank and Fund have more closely coordinated their conditionality policies in "Policy Framework Papers" or "PFPs," reducing the "wiggle room" for borrowers that had resulted from the previously separate bargaining processes with these two largest IFIs. The effect, a study of the World Bank concluded, is that "[o]nce the officials of the Bank and the Fund have made up their minds, there is usually little material contribution from the officials of the borrowing government, at least in the case of the poor, indebted countries where conditionality bites hardest."[15] It is well worth noting that PFPs are used in the case of low-income countries, and do not appear to have been extended to middle-income developing countries.

The larger and more attractive developing countries have more bargaining power with the IFIs, in large part because they are of greater interest to the international financial community and have some alternative sources of resources. One analysis put it, "countries pass through 'stages of financing,'" and for successful countries private finance comes to replace official flows.[16] Such countries are able, once they have adopted IFI-approved economic policy reforms and gotten help with their debt, to move into a kind of post-political relationship with the industrial world, where relations become centered in the private sector rather than the governments.

This will be true of U.S.-Chilean and U.S.-Mexican relations, for example, once free trade agreements are in place. And it is already true that official U.S. relations with the fastest-growing developing countries center increasingly on trade and financial, rather than political, issues. Thus the outlines of future patterns can be seen: "first world" governments, perhaps best defined as OECD members, will hand off the more promising underdeveloped countries to the private sector, and the least promising ones to the IFIs. In these acts of triage, the OECD governments will identify those who cannot make it, and try to wash their hands of the "losers."

Which those governments are now, after the Cold War, much better able to do. Security issues put and kept governments in the forefront. The key relationships involved chanceries, armies, intelligence agencies, and foreign aid agencies. The key decisions were

---

[13]"The Diplomacy of Policy-Based Lending," by Joan M. Nelson, in *Between Two Worlds: The World Bank's Next Decade*, Overseas Development Council, (Washington, 1986), p. 80.

[14]"Trade and Industrial Policy in Latin America: Issues for the 1990s," by David Glover, in *Latin America to the Year 2000*, Archibald R. M. Ritter et al., eds., (New York, 1992), p. 55.

[15]*Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-based Lending*, by Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan, and John Toye (Washington, 1991), p. 55.

[16]"The Transition from Aid to Private Capital Flows," by Homi J. Karas and Hisanobu Shishido, in *Transitions in Development*, Uma Lele and Ijaz Nabi, eds., (San Francisco, 1991), p. 405.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those made in capitals by officials. When economic relationships become paramount, this is no longer the case. The most important role of governments is to set the rules of the game, which is precisely the function of framework agreements on trade and investment and of free trade agreements. Once that has been done, decisions about trade and investment are made by thousands of individuals and firms in a relatively free market. In this sense the model is the U.S.-Canada relationship, where "political" issues between the governments center around trade and investment issues and the dense relationship between the countries consists mostly of the actions of tourists, businessmen, and bankers.

There are three tasks LDC governments must perform before this kind of relationship can be achieved. The first is to get their own houses in order, adopting economic policies that permit and promote economic growth. The experience of the Asian tigers is being replicated in countries such as Mexico, Chile, and China, for the rules apply despite geographical and cultural differences. When economic policy reforms make investment worthwhile, investors appear. As the World Bank put it recently, "one of the most visible fruits of past policy reforms has been the resurgence of private-source flows..."[17]

The second task is negotiating treaties that set the rules for these private relationships beyond national borders. This task is well underway now, and the path ahead, while very long, holds few mysteries. In this hemisphere, if NAFTA is approved by Congress, other nations or groups of nations in the hemisphere will seek some sort of accession or "docking" to it. Meanwhile, and perhaps of greater importance, they must pursue similar ties to other nations in the region. Trade liberalization works not only between the most highly industrialized countries and less developed ones, but among the less developed as well (as the astonishing leap in trade between Colombia and Venezuela, where trade doubled in one year when tariffs were eliminated, is demonstrating).

The third task is to deal with the "debt overhang," and here as well government action is essential. Even when the bulk of debt is owed to private creditors, governments must play a central role: negotiating with official creditors in the "Paris Club" and with the international financial institutions, and as actors able to influence the private creditors. It is in the nature of the process that when governments succeed, their own future role is reduced and the way is cleared for foreign investors, merchants, and private lenders to replace them.

The countries which undertake the needed reforms can begin to move out of Third World status, taking advantage of international capital markets and the new technology that increasingly underlie a modern economy. Those that avoid or delay reform—or are simply too small and poorly endowed with resources—will find themselves the wards of today's international version of the poorhouse, the World Bank and its regional corollaries. A complete breakdown of the state, with all the ensuing violence, may attract international attention and produce the rare international rescue mission of the Somalia variety. Otherwise, with the Cold War over, the poverty of small and poor countries will cause them to lose the attention of the rich, their real estate no longer of value, their "loss" no longer a worry that keeps statesmen awake at night. □

---

[17] *Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries*, p. 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Women in Combat

Heather Wilson

THE INTEGRATION of women into the American military has been a gradual process punctuated by historic milestones: the 1967 decision to lift the restrictions which prevented women from rising above the rank of lieutenant colonel; the entrance of women into ROTC in 1969 and pilot training in 1973; the expansion of opportunities for women to serve at sea which began in 1972; and the admission of women into the service academies in 1976. Over the last twenty-five years, women in the military have increased in number and migrated away from the traditional roles of nurse and clerk, into positions of greater risk and responsibility.

This evolution went largely unnoticed until the Gulf War, when CNN brought us images of a military force which had gone co-ed. 40,000 American women served in the Gulf War; 2 were POWs; 11 were killed in action. For the first time in our history, America's leaders spoke routinely about "our men and women" in the Armed Forces.

The Gulf War highlighted the jobs women already do in the military and the laws and policies which continued to circumscribe their participation. In the wake of the war, a debate ensued about what women in the military *can* do, and what they *should* do. Over the last year and a half, Congress, a Presidential Commission, and the Department of Defense considered the evidence and argued the merits. In December 1991, the 1948 law prohibiting women from flying in combat was repealed. In April of this year, the secretary of defense directed the services to change their policies and open combat aircraft to women. With the public support of the Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of Defense Aspin, Congress will probably consider lifting the one remaining law that limits the authority of the Department of Defense to assign women, Title 10 U.S.C 6015, which prohibits women from serving on combat ships for longer than 180 days at a time.

While many Americans continue to have concerns about allowing women in ground combat, the Services are ready to open combat ships and aircraft to women. Women can do these jobs, and, as a society, we should not prohibit them from doing so.

Can They?

IN 1973 the first group of women entered naval pilot training and the Air Force opened pilot training in 1976. Training and standards are the same for men and women. While the Air Force has not allowed women to fly combat aircraft other than as test pilots, the Navy has interpreted the law more liberally, allowing women to fly all aircraft, but not assigning them to combat missions. Every type of aircraft in the Air Force and Navy inventories has been flown by women, as test pilots or in operational squadrons. In the Army, women could fly assault helicopters, like

Heather Wilson is president of Keystone International, Inc. in Albuquerque, New Mexico. She is a 1982 graduate of the USAF Academy where she was second-in-command of the Wing of 4400 cadets and the first woman to command Basic Cadet Training. She is a Rhodes Scholar, a former director on the National Security Council Staff, and vice chair of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Women in the Services.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Blackhawk, but Army policy prohibited them from flying attack helicopters, like the Apache. (An assault helicopter carries troops; an attack helicopter is armed and principally attacks enemy armor.) The many studies that have been done indicate that there are no physiological reasons why women cannot fly in combat.

Some critics of opening combat roles to women worry about unit cohesion. The services have had integrated flying squadrons and air crews for eighteen years and there is no evidence to suggest that these units have lacked cohesion or effectiveness, even in the stressful conditions they faced in the skies over Iraq.

From 1972 through the late 1980s, the Navy significantly increased the number of women assigned to ships. At present, sixty-four of America's Navy ships regularly have women assigned to their crews. Women serve on oilers and supply ships, on repair ships and hospital ships, and on the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal. In addition, women can serve on combat ships for up to six months at a time. The Navy has used this 180 day loophole frequently to fill critical skills and keep ships underway. As one woman Navy officer recently said, "I can serve on a combat ship. I just have to get on and off more often than the guys."

The issue of ground combat is more complicated. Physical strength is more important and, while some women could certainly pass physical tests for ground combat, it is unclear whether sufficient numbers of women could qualify to make integration of all ground combat units feasible.

However, Army assignment policy should also be reviewed. Restrictions on the assignment of women in the Army are imposed by policy, not by law, and the policy is often unreasonably restrictive. Some entire units are closed to women because they have a combat mission. This Army policy is used to justify preventing women from serving in the ceremonial guard for the White House and at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier because, as an Army general recently explained, "these infantry units have a wartime mission of defending the city of Washington." If the British ever come back to burn the Library of Congress again, one would hope that every trained man and woman would join the fight. Washington's Old Guard is, perhaps, an extreme example. But it illustrates the need to review Army assignment policy.

In addition to units that are categorically closed, many non-combat support positions in the Army are closed based on the Army's assessment that those particular positions are at higher risk. For example, women can bring supplies to infantry troops, but they are barred from supply positions which would require that they remain close to the infantry unit. In other words, if they keep moving, they can do the job. There is clearly room for review of Army assignment policy, far short of opening ground combat positions to women.

Should They?

WHILE SOME who argue against opening combat ships and aircraft to women continue to claim that women are not able to do the job, the weight of evidence and historical experience make these arguments increasingly difficult to sustain. But beyond the question of ability, the prospect of women fighting in combat, even if only on the sea and in the air, has prompted a debate about social values—what we are as a nation and what we should be.

There is a traditionalist view that women enjoy a special status in our society and should be protected, not the protectors. As the givers of life, it is argued, combat is or ought to be against a woman's nature and their principal, though not exclusive, responsibility is to the family. There is, I believe, a genuine fear among those who hold these views of the social consequences if we were to allow the primary nurturers in our society to be combatants.

Liberals tend to be as dismissive of these traditional social values as traditionalists are of categorical liberal insistence on equal opportunity, irrespective of the requirement to maintain a capable military. But there are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also strong and long-held American values which clash directly with traditionalist views on this subject. More than many other societies, past and present, there is a strong strain of individualism in America: a belief that a person should be judged on his or her merits, and that a child can grow up to become anything he or she wants to be.

Principally since the 1960s, women have assumed much wider roles in our society beyond that of nurturer. Gender is no longer generally accepted as a legitimate barrier to a woman's use of her God-given talents in whatever way she chooses. Women can be lawyers, astronauts, police and fire fighters, politicians, business executives, professional athletes, and homemakers. All of these are now widely accepted and acceptable roles for women which traditionalists argued against for the same reasons they still oppose opening combat ships and aircraft to women.

But, in fact, the idea that women are protected in our society is largely a myth. It is sadly true that women are safer in combat units in the military than they are on the streets of our capital city at night. It is also true that women, as the givers of life, deserve respect. Anyone who can fly an F-18, bear children, and chair the board of a nursery school has mine. The beauty of being a woman in the 1990s is that there is greater acceptance of the compatibility of these roles. One can be a mother and a soldier, just as one can be a loving father and a pilot.

Before long, women will be flying combat aircraft and expanding their participation at sea and in the Army in the defense of this country. Theirs is an honorable profession. The integration of women into the military has been gradual; they are trained volunteers prepared to do a difficult job well. We should welcome them. □

Fit for Duty

Edna G. Rostow

IN 1950, a project undertaken for the Office of Scientific Research and Development of the U.S. Government and entitled "The Adjustment and Achievement of Former University Psychiatric Patients in Military Service" was completed. It had been conducted by Dr. Clements C. Fry, Chief Psychiatrist and head of Yale's Division of Student Mental Hygiene, and myself, then the Executive Associate and Director of Research for the Yale Division.

The seven-year investigation, done through the National Research Council and with the help of the Surgeons General of the Army and Navy, focused on a sample of 2017 Yale and Harvard undergraduate and graduate students who had been patients of the University psychiatrist and who had subsequently served in the military. Among these students was a group of 176 homosexuals. The report of the study in general was held classified until the mid-fifties before being released—too late to be of much interest to the psychiatric community, or to the military. Now, with political action focusing on the question of homosexuality and military service, this old report has suddenly become topical. A central question it raised is still relevant: should the military be interested in homosexuality as such, or in an individual's conformity to the demands of service?

Edna G. Rostow was, until 1990, consultant to the Yale Division of Student Mental Health, and has been a consultant to the State Department and the Foreign Service.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The study concluded that many former patients (in all diagnostic categories, including that of homosexual) who should have been rejected for service under the official regulations had entered one or another of the services, and performed their duties at least as well as former students who had *not* been patients. The rate of psychiatric discharge for the former was no worse than that for the non-patient group.

The study was undertaken at a time when leading psychiatric figures were beginning to explore and question long-held opinions and judgments. Psychiatric experience with and knowledge of individual growth and development coinciding with the college years was limited. It was our conclusion that, for all categories reviewed, the value of the study lay primarily in the questions it raised about the adequacy of prevailing psychiatric classifications and projections, especially with regard to individuals of military service age. In the words of the report, "the diagnostic labels then in common use seemed to us to be not only inappropriate, in the light of case records available for our research, but shallow and sterile as well."

Thus the general thrust of the report was a considered evaluation of the state of psychiatric knowledge about individual behavior in circumstances of particular stress; how the knowledge related to predictability of individual performance; and what relevant factors evidenced themselves in a selected group of individuals who were not representatives of the total mass of draftees, but seemed to be representative of the pool from which junior officers were drawn. At the time, junior officers were recruited principally from ROTC members and volunteers from colleges and universities.

With regard to the homosexual men in the group, the report found that the issue of the homosexual and his relation to service was not so clear-cut and simple as the regulations of the day would indicate. The study undertook, therefore, to examine the theory underlying the regulation referring to rejection of homosexuals, and some of the problems involved in carrying it out:

> It would seem to be worthwhile to explore the validity of beliefs...popularly assumed to be truths. Is it true, for example, that...homosexuals always carry over undesirable habits from civilian to service life, especially sexual behavior? Would their behavior as officers be affected by their sexual orientation? Would it disqualify them as officers? Would their sexual responses disrupt their group? Would living in an exclusively male environment be too great a strain for them? The intention stated was to attempt to test common attitudes towards homosexuals.

Of the 131 accepted for service, 124 served on active duty for periods ranging from three months to nine years, the greatest concentration of those serving between three and four years, most of them (61.38 percent) as officers. The question posed then was:

> ...whether the military services should be interested in homosexuality as such, or the individual's capacity to make a socially productive adjustment to the particular group in which he might be placed in the service...(I)t is by no means clear (from the data) that there is any reason whatever for concluding that homosexuality itself is uniformly correlated with personality traits which would make a man a poor military risk.

The report's conclusion was that individuals who wished to be productive, conforming members of their group, whether homosexual or not, behaved in ways which were comparable. It was confirmed by the numbers of homosexuals who did serve without incident—and who apparently still do.

The authors argued that homosexuality should not be judged by the legal definition of it as a form of criminal behavior but as an "illness" and that discharge, where invoked, should be for sexual acts, not simply because of sexual orientation, and that discharge in any case should not be automatically "dishonorable." If no sexual acts were evidenced,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the man should be judged in terms of service performance.

This view of homosexuality as an illness should be understood in the context of the period. It denoted a big step forward for psychiatry and the influence of psychiatric thought on general attitudes. It has only been comparatively recently that the idea of homosexuality as a form of alternative and not deviant behavior has found qualified acceptance in American culture—and it is, even now, by no means universal acceptance. Questions continue to be raised as to the origin of homosexuality and its developmental course among individuals, although in this area, as in others, conventional thought may interfere with the pursuit of unconventional inquiry.

The report's questioning of the procedures for "dishonorable discharge" in the cases of homosexual soldiers was novel. It should be noted as well that in the period of seven years during which the study was made, the modifications and even revisions taking place in psychiatric thought on many questions, including that of homosexuality and the military, was reflected in the conclusion of the report calling attention to

> ...the recognition of homosexuality as a medical problem and the virtual elimination of court-martialling of homosexuals. The armed forces have taken an important step toward an enlightened view of an important social fact: namely, that the existence of homosexuality is not a crime or a rarity. The next step as we have already said is to examine the question as to whether the military services should be interested in homosexuality as such, or in the individual's capacity to make a socially productive adjustment to the group in which he might be placed in service.

Most of the present interest in the question of homosexuality and military service has now moved from the preoccupations of the authors of the work reported here. The primary thrust of our investigation was to explore the state of medical and psychiatric knowledge about a particular period in the individual physical and psychosocial growth and development of young men, coinciding with the student years. We were aware, as the report indicates, of limits on what was known about homosexuality in many of its aspects, not least in relation to individual growth and development. We found no evidence that homosexuality made a man a poor military risk. And we were critical of the deprivations of the civil rights of the defendant in the military discharging process. □

A Culture of Humiliation

Christopher Cviic

WHY COULD the parting in Yugoslavia—if it had to happen—not be achieved peacefully, through Western-style negotiation (like that, for example between Sweden and Norway in 1905) rather than through bloody conflict costing thousands of lives? As I reflect on this question, I keep returning to an incident from my personal experience that, to me at any rate, symbolizes and encapsulates the attitudes that have led to the present disaster. On May 1, 1985, a 59-year-old

Christopher Cviic is the editor of *The World Today*, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Serbian farmer by the name of Djordje Martinović was found in a distressed condition with a broken bottle up his anus in his own province of Serbia, one with a large ethnic Albanian majority. Almost overnight, this elderly man, who supplemented his farm income by working as a storekeeper for the Yugoslav Army in Gnjilane, became the center of a fierce controversy that quickly grew into a *cause célèbre*.

According to reports claiming to be based on Mr. Martinović's own evidence and published in Belgrade, Serbia's capital, Mr. Martinović had been attacked from behind by a group of masked men speaking Albanian, who then allegedly tied him up and brutalized him. The other version, in Kosovo's Albanian-language press and in the media in some non-Serbian parts of Yugoslavia, was very different. According to that account, Mr. Martinović was a homosexual who had suffered an accident while in the act of self-gratification and, in order to avoid bringing dishonor on himself and his family in a very old-fashioned society, decided to invent the alleged attack.

I arrived in Kosovo shortly thereafter while researching a story on the national question in Yugoslavia for *The Economist* and was one of the first Western correspondents to write about "the Martinović affair." The atmosphere I found there reminded me of Kurosawa's famous film "Rashomon" I had seen while still living in Yugoslavia in the early 1950s, in which a single violent incident is told in several completely different versions. I wanted to talk to Mr. Martinović but could not: he had been taken out of the hands of the Kosovo authorities, whisked off to the Yugoslav Army's Medical Academy in Belgrade and kept incommunicado there pending further clinical and psychiatric investigations.

Meanwhile ethnic Albanian officials in Priština, Kosovo's capital, kept assuring me that the story of the attack was a complete fabrication and even provided me with graphic clinical details of the incident as recorded by the local Albanian doctors (including the exact size of the bottle). They argued that the Martinović case was being exploited politically by the Serbian leaders in Belgrade as another argument in their campaign for the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy and its re-annexation by Serbia, on the grounds that this was the only way of protecting the local Serbs (by then 10 percent of the total population) from Albanian "terror." On the other hand, local Kosovo Serbs I talked to claimed to believe the attack version implicitly and interpreted the incident as another instance of the systematic Albanian campaign aimed at forcing the Kosovo Serbs to emigrate, leaving it to the Albanians. In Belgrade, meanwhile, the Kosovo farmer had become a hero to Serbian opinion as a martyr in the national cause. A famous Serbian painter not long afterwards made Mr. Martinović the central figure of a crucifixion scene in a painting which, I was told, now adorns one of the rooms in the building of the Serbian Academy of Sciences in Belgrade.

FOUR YEARS AFTER this bizarre and gruesome incident, in June 1989, Serbia re-annexed Kosovo, thus regaining full control over its police and judiciary. Intriguingly, the Martinović file remained closed. The new Serbian authorities have so far failed—to my knowledge anyway—to do what they might have been expected to do in such a highly publicized case. They have not reopened the investigation with a view to catching the alleged perpetrators, bringing them to justice and vindicating the old man's honor. This suggests that the attack theory might after all have been an anti-Albanian fabrication, as the local Albanians had claimed from the start. But, whatever the true facts of the case, they do not seem to matter any more—at least not to the present genera-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of Serbs. The martyrdom of Djordje Martinović, in the highly stylized form of the crucifixion in the Academy of Sciences picture, has become part of the Serbs' vision of themselves as perpetual victims of cruel historical circumstances—an idea born in Kosovo more than 600 years ago.

It was in Kosovo Polje (the Field of Blackbirds), not far from where Djordje Martinović suffered his mysterious humiliation, that on June 28, 1389 the Serbs suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the Turks. They did not fight alone—alongside them were Croatian and Hungarian nobles, as well as the local (also Christian) Albanians—but they still lost. That defeat at Kosovo sealed the fate of the Serbian state and ushered in five centuries of life under Ottoman rule. The Serbs' sense of national humiliation after Kosovo was particularly acute because at the time the memories were still fresh of their own short-lived kingdom which had spread over a large part of the Balkans. Life under the Ottoman Empire, involving as it did for the majority population what would nowadays be called collaboration with the enemy. For example, the main hero of Serbian folk poetry, Prince Marko (*Kraljević Marko*), endowed in popular imagination with superhuman strength and extraordinary bravery as well as great cunning, was a historical figure—in fact a small feudal ruler who, like all the other Serbian Christian nobles, became the Turkish sultan's vassal after the Kosovo battle. In one of the Serbian folk ballads called "*Kraljević Marko i Musa Kesedžija*," Marko is commissioned by the Turks to kill Musa, represented in the poem as a bandit but in fact an Albanian insurgent against Turkish rule. The necessity to collaborate with the enemy induced in the Serbs a strong sense of inferiority and a correspondingly powerful urge for a violent compensation, both of which are reflected in Serbian folk poetry (later discovered and much praised by the Grimm brothers and other German scholars of the Romantic era). Much of that poetry is so violent and sadistic that in schools, as I myself remember, it was taught in a severely bowdlerized form.

It was just short of 500 years after the battle of Kosovo, at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, that Serbia regained its independence, following it four years later, in 1882, with the proclamation of a monarchy. In the intervening centuries, the Serbs had turned their defeat at Kosovo into a powerful national myth—that of a virtuous, gallant victim undeservedly crushed by an overwhelmingly stronger army but certain to rise one day to a new greatness. It was one of several myths that the Serbs relied on to help them overcome the trauma of lost sovereignty and to compensate for the humiliations and deprivations of life under foreign rule. This acute sense of national grievance against what they perceived as an unkind fate gave the Serbs an all-encompassing alibi for the policy of territorial expansion embarked upon in the first half of the nineteenth century. That sense of being absolved, on account of past suffering, from compliance with the usual norms of international behavior is one of the most important elements of Serbian political culture and behavior today. It provides an excuse for policies such as "ethnic cleansing," widely condemned by the rest of the world and based on the idea that Serbs must not be obliged to live "under" any other nation or even, as in Bosnia, to share a state with non-Serbs. Significantly, old Serb myths are particularly strong among the Serbs in Bosnia, most of whom live in sparsely populated mountain areas, with a tradition of singing folk ballads to the accompaniment of the *gusle*, the one-string fiddle. A recent BBC-TV documentary depicted Mr. Radovan Karadžić, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and his men playing contemporary, strongly xenophobic versions of old folk ballads to the accompaniment of the *gusle*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the past several years the Serbs have been fed, through their state-controlled television and other media, a diet of hate for the neighboring peoples. Warnings of genocide allegedly in store for the Serbs in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, and elsewhere were coupled with reminders of the sufferings, many of them only too real, inflicted on the Serbs in the past—as in the years between 1941 and 1945, under the murderous regime of Ante Pavelic in Croatia. But there was also a lot of propaganda about the dark anti-Serb activities of the "enemies of the Serbian people" operating out of Bonn, Vienna, Rome, Tirana, and other "anti-Serb" centers. Cases like that of the hapless Djordje Martinović were manipulated to make the Serbs feel humiliated once again, as they had been under the Turks, and to make them demand revenge.

This propaganda campaign, masterminded by nationalist intellectuals in the Serbian Academy of Sciences in Belgrade and similar bodies—and indirectly helped by nationalist anti-Serb outbursts from places like Ljubljana and Zagreb—proved a brilliant success. State-owned Serbian television, which for the majority of the population is the chief source of information, played a role not unlike the *gusle* singers. The campaign delivered the Serbian people, both those in Serbia proper and those outside, into the hands of Mr. Milosević, Serbia's leader since 1986, and his allies, the communist generals, in their quest for a Greater Serbia. Critical voices advocating a different course—what Serbia's small opposition likes to call the "European option"—were silenced, not least because the West seemed unable or unwilling to stop the aggression. The Serbian opposition's position today is not unlike that of the anti-Nazi German in, say, 1941 or 1942 when Hitler seemed to be invincible.

It is unlikely that the bid for Greater Serbia will succeed. It will take time, however, before it becomes clear—above all to the Serbs—that it has failed. Only when the majority of Serbs have freed themselves from the powerful grip of mythical thinking will it be possible for the democratization process to begin. It will be a long haul. □

Gremlins

We regret the following errors in our Spring 1993 issue:

In Peter Reddaway's "The Role of Popular Discontent." On Page 59, column 2, the paragraph beginning "At first...." should read "Why then did Gorbachev, soon after his accession to power in 1985, diverge from this traditional and rational enough view of the dangers posed by popular dissatisfaction? At first...."

In Nathan Glazer's "Did We Go Too Far?" on page 135, paragraph 2, the title of Lionel Trilling book should be "The Middle of the Journey."

In Martin Malia's "A Fatal Logic," on page 83, the author of *Darkness at Noon* is, of course, Arthur Koestler.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Seeing Ghosts

Noel Malcolm

Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 307 pp., $22.95.

ROBERT KAPLAN is a travel-writer and journalist who spent much of the 1980s living in Greece. From there he also traveled frequently to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, occasionally to Romania, and once to Albania. Soon after the fall of Ceausescu he journeyed for six weeks through Romania, and more recently he has been to Croatia and Macedonia. Out of these travels and an eclectic reading-list of biographies, histories and other writers' travel-books, he has strung together a narrative-descriptive chain of Balkan bits and pieces. The publishers proudly cite Professor Paul Kennedy on the back cover, proclaiming the book as "full of significance for Europe's contemporary condition." Can a chain so constructed out of vignettes, anecdotes and *aperçus* really carry such a great weight? This one is, alas, no stronger than its many weak links; it may succeed as a work of literary art, but it lacks explanatory pulling-power.

Evidently, Robert Kaplan knows some countries better than others. The one he is most familiar with is Greece; and the final section of the book, which is about Greek culture and politics and the extraordinary career of the Socialist former Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, is undoubtedly the best. Here, one senses, Mr Kaplan knows his way around. He knows the sorts of hidden things that casual visitors would not be aware of unless they had done their homework particularly well: the suppressed ethnic diversity of the population, for example, and the shadowy terrorist movements of the 1980s which—with a little help from the Greek government—turned Athens into one of the terrorist capitals of Europe. The whole chapter on Papandreou is a *tour de force*, tracing his development from tweed-clad chairman of the economics department at Berkeley to leader of a gangsterish and virulently anti-American party, befriended both by Colonel Qaddafi and (in a more intimate capacity) by an airline hostess whose husband was an official of the Maoist Revolutionary Communist Party.

Greece, as Robert Kaplan points out, is not quite the sort of country which those blessed with a classical education have always supposed—or wanted—it to be. It is more Oriental, more Ottoman, more Byzantine. Kaplan rails against the usual misunderstandings in a paragraph which is, in my view, the unintentionally defining passage of the whole book:

> In the seven years I lived in Greece, few things irked me more than to see foreign correspondents explain the local political turmoil with such phrases as "After all, the Greeks invented theater" and "Not only is *democracy* a Greek word, but so is *anarchy*." Then there were the cute references to "Greek tragedy" and "Greek comedy." I too, in a lazy period, once fell back on ancient Greek "theater" and "masks" to explain modern Greek politics. Editors and readers in America and England had studied Greek drama at school and could therefore relate to the reference.

I call this the unintentionally defining passage of the book, because when I reached this paragraph it crystallized in my mind the objections I had felt throughout the previous 260 pages to Kaplan's treatment of the other Balkan countries. Just as the foreign correspondents he

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

complains of here fitted Greece into their own ready-made explanatory clichés, so Robert Kaplan has done the same with Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria. But while those hack journalists tried to explain Greece in terms of Aeschylus and Sophocles (who were at least Greek), Kaplan's preferred literary models for explaining the Slav-Danubian world are Dostoyevsky and Bram Stoker—each of whom was writing roughly a thousand miles away.

A few typical Kaplanite comments will illustrate the nature of the problem. The frescoes in the Serbian monastery of Peć showed him

> haunted and hunger-ravaged faces from a preconscious, Serb past, evincing a spirituality and primitivism that the West knows best through the characters of Dostoyevsky. I felt as though I were inside a skull into which the collective memories of a people had been burned.

At the end of his journey across Romania he concluded that "Romania was an echo of Dostoyevsky's world: the inside of a ghoulish, Byzantine icon, peopled by suffering and passionate figures whose minds were distorted by their own rage and belief in wild half-truths and conspiracies." Earlier he had observed that the "mystical streak" of the Romanians had been

> intensified by the Carpathian landscape itself, darkened by fir forests and teeming with wolves and bears, out of which arose a pantheon of spirits and superstitions...It was no accident that Bram Stoker, the Dublin-born author of *Dracula*, situated his novel in Romania.

And, most extraordinarily of all, the Balkans as a whole are summed up as follows: "This was a time-capsule world: a dim stage upon which people raged, spilled blood, experienced visions and ecstasies. Yet their expressions remained fixed and distant, like dusty statuary."

We have entered the world of the living dead cliché. Bram Stoker never set foot in Romania, and his *Dracula* (which Kaplan cites six times) had about as much to do with the place as Erroll Flynn had with medieval Nottingham. But he serves Robert Kaplan's purpose, which is to conjure up a ghoulish world of mysticism and murder, of irrational, superstitious hatred. The key to the Balkans, we are meant to think, is that people there hate one another with a kind of age-old sacred fury. As an explanatory characterization of Balkan life and history, this is nonsense. But with the war now raging in Bosnia it is worse than mere nonsense—it is dangerous nonsense.

I SOMETIMES FEEL that even if I had been paid only a hyper-inflated Yugoslav *dinar* every time I had heard the phrase "age-old ethnic hatreds" during the last couple of years, I should be a rich man. It has been the mantra of Western politicians who wish to indicate both that they have some vague historical understanding of the region, and—herein lies the danger—that they are confident there is nothing the West can or should do. (If a lot of strange foreigners are determined to kill one another for their own, strange, ancient reasons, how can we ever stop them?) As a way of looking at the origins of the present war in Bosnia, this is an abdication of judgment.

The Bosnian war was not caused by ancient hatreds; it was caused by modern politicians, notably Mr. Milošević and Dr. Karadžić, with the help of the political controllers of Radio Television Belgrade. The politicians had to work very hard at their propaganda, political manipulation, misinformation, rumor-mongering and terrorizing in order to create active hatred where it did not exist before. Bosnia is not covered in Kaplan's book, but the brief mention he makes of it is characteristic: he calls it (before the present war) "full of suspicions and hatreds." I have stayed in many places in Bosnia, including Serb, Muslim, and Croat villages, during the last fifteen years, and I simply do not recognize Kaplan's description. He gives no source

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for this off-the-cuff judgment, and I doubt whether he has read serious scholars such as the anthropologist William Lockwood, whose *European Muslims: Economy and Ethnicity in Western Bosnia* (1975) was based on extensive fieldwork in villages north-west of Sarajevo. Lockwood concluded: "Interethnic relations...can generally be described as good." The truth is that the three communities in Bosnia have lived peaceably together for most of the period since 1878. The episodes of conflict in the two world wars were the exceptions, induced and aggravated by political causes originating from outside Bosnia's borders. And while it is true that there was hatred and violence in pre-1878 Bosnia, it was not an ethnic conflict as such, but an agrarian conflict between serfs and landowners.

Lockwood's book is worth studying for the picture it gives of traditional inter-ethnic life in a typical area of mixed settlement. In the countryside, the communities lived elaborately parallel lives—intertwined, so to speak, but not interwoven. Modern life has produced more opportunities for direct contact, through national schooling, military service and the general effects of urbanization. But in the old way of life in the countryside, the marketplace was almost the only point at which all communities met and interacted. The same pattern can be observed today in the mixed Slav-Albanian areas of western Macedonia. Each community keeps to itself; relations when they meet may be cool or cordial, but hatred is not a driving force except when national politicians are doing the driving.

This was almost the natural pattern of life in many parts of the Balkans under Ottoman rule. One has only to look at an ethnographic map showing the mosaic of villages in late Ottoman northern Greece—Slav, Turkish, Albanian, Vlach—to see that it could scarcely have been otherwise. There were ancient differences, certainly; but the idea that such differences should be a basis for hatred is, historically, a recent innovation, brought in by intellectuals and politicians in the nineteenth century when they tried to impose the theory of the homogeneous national state on their very heterogeneous homelands. That was the period of the nursing of national myths: the revival of the Kosovo epic in Serbia, for example, or the insistence on the Roman (or Dacian) origins of the Romanians. Today, when these myths are harped on so constantly in the service of modern political hatred, it is easy to misjudge their significance. When an observer such as Robert Kaplan hears a Romanian and a Hungarian arguing passionately about the ethnic make-up of ninth-century Transylvania, he all too easily assumes that he is listening to an expression of "ancient hatred." The history may be ancient; but its deployment in the service of hatred is comparatively modern.

Not understanding this, Kaplan has picked again and again on the most extreme and untypical moments of twentieth-century Balkan history and done his best to dress them up as archetypes. His account begins with the story of the Croatian Archbishop Stepinac and his uneasy attitude—first benign, then denunciatory—towards the murderous Ustaša state from 1941 to 1945. No serious observer would call this a typical moment in Croatian history; the ideology of the Ustaši was borrowed from abroad, their power was secured by foreign armies, and when installed in government they had barely 12,000 members among the entire population. But they did kill a lot of people; and this, to put it crudely, is what seems to have attracted Mr Kaplan's attention. (Compare his atrocity-by-atrocity summary of Romanian history; as magpies make collections of shiny objects, so Mr Kaplan goes through national histories, picking out the gory bits.) The ghost of Cardinal Stepinac, he tells us, "serves as the elemental symbol of the Serb-Croat dispute, around which every other ethnic hatred...is arranged." But what exactly, before the second world war, was the Serb-Croat dispute? It was a political dispute, or an historical-theoretical dispute among intellectuals. The political dispute occasionally caused riots or assassinations; but it is hard to think of any instances in earlier Serb-Croat history of Serbs wanting to kill Croats just because they were Croats, or vice-versa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kaplan may call Stepinac an "elemental" symbol if he so wishes, but he does not begin to demonstrate that the Serb-Croat dispute rested on any kind of historically elemental hatred.

The untypicality of the period just before and during the second world war is nowhere more obvious than when Kaplan deals with antisemitism. He tells the terrible story of the atrocities committed by the Iron Guard in Romania, and of the deportations and exterminations in Romanian-occupied Bessarabia. Once again an aura of false logic hovers over the argument: the methods used were primitive or medieval; therefore the hatred must have been primitive or medieval too. The truth, however, is that antisemitism as a political force in Romania is a twentieth-century phenomenon. Nineteenth-century intellectuals paved the way with theories of the pure Romanian national spirit; but antisemitism as a basis for political violence is hardly visible in Romanian history before the peasant revolt of 1907, when Jewish estate managers in Moldavia became a political as well as an economic scapegoat. Kaplan writes that northern Romania in the late nineteenth century was "one of the worst places in Europe for a Jew to have been born." How then does he account for the steady flow of Jews who, throughout the nineteenth century, migrated into northern Romania? Despite the lack of full civic rights, they found life hugely preferable there to conditions under the anti-semitic laws which applied in the Ukraine and Bessarabia.

And that is to say nothing of the previous five or six centuries of largely peaceful Jewish life in Romania, one of the Balkan havens to which Jews had fled after their expulsions from Hungary in the fourteenth century and Spain in the fifteenth. The two darkest themes running through Kaplan's account are antisemitism and the visceral cruelty of Turkish rule—the "poison of Eastern despotism" which, he says, seeped through the sultan's palace. Yet at no point in the book does he put these two themes together and note the obvious damage to his argument which results.

The plain truth, visible in the works of scholars such as Stanford Shaw, is that Jews fared better under the Ottoman Empire than they did in most parts of the Slavic-Germanic world further north. In Skopje and Salonica Kaplan mourns the Sephardic communities which were almost exterminated in the second world war. Their slaughter is presented as yet another sign of typical Balkan blood-lust; but if it was really so typical, why had it not happened during the previous 450 years? The obvious answer is that it was Nazi policy, not Balkan ancient hatred, that killed those Jews. And to this answer, the only counter-reply Kaplan ever offers is perhaps the most flimsy piece of special pleading in his book: "Nazism, for instance, can claim Balkan origins. Among the flophouses of Vienna, a breeding ground of ethnic resentments close to the southern Slav world, Hitler learned how to hate so infectiously." One might as well say that serialism can claim Balkan origins, because Schoenberg may have heard Slavs whistling funny tunes on the *Mariahilferstrasse*.

NO ONE CAN so specialize in the collection of hatreds without acquiring one or two little animosities of his own. Kaplan's hostile feelings towards Turks seep through many of these pages—most notably in the final pages, when he takes a bus ride from Greece into Eastern Thrace. At the border post there was a picture of Atatürk, which immediately reminded Mr. Kaplan of "an Aryan Dracula"; he also saw a soldier whose expression was "proud and obedient: he looked capable of great cruelty." Later in the streets of Edirne he noted how polite and well-behaved the people were, and decided that they were adopting "a complacent, dignified air that I realized was the luxury of the conquerors." Another revealing moment is when Kaplan describes the aftermath of the Greco-Turkish war. "In the massive population exchange that followed," he writes, "400,000 Turks from Greek Thrace marched into Turkey, and 1,250,000 Greeks from Asia Minor went into exile in Greece—homeless, ill-clothed, starving." Note the symbolism: the Turks, though equally uprooted against their wishes as a consequence of an aggressive Greek military

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adventure, "marched into Turkey," while the Greeks went into miserable exile. (Note also the error: Greek Thrace was specifically excluded from the population exchange by the Treaty of Lausanne.)

This prejudice is carried over, in an indirect and curiously unpleasant way, into Kaplan's account of the Albanians of Kosovo. Arriving at Priština (the capital of Kosovo), Kaplan smells "the odors of garbage and mixed cement. I thought of the liver-hued suburbs of Ankara and Istanbul....Prishtina seemed a regurgitation not only of the Turkish past, but of the Turkish present too." Some might wonder why one has to go all the way to Turkey in order to characterize the smell of garbage and mixed cement; but Kaplan's sub-text here is a powerful engine which overturns such rational objections. It is constructing a web of association between ethnic Albanians, modern Turks, Ottoman Turks, Islam, primitive behavior, and dirt—a characteristically Serbian pattern of association. Kaplan's account of the ways in which these Albanians have suffered under the Serbs during this century is extremely sketchy, and his bare reference to the clampdown under Milošević is quite uncomprehending; in his view, the worst thing the Serbs have done to the Albanians is to build too many expensive modern buildings for them. "Not until I traveled to Prishtina," he writes, "did I fully grasp the extent of the crime committed by Tito and the other sultans going all the way back to Murad." The meaning seems to be that Tito's crime was to build fancy libraries and tower-blocks for the Albanians, and the other sultans' crime was to introduce them into Kosovo in the first place. Modern Serb hatred could not put it better.

Other elements of a Serb-eyed view of the world also peep through some of these pages. Kaplan's account of the special land-holding arrangements of the martial Serbs who were placed by the Habsburgs on the military 'Krajina' (frontier-zone) of Croatia is a blend of ignorance and Serb paranoia: "such devious stratagems as giving the Serb minority in Croatia special privileges, in order to incite the Croats against the Serbs." And when Kaplan describes the Austro-Hungarian governance of Bosnia as "misrule," "vicious," and a "tyranny," one senses that he is extraordinarily dependent on Serb nationalist sources. Though he boasts of his familiarity with out-of-print books on the Balkans, he has evidently never read the detailed accounts of Bosnia under Austrian rule by unbiased observers such as the British scholar William Miller (*Travels and Politics in the Near East*, [1898]) or the American journalist W. E. Curtis (*The Turk and his Lost Provinces*, [1903]). "Members of the different religious faiths mix with each other on amicable terms and show mutual respect and mutual toleration," wrote Curtis. "The courts are wisely and honestly administered, justice is awarded to every citizen regardless of his religion or social position...Today human life is as safe in Bosnia as in Illinois."

Passing down the Balkan peninsula, Mr. Kaplan's pro-Serb sympathies merge with his pro-Greek ones. The natural changeover point is Macedonia, an area with a small Serb minority which was partly conquered by the Serbian army in 1912 and incorporated into Serbian territory under the made-up title of "Southern Serbia." Here Kaplan repeats the standard line of both Greek and Serbian propagandists, which is that the idea of a separate linguistic and ethnic Macedonian identity is a recent, Titoist invention. Nobody, he insists, ever promoted such a separate identity in the nineteenth century; this suggests a certain unfamiliarity with such works as Miladinov's collection of Macedonian folk tales (1861) or Pulevski's *Trilingual Dictionary* (1875), which presented Macedonian as a separate language. The best guide, Kaplan insists, is a Greek writer, Evangelos Kofos (who these days acts as a quasi-official spokesman for the Greek government on Macedonia). "According to Kofos, this part of former Yugoslavia is actually southern Serbia. True, perhaps; but rightly or wrongly, these Slavs now consider themselves Macedonians, not Serbs...." That second sentence squirms with logical discomfort. Since these people, like their parents and ancestors before them, are not Serbs and do not have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Serbian as their mother tongue, a better judgment would be not "true, perhaps," but: "false, obviously."

KAPLAN HAS a vivid pen, and some of his descriptive passages work well. But like a retreating star undergoing the Doppler effect, his prose seems always to be shifting into purple. Too often I found him touching up (or down) places and people I knew, till his descriptions verged on caricature. In the towns he dislikes it is always raining—or perhaps vice-versa—and the waitresses invariably have "hairy legs."

While Kaplan's English is tolerable, the same cannot be said of his command of local languages, personal names and place-names. Leaving aside his quaint use of phoneticisms taken from Rebecca West ("Kossovo" instead of Kosovo or Kosovë/Kosova) and his use of the old-fashioned "Jassy" instead of Iasi ("Jassy often appears on maps as Iasi," he helpfully explains; that is because Iasi is its name, of which Jassy is simply a version in Hungarian transcription), I am still left wondering why he calls the notorious Croatian death-camp "Jesenovac" (it is Jasenovac), why he thinks the most famous spot in Belgrade is called "Kalimegdan" (it is Kalemegdan), why he calls the prominent Kosovar politician "Azen Vlasi" (he is Azem Vllasi) or the famous Romanian historian "Nicholae Iorga" (he was Nicolae Iorga), why he refers to the Albanian town of "Serande," adding that it is called "Aghios Saranda" in Greek (it is Sarandë/Saranda in Albanian, and Aghii Saranda in Greek), and why on earth he steadfastly and absurdly presents the name of the former Romanian security police as "the Securitatae." German, Romanian and Serbo-Croat words or phrases proudly printed in italics are riddled with similar errors. When he tells us that Gypsies are "*Tziganes* in Romanian" he is adding nothing to his narrative, and even less to the store of knowledge: the Romanian for Gypsies is either *tsigani* or *tigani*, depending on which method of transliteration one uses. Mr. Kaplan, erratically, uses both. □

Noel Malcolm was until recently Foreign Editor of the London Spectator. *He now writes for the London* Daily Telegraph.

The Enemy Within

Fred C. Iklé

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 221 pp., $19.95.

EVERY SPOT ON this earth—well, nearly every one—is inhabited nowadays by two, three, or more peoples that differ in race, religion, or ethnic background. For each of these disparate groups, the same spot is their inalienable land, their rightful home, their patrimony. The origins of this multi-tribal cohabitation vary greatly. Sometimes one tribe conquered the territory inhabited by another tribe without expelling or killing all the "natives." In other cases, racially or ethnically disparate people were imported as slaves or indentured labor, or welcomed as voluntary immigrants.

It has also happened in past centuries that diversity emerged out of a previously homogeneous population, without any transfer of peo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ple. During the Protestant Reformation in Europe scattered clusters of people suddenly changed their religion, thereafter either to kill their neighbors who no longer belonged to their in-group, or to live side by side peacefully for centuries. The Reformation thus fragmented large regions of Central Europe into a leopard spot map colored "Catholic" and "Protestant." The political sorting out of this fragmentation led to the Thirty Years War, a most calamitous, cruel, destructive war with a great deal of "religious cleansing."

Leopard-spot maps colored by religion were created also by the spread of Islam (largely through the expansion of the Ottoman Empire) in parts of Africa and in the Balkans. These religious conversions—although occurring in a flash, so to speak—have shown a curiously stubborn persistence, surviving from generation to generation as if they had been locked into the genetic code of families. Building on this persistence, history has played a most cruel joke: it has repainted the religious leopard-spot map with "ethnic" colors. Just as the religious colors on the map of the Balkans (and other parts of Europe) were being bleached by the agnosticism and religious indifferentism of the late nineteenth and twentieth century, history freshened up the spots garishly with ethnicity.

The Muslim villages in what used to be Bosnia-Herzegovina, a province of what used to be Yugoslavia, had been inhabited—prior to their recent ethnic cleansing—neither by new immigrants and asylum seekers, nor (with a few blurred exceptions) by descendants of Turk conquerors from Ottoman times, but instead by descendants of "natives" who had been converted to Islam, centuries ago.

NOW THE Bosnian landscape has been repainted again, with the ash-color of burnt villages and the mud-color of fresh mass graves. It has become pandemonium, a gathering place of wickedness and old demons, a most recent instance of what Daniel Patrick Moynihan's latest book *Pandaemonium* is about. Despite the subtitle that stays neutral between good and evil, Moynihan's book is about the demonic side of ethnicity. It is about ethnic conflict that has exploded into carnage, rape, and arson, now to be witnessed in every corner of the globe—Nagorno-Karabakh, India, Los Angeles in 1992. And, more profoundly, it is about such ethnic conflict that is still latent, waiting to happen; perhaps in the Crimea, perhaps in Latvia—and perhaps in the United States.

Since Marcus Aurelius, the world may never have seen a philosopher-king. Yet, happily, today's American political system can still nourish a philosopher-senator. Moynihan—author of many books, coauthor of *Beyond the Melting Pot* (1963), erstwhile Harvard professor of urban politics, U.S. assistant secretary of labor, assistant for urban affairs for the president, diplomatist, and more—is truly a philosopher-politician, especially when it comes to matters ethnic in America. When Moynihan returned home from his distinguished ambassadorship to the world's largest democracy, a country drenched in ethnic conflict from Bihar to Kashmir, he might have whispered to himself: "I have seen the future and it doesn't work."

Will it work at home? Reading between the lines of *Pandaemonium* one detects a melancholy sense of foreboding, a barely spoken forecast of horrendous ethnic strife abroad and—may the Lord have mercy on us—in the United States. At the same time, one is being entertained on nearly every page by elegant wit, refreshingly irreverent asides, and whimsical surprises. It makes you feel as if you were listening to two pieces of music at the same time. You enter the concert hall and your enjoyment begins with one of Mozart's Divertimentos; but then, every so often, themes from the Requiem waft into the room—*dies irae*, that day of wrath dissolving centuries into ashes. Then again, tralala, the Divertimento. There is nothing wrong with keeping a sense of humor while writing about most tragic things to come. In

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fact, it is healthier that way.

"What is to be done? Not, perhaps, a great deal," writes Moynihan in the concluding chapter. He reaches this point after reviewing the intellectual-political ruins left throughout the world by "two large ideas" that had each offered the historic remedy for ethnicity. One was the Marxist idea that ethnicity would be overtaken by "proletarian internationalism." The other idea was—and in some minds still is—the liberal view that ethnicity will be dissolved in the melting pot of democracy, or if not thus dissolved then at least solved through self-determination for all the ethnic populations.

To recall the Marxist "solution" of ethnicity, Moynihan paints for us in a few elegant strokes a bridge between the mendacious and contorted nationality policies of the early Bolsheviks, the entry on stage of Stalin as Chairman of the Commissariat for Nationalities, and the exit from stage of the Soviet Union, the giant that suddenly broke into ethnic shards. Who would have foreseen this outcome? Well, for one, Moynihan. Without any false modesty, he lets the reader review his most enviable record of political prediction and farsightedness.

TEN YEARS before the Berlin Wall came down, he wrote: "Since 1920 the Communists have rather encouraged ethnic culture, while ruthlessly suppressing ethnic politics. It won't work." In 1984, Moynihan said "the Cold War is over. The West won...." In 1986 he wrote of "the near complete collapse of Marxism as an ideological force in the world," of "a world convulsed with ethnic conflict that defeats any Marxist analysis." Understandably, Moynihan can now have some fun with those who then insisted that "our grandchildren" would still have to confront the Soviet threat. His glee here, just once, drives him off the subject of ethnicity: on page 50 we have to read about the U.S. budget deficit. He seems to say here that the Reagan Administration's failure to foresee the collapse of Communism led to the defense build-up, which led to the deficit. One could go on, however, beyond this single cause explanation, and add the Reagan administration's toleration of the growth in entitlements, and of large farm subsidies, plus the many budgetary sins of Congress.

In lieu of quoting David Stockman's kiss-and-tell criticism of the budget process in the Reagan years, it would have been more pertinent—and more gracious—had Moynihan quoted what Ronald Reagan had to say about communism only a year and a half after Moynihan's (apparently) first on the record statement that the Soviet Union might "blow up" and that communism would not work. Since the new edition of *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations* deliberately suppresses all familiar Reagan quotations, let us overcome this censorship here and now:

> The years ahead are great ones for this country, for the cause of freedom...The West won't contain communism, it will transcend communism...[It] will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written.[May 17, 1981]

About the other "large idea" for overcoming the problems of ethnicity, Moynihan has things to say that are not just retrospective (as with communism) but point—in a profoundly troubling way—to the coming decades. The idea of self-determination of peoples, we are reminded, was promoted by President Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I. But *Pandaemonium* tells us a great deal more about the history of the idea (which traces back to the eighteenth century Enlightenment) and about the foibles of those promoting it (especially Woodrow Wilson).

Undoubtedly, the idea of self-determination had not been thought through when the United States began to promote it throughout the world. But pray tell us, what was the alternative at the end of World War I when the Hapsburg and the Ottoman empires unravelled? And what was the alternative during the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

last few years, as we faced the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia? Moynihan himself chides James Baker and George Bush for not welcoming the break-up of these two multi-ethnic states soon enough. So surely, he is not arguing that Woodrow Wilson should have declared in 1918 (to paraphrase James Baker's 1991 statement on Yugoslavia) "that the United States continues to recognize and support the territorial integrity of the Hapsburg and the Ottoman empires." If the ethnic mosaics of these disintegrating empires were to be held together, it would have required a new cohesive force. Where could it have come from? Who would have provided it? Could it have been other than a coercive force?

Some potential ethnic conflicts have been avoided without a Stalin and without a melting pot. As Moynihan puts it "scholars also need to attend to success." And there aren't many successes in this domain. Moynihan mentions one: the case of the South Tirol (Italy's German speaking region). In the mid-1980s, ethnic tension was rife there, leading even to some violence. Now, Italy and Austria have found a resolution and all seems peaceful.

Another success story (not mentioned in *Pandaemonium*) is Switzerland. The Protestant Reformation splintered the religious map of Switzerland more than it fragmented the German-speaking regions that stretched from the Rhine to Bohemia, from Munich to Hamburg. Yet, in those German lands it took thirty years of warfare to sort out the new boundaries, while the Swiss, to avoid war, peacefully divided several of their cantons into Catholic and Protestant parts. Nor was that the last of peaceful ethnic partitioning. Only some twenty years ago the citizens of French speaking counties of Canton Berne suddenly discovered that they had had enough of those Germanic burghers in the city of Berne. After interminable discussions, votes, and referenda, the new Canton Jura was cut out of Canton Berne to accommodate this outburst of ethnicity.

The challenge, Moynihan postulates, "is to make the world safe for and from ethnicity." Federalism, properly designed, can go a long way, providing the ethnic cohabitation is not an emulsion that defies geographic separation. The European Community bureaucrats have given the key idea of federalism a new name: "subsidiarity," the principle that the central authority in a federal structure should legislate and rule over only those matters that cannot be delegated to the constituent parts. Whether the bureaucrats in Brussels only preach or also practice subsidiarity is another question.

More subsidiarity might help attenuate ethnic conflict even in situations where cantonization is not the appropriate remedy (i.e. where there is an ethnic "emulsion," not a leopard-spot map). Indeed, more subsidiarity (or federalism) would be good for the United States. There was a time when the Republican party used to promote federalism. Today, however, federal centralism is a plague on both sides of the aisle. Whenever some heinous crime is reported on television, Republicans and Democrats vie with each other to legislate a new Federal Crime. Last year, the Bush administration would not let Oregon do its own reasonable thing for health insurance.

Appropriately, *Pandaemonium* concludes with an anxious glance at the racial and ethnic tensions in American cities. "Spreading patters of group preferences" that silt up "the interstices of municipal government" exacerbate these tensions. And the problem will now get worse, Moynihan warns, since new federal laws and legal practices are mandating group preferences, creating "protected classes."

Add to this the fact that the pandemonium of ethnic conflict abroad will inflame ethnic tensions at home. In the next fifty years there will be fifty—or a hundred and fifty—new states, and most of these "will appear in Africa and Asia." And, adds Moynihan, "we can say with an equal order of confidence that most of these new states will be badly off, not least from the point of view of ethnic homogeneity. Nor will they

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have much of a civic culture."

From such turmoil and misery, emigration is a tempting escape. Where to? Moynihan points out that the sorting out of ethnic and kindred tensions in the United States "is complicated by the huge immigration of the 1970s and 1980s." Now, the senior senator from New York wisely leaves a few connecting thoughts to be discovered by the reader. The two points about current levels of immigration and about many new states with ethnic crises (that might generate emigration) are safely insulated by a good many pages from another point, politically so incorrect today it is best made by citing an old text. So Moynihan quotes something he wrote in 1986 to tell us that the strengthening of American democracy in the previous age of immigration had something to do with the cultures from which the immigrants came. "Put plain, the immigrants of the second half of the nineteenth century came from societies more civilized than ours." Here then, scattered throughout the pleasant Divertimento, one can hear the Requiem's bodeful cantus of *dies irae*, the day of wrath.

A splendid performance to convey it all in such a compact book. □

Fred Charles Iklé was undersecretary of defense for policy in the Reagan administration and is currently a Distinguished Scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.

War and Cruelty

Eliot Cohen

Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 504 pp., $29.95.

Kanan Makiya, *Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), 367 pp., $22.95.

THE GULF WAR has already developed a peculiar historiography. It took place, if not in the glare of klieg lights then under the level stare of thousands of video cameras. Its participants, and particularly the American leaders who shaped the diplomacy and strategy of the crisis and the war, have spoken often and at great length about their deeds. The events of 1990/1991 received the scrutiny of pundits (myself included) in front of Congressional committees, on television, radio, and in the print media. Commercial database services such as LEXIS/NEXIS allow researchers and memoirists to summon forth and cull all these records, and the word processor allows them to recombine and mold these mounds of data into serviceable accounts within a year or two, and in some cases months, of the end of the fighting.

The future historian, one might think, would have little left to understand. Such, in fact, is not the case; the apparent completeness of the publicly rendered account of the Gulf War masks areas of uncertainty which may require years or even decades to dispell. In some cases written records—the stuff of real research—simply do not exist. The existence of cheap and reliable secure communications, and the omnipresence of an increasingly persistent and inquisitive press, have led politicians, diplomats, and generals to transact more and more business over the telephone, often without the benefit of tape recording or stenographic record. The ad hoc decision-making style of the Bush administration similarly did

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not lend itself to the meticulous recording of decisions and the reasons for them. Thus, the true story of the decision to terminate the war on February 28th (to take just one example) remains hazy, and the key to it will surely be found in what went on in telephone conversations between authorities in Washington and Riyadh, and in the confidences of a small group of men in the White House. Protocols of these discussions may not exist, and if they do, may not become available for quite some time: General Schwarzkopf, for example, noted in his memoir that he dictated a daily diary, including a commentary on telephone conversations, but he has given no indication when and how that will become available to scholars.

Some of the critical paper records that do exist may also prove disappointing. In the past, it was more common for major strategic options to appear before the president or his senior advisers in the form of memoranda—long, carefully argued discussions of a problem requiring action. One may trace, for example, the decision making that went into the invasion of the European Continent in 1944 by reviewing the carefully crafted memoranda created by the military bureaucracies of the United States and Great Britain, documents which set forth arguments with a crispness sadly lacking in the glutinous prose of more recent times. Today, the American government takes military decisions chiefly on the basis of briefings—oral presentations backed by slides, each of which has several cryptic "bullets" on it, such as "250 targets at 3 sorties per target, 500 sorties per day." These slides are the only trail that many decisions leave behind. Inevitably, however, the slides do not tell the whole or even, in some cases, the most important part of the story, which often consists of the gloss offered by a briefer. Notoriously, different members of an audience hear different things in a formal briefing. Furthermore, because staff officers know the desirability of tailoring the briefing to the audience, and because they can modify briefing slides with the stroke of a computer keyboard, briefings change their content and order day by day, and sometimes even hour by hour. An historian may find himself led astray by looking at the wrong version of the slides, some of which may have been omitted, or which antedate the meeting that he wishes to understand.

Some of the most copious records may prove the most misleading. Television footage is, of course, the prime example. To judge from the pictures on national television during the Gulf War, for example, one might think that a large fraction of American air strikes during the war consisted of laser-guided bombs going down the ventilator shafts of government office buildings in Baghdad. In fact, less than 10 percent of the munitions used in the air war had precision guidance, and only a handful of strikes went against the Iraqi leadership. Newspaper interviews with key participants in the war—who have been remarkably forthcoming in their comments on it—may also mislead the researcher. The memories of statesmen and generals, no less than those of other mortals, are fallible. When one's memories are intimately tied to participation in a great historical event, and when one's own reputation rests on one's participation in that event, the witness's recollections become more suspect as evidence. And when, as in the present case, hordes of journalists, talk show hosts, and chairmen of celebratory conferences have given a leader an opportunity to restate his version of events many times, smoothing out inconsistencies and lending themes increasing certainty through repetition—why, first-hand evidence becomes shakier yet.

THE WRITING of histories of the Gulf War may thus be more complicated than it appears at first blush. One useful study is *The Gulf Conflict* by Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, an admirably balanced and dispassionate examination of the events of August 1990 through March 1991. The authors, who teach at the War Studies program of King's College at the University of London, bring to bear a wide knowledge of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

diplomatic and military history, and by drawing on the material described above, have put together a valuable guide to the conflict. Three quarters of the book recounts the moves and countermoves of the crisis; the remaining section summarizes the war that lasted forty-two days. They offer no interpretation that will seem radical or odd to the reader, save, perhaps, for greater emphasis on the element of Iraqi rational calculation (albeit ratiocination that repeatedly came to wrong conclusions) in the making of the twin debacles of the wars with Iran and the United States. They draw judiciously on a host of accounts, and their book has the merit of focusing more on the European side of the crisis than is common in American accounts.

Freedman and Karsh assert that "From the start, the United Nations set itself the goal of getting Iraq out of Kuwait, and at no point thereafter was that goal ever judged to be secondary to the potential costs of achieving it." Their description of the crisis of August-December 1990, however, makes one wonder about the validity of this assertion. It is depressing to recall, for example, the long string of former and serving heads of state and senior diplomats who trudged to Baghdad to win the release of the hostages that Saddam had taken. The authors also remind us of the numerous experts, including former members of presidential cabinets and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who insisted that a war would prove too grisly to be worth it. Here, one wonders if some of the hidden history of the crisis will cause scholars to revise this provisional judgment of the inevitability of war because of the stiff spine of the anti-Iraqi Coalition. Had Saddam been somewhat shrewder—had he, for example, been less intransigent in holding on to all of Kuwait—is it so clear that the international coalition would have held together? Had he clutched at the life preservers thrown to him by the French and Soviet governments, would the United States have gone to war nonetheless?

The story of the war itself has now been told a number of times, including in several official reports. Here again, Freedman and Karsh do a fine job of synthesis, although their account suffers from a number of technical inaccuracies (for example, a gross exaggeration of the number of first-line Iraqi Mirage F-1 aircraft). Once again, however, the certainties of the public record may dissolve under closer scrutiny. The incessant demand for press briefings leads bureaucracies to produce in haste vast quantities of data—numbers of sorties devoted to the hunting of Iraqi mobile missiles, for example. The harried staff officers who generate these numbers often have not had the time to review them critically, but the numbers then take on a life of their own, showing up in newspaper accounts, further briefings, and books. They take on a spurious precision, as well, because instead of saying "about 2,000"— a phrase that might accurately convey the vagueness of an estimate— a briefer would rather say "1,937," which makes it sound as if he is on top of the detail.

One must therefore be careful about accepting the quantitative descriptions of the Gulf War in this as in other books, not because of any fault of the authors, but because of the unreliability of, for instance, contemporary estimates of Iraqi tank strength in the Kuwait theater, or counts of sorties flown against Iraqi ground units. This difficulty becomes worse when one considers the peculiarity of a war waged against a passive but secretive opponent, who spent most of the conflict absorbing punishment day in and day out. Indeed, one intrinsic limit to all studies of the Gulf War, including official ones, must remain the thinness of the account on the Iraqi side, particularly at the upper levels of government, but even from the humbler ranks of Iraqi society.

CRUELTY AND SILENCE by Kanan Makiya redresses some of this balance, and offers a sharp contrast to *The Gulf Conflict*. Where Freedman and Karsh observe the crisis and war with the cool detachment of scholars, Makiya writes about the aftermath of the Iraqi debacle with a passion—at times, a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

barely contained fury and horror—that will shake the most stolid students of the Gulf War. That is not a bad thing, because, for too many Americans, this war took on the curious aspect of a spectator sport, watched with satisfaction on television, and celebrated with an exuberance that may have exceeded good taste (as, indeed, more than one Vietnam veteran who never got a welcoming parade after that war suggested). There is no glory in *Cruelty and Silence*, but rather misery, and terror, and sadness.

Makiya, who has until now written under the pseudonym Samir Al-Khalil, made his mark at the very beginning of the Gulf crisis with a book called *Republic of Fear*—a book published to little fanfare by a university press, but which soon gained a deserved reputation as one of the most powerful descriptions of modern Iraq ever written. *Republic of Fear*, and its sequel, *The Monument* (a discussion of the relationship between the architecture and totalitarian politics of the Ba'athist dictatorship) revealed their author as a man with exquisite sensibility, a superb command of English, and a passionate loathing of tyranny that recalled the great anti-totalitarians of the middle of this century.

The first part of Makiya's book—*Cruelty*—deals with the uprisings by Iraqi Kurds and Shi'ites against Saddam after the war, and the ferocity with which the Ba'athists suppressed them. Visiting the areas held by rebels, he comes back with harrowing tales.

> Some rebels, it has been alleged, were forced to drink gasoline before being shot. It appears that instead of crumpling into an undramatic heap, the victim explodes and burns like a torch for a short while. Executions of this sort had more impact on on-lookers than lining people up against walls and mowing them down.

His interview with a Shi'ite boy who crawled, badly wounded, out of a mass grave in which his parents lay writhing in their death agonies reminds one of stories from Nazi-occupied Europe. Encouraged by the stunning blow the Iraqi regime had suffered, and perhaps led to expect more from the United States than would be forthcoming, the Kurds and Shi'ites turned on a hated oppressor, and have paid the price many times over.

Makiya makes clear the monstrous deeds of cruelty perpetuated by the Iraqi regime in hot blood, but just as chilling is his account of the anatomy of normal terror of the Iraqi regime. He describes, for example, an identity card for a secret policeman that came into his possession: it lists as the man's special activity "the violation of women's honor." The succeeding discussion describes the systematic use of rape as a means of repression, and a nauseating read it is. In this, the book's second part, Makiya scourges Arab intellectuals and apologists such as Edward Said for failing to call such barbarity by its name, for either pretending that it does not exist or attempting to deflect the questions it raises by denouncing Israel or Western imperialism. "Silence is a synonym for the death of compassion in the Arab world," he writes. It is a theme that has been stated before by a few other courageous individuals like Fouad Ajami; it will, no doubt, attract for the author obloquy and contempt.

For some in government and outside it the Gulf War opened up the vista of a world in which the use of force by the United States, operating within a framework set by the United Nations, could right many of the world's ills. The United States demonstrated in the conflict that it disposes of certain kinds of military force of unrivalled power, against which potential opponents will find few antidotes. Those who ask whether we really won the war, given that Saddam remains in power, surely have it wrong. Had the United States not been willing to use force we would have before us today the specter of a nuclear-armed Iraq, dominant in the Arab Middle East, a source of danger to its neighbors and the region. The smashing defeat suffered by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

region. The smashing defeat suffered by the Iraqis gave hope, for some time at any rate, that potential aggressors would refrain from simply snatching the sovereign territory of their neighbors.

Still, Makiya's book should give us pause in any new found enthusiasm for uses of force that appear surgical, humane, and reliable. Certainly, no one in the United States government anticipated the calamities that befell the Kurds and the Shi'ites—insofar as the U.S. government expected a revolution in Iraq it probably hoped for the overthrow of Saddam by a military rival. Commendably, the United States made every effort to define its goals precisely and narrowly, eschewing the temptation to remake Iraq. But the war triggered upheavals that today have American aircraft flying cover over both Kurds and Shi'ites, and that may, ironically, lead to the breakup of an enemy that the United States wished to preserve intact. "No one who embarks upon that strange voyage," Winston Churchill once wrote of the decision to go to war, "can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter." Alas, the history of the Gulf War suggests that this remains the case, even if someone else suffers the shipwreck. □

Eliot Cohen is director of Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies.

Managerial Man

Mark Lagon

Deborah Shapley, *Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 734 pp., $29.95.

SINCE LEAVING THE presidency of the World Bank in 1981, Robert McNamara has pursued a frenetically active "retirement" worthy of an elder statesman. With his reputation scarcely tarnished by his consistent failures in private industry, in the cabinet, and in leading a major international organization, McNamara has consciously taken on the persona of *éminence grise*. By advocating aid for the Third World, limits on American use of force, and nuclear disarmament, McNamara has sought to fabricate the image of a man committed to peace and justice throughout his public life. An exemplary pronouncement in recent years was his recommendation that the United States and the world rely on economic sanctions as a response to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.

Much of his retirement has been devoted to a revision of his own history, despite his unwillingness to publish memoirs. It is hardly surprising that McNamara has tried to control his image in history, since Deborah Shapley, in her breezy new biography, presents plentiful evidence that the quest for control and management has been the central motif of McNamara's career.

McNamara's management mentality is evident in each of the successive phases of his life. The future emblem of the American establishment rose from modest roots in northern California. The first in his family to attend college, he excelled at Berkeley and at the Harvard Business

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

School in the 1930s. After a brief stint at an accounting firm back in his native state, McNamara was invited to join the faculty of the Harvard Business School. Upon receiving this invitation he proposed to his sweetheart, Margy Craig, before moving to the East Coast. Shapley recounts an act which illustrates McNamara's quest for efficiency nicely. He arranged a cruise from the West Coast through the Panama Canal to Boston in August 1940 with a dual purpose: both to move his belongings to his new home and as a honeymoon.

McNamara was not a faculty member for long at the Harvard Business School. He and a number of other practitioners of a systems approach to management worked for the Air Force in World War II. This group was dubbed the "whiz kids," after a contemporary television game show. After contributing to the systematic pursuit of the war effort, this cell of managers hired itself out to private industry. The "whiz kids" went to work for the Ford Motor Company. Applying his technique of statistical control to auto making rather than in the classroom or in building FDR's "arsenal of democracy," McNamara steadily moved up the executive ranks at Ford.

As an executive and (as of 1960) president of Ford, McNamara relentlessly expanded the application of systems analysis to the production of cars. He cared more about efficiency and cost, as measured by statistics and dollar amounts, than engineering considerations. McNamara's managerial ethic led him to distance himself from technical experts with substantive knowledge of auto design—as it would later lead him to be remote from career military men at the Pentagon.

An often-mentioned episode in his tenure with Ford was the Edsel project. In discussions at Ford, McNamara initially opposed development of the Edsel, and later he was at pains to take credit for this. Yet when the project fell into his portfolio as general manager of the car division, he publicly supported the Edsel—showered it with praise—while still hoping to phase it out. Shapley devotes considerable space to this brief chapter in McNamara's life, finding in it an analog to his handling of the Vietnam war as an episode in his career.

AS SECRETARY of defense for Kennedy and later Lyndon Johnson, McNamara took the systems analysis method which he had learned and then taught at the Harvard Business School, and sought to revolutionize the civilian management of the military. The "whiz kids" label was revived for the team of brash and highly educated civilian systems analysts he unleashed on the military (one of them being a young Les Aspin).

The first foreign policy challenge for the Charles River gang at the helm of the ship of state—and, in particular, for the new secretary of defense—was the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. The Bay of Pigs is treated rather cursorily in *Promise and Power*. The incident, however, reveals a lot about McNamara's penchant for dangerous half-measures. The recently installed Kennedy administration could have scotched the Eisenhower-initiated CIA program assisting Cuban exiles who sought to unseat Castro. Or it could have supported these indigenous forces with the full weight of American military might, much as Eisenhower had backed the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. But instead, as Kennedy's chief military advisor, McNamara implemented a middle course—a course which produced a serious political setback and public relations disaster.

Another telling early episode in McNamara's tenure at the Pentagon was his performance in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The keepers of the Kennedy flame

[1]See Eliot A. Cohen, "Why We Should Stop Studying the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The National Interest* (Winter 1985/86).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

celebrate the administration's crisis management in avoiding nuclear holocaust, and McNamara to this day continues to contribute to the self-congratulatory air of participants in this overstudied crisis.[1] His initial response to evidence of Soviet placement of potentially nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba was to be blasé. In his view, a missile was a missile. Nuclear-armed ICBM's on Soviet soil had been targeting the United States for some time. Why fret over the placement of a few in Cuba? They would only be a little quicker in arriving. While some criticize Kennedy for his compromises in the crisis—such as agreeing secretly to the *quid pro quo* of removing American Jupiter missiles in Turkey and promising not to oust Castro—at least he did not take McNamara's initial advice, which was to do nothing. The celebration of the Cuban Missile Crisis, however, testifies to the hold of the McNamara myth over liberal elites, this instance of crisis "management" representing the kind of misguided rationalism that he stood for.

McNamara had an enormous influence on military doctrine during the later stages of the Cold War, especially in the area of nuclear weapons. He helped create the reliance on a nuclear balance of terror between the two superpowers holding each other's populations hostage to potential obliteration—the doctrine of "Mutually Assured Destruction." About MAD, Shapley aptly surmises: "McNamara used his bent for analysis, and the formidable analytic talent he assembled in the Building, to arrive at a supposed 'truth,' which he then put forward as universal law." He shifted American nuclear targeting to Soviet population centers. Through this "countervalue" targeting, a patronizing McNamara sought to teach the Soviets to understand what he saw as the Americans' more sophisticated view that nuclear weapons could never be used for Clausewitzian political ends.

In addition, he scrapped Eisenhower's reliance on nuclear weapons to yield "bigger bang for the buck," through a threat of massive retaliation against Soviet aggression. McNamara crafted instead a doctrine of "flexible response." A doctrine that took its stand on rational consideration of options and a precise calculation of costs and benefits. Such an approach made little allowance for political passion, ideological obduracy, and other factors that distanced the logic of life-and-death struggle from the measured competition of the business world. Based on a greater emphasis on conventional preparedness, flexible response was the embodiment of McNamara's rationalism and its crowning achievement. Confident that political leaders could calibrate precisely the right response to a Cold War crisis through gradual escalation, McNamara sought to create options for his commander-in-chief all the way up the ladder of escalation, from limited conventional action to a full nuclear strike.

This approach was not only more costly, because it relied more on expensive conventional manpower and hardware more expensive than on nuclear arms, but arguably it also made the Vietnam debacle a necessity.

THE NEW CALCULUS of calibration needed a test case, and Southeast Asia provided it. The approach of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to Vietnam was one of untenable half-measures, based on McNamara's management mentality as codified in the form of the flexible response doctrine. In particular, it placed three limitations on the American intervention in South Vietnam: no direct invasion of North Vietnam, no bombing of Hanoi, and no attacks on the neighboring states of Cambodia and Laos, which provided sanctuaries for the Vietcong. These limitations rendered a war already lacking a clear definition of victory virtually unwinnable.

In trying to split the difference between noninvolvement and commitment to military victory, McNamara helped split the country: the pre-Vietnam bipartisan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consensus in favor of containment was lost. As a result of this test case in rationalist gradualism, the left would abandon containment as a legitimate goal and the right would use force circumspectly—as seen in Reagan's enormous effort to render trifling support to proxies for direct American intervention in Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan, and Cambodia.

Shapley's book devotes too many pages to the Vietnam War relative to other aspects of McNamara's life. He did plenty of damage in other areas of his work at the Pentagon. Much of the blame for the American military procurement system, which came under fire in scandals of the late 1980s, deserves to be dropped squarely in McNamara's lap. In the name of rationalism, he synthesized something halfway between the free market and statism. He managed to incorporate the worst elements of private industry and governmental inefficiency into the contracting system.

The TFX affair offers a snapshot of McNamara's approach to procurement. His decision regarding a new fighter aircraft for the Air Force and the Navy mirrored his style in leading the Ford Motor Company. Without a subtle grasp of the qualitative technical requirements involved, McNamara leapt to the conclusion that the most efficient way to deliver a new fighter aircraft to the Air Force and Navy was to stick both branches of the military with the same plane. Given their irreconcilable needs, the development of the F-111 for use by the two services turned out to be disastrous—and more costly than separate planes would have been. It is no exaggeration to say that McNamara found the situation Eisenhower had just identified in his farewell address as the "military industrial complex" and managed to make it much worse.

AFTER HIS long tenure as Defense Secretary, McNamara engineered an appointment as head of the World Bank, where he remained even longer. One interesting and revealing similarity between McNamara's tenure at the World Bank (from 1968 to 1981) and his stint at the Pentagon was his self-imposed distance from underlings. Shapley gives evidence of the World Bank staff's growing frustration with McNamara's taste for insulating himself. In both jobs—and in fact even earlier at Ford—this aloofness from the advice of the people under him was a source of failure. Over and over, McNamara communicated that he knew better how to run an institution by refusing to solicit qualitative advice from qualified subordinates. For him, their function was simply to produce data with which he could make the decisions.

While distancing himself from his staff at the World Bank, McNamara went to great lengths to expand that staff as well as the programs of the Bank. Annual addresses, fora, reports, and above all, massive loans were introduced in the name of a new purpose for the Bank—that summed up in the phrase "basic human needs." Alleviating the most egregious conditions of Third World poverty and hunger became the Bank's highest priority. McNamara, one might say, shifted the emphasis of World Bank programs from teaching developing countries how to fish to giving them fish outright. In trying to erect a safety net for the world, the Bank encouraged collectivist, statist economic policies in Third World nations, even though these policies contradicted American values and principles, and even though the states involved proved for the most part to be hopelessly inefficient and corrupt instruments for development.

One of the worst legacies of McNamara's expansion of World Bank loans, the inability of Third World nations to repay their debts to Western banks, created a crisis in North-South relations. McNamara failed to foresee the problem of the "debt bomb."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The principal preoccupation of McNamara's retirement has been a return to nuclear doctrine and arms control. His most newsworthy publications on these matters were collaborative efforts with McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, and Gerard Smith. They earned the label "the Gang of Four" when in 1982 they authored an article in *Foreign Affairs* calling for the United States to abandon its nuclear umbrella pledge to its Western allies in favor of a "no first use" pledge. This was precisely at the time when Reagan was threatening to follow through on the 1979 dual-track decision by deploying ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Europe. The U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons if the Warsaw Pact attacked Western Europe was the cornerstone of the NATO deterrence policy, by which the West compensated for Warsaw Pact advantages in manpower and hardware. This idea of the Gang of Four earned deserved criticism from both sides of the Atlantic, and Shapley's treatment of McNamara's thinking on nuclear weapons and arms control is superficial and unduly sympathetic.

PROMISE AND POWER leads to the natural conclusion that Robert McNamara personifies the Peter Principle. As he fumbled in one job after another—in industry, at the Pentagon, and at the World Bank—with deleterious consequences of ever widening scope, McNamara just kept rising in the esteem of the liberal establishment. With each failure, his reputation as a "wise man" grew. Malcolm Muggeridge once said of David Frost that "he rose without a trace." In terms of talent and success the same could be said of McNamara, though unfortunately he did leave a trail of serious consequences in his wake.

McNamara represents a mutant form of American "can-do" optimism. Throughout his life, from his days as a World War II "whiz kid" to his recent eminence as a septuagenarian sage on arms control matters, his actions have been driven by a peculiar mindset: a "management" mentality that proceeds on the assumption that all problems could be solved if enough effort and logic were applied to them.

Shapley puts great weight on the psychological origins of McNamara's outlook. But rationalism married to hubris is not unique to McNamara. Though McNamara's personality may explain his attraction to the managerial approach, that approach was—and is—shared by enough members of the American elite for it to be considered a characteristic of America's political culture, particularly in its liberal interpretation. Deborah Shapley may have had the representative character of her subject in mind when the book was originally given the title, *Robert S. McNamara: Soldier of the American Century*. But this got lost somewhere as the emphasis on pop psychological analysis gained ground.

While Shapley's journalistic account is entertaining, informative and occasionally insightful, a serious analysis of McNamara's thinking and impact on the America of his time still waits to be done. McNamara is worth such a study because he is emblematic of a recurring American desire to depoliticize politics, to replace the clash of competing interests with the allegedly objective wisdom of the manager. One hopes that the new administration—including a defense secretary who worked under him in the 1960s—will choose to learn from McNamara's mistakes rather than to emulate him. □

Mark P. Lagon is Research Associate at the American Enterprise Institute, and Adjunct Professor of Government at Georgetown University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Politically Incorrect Liberal

John O'Sullivan

Max Beloff, *A Historian in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 137 pp., $25.00.

HUGH THOMAS remarked some years ago that historians can be divided into two groups: those who have a philosophy of history and those who have a knowledge of history. An entertaining parlor game could be devised of assigning the more celebrated living historians into one or other category. But no prize could be won, or even expected, for assigning Max Beloff to the second.

The author of major works on American, European, French, Soviet, English, and British imperial history, as well as a constitutional scholar of the first rank, Professor Beloff is distinguished by historical knowledge that is at once wide-ranging and narrowly precise. And this feat is possible both because his style of history attends to particular societies, making no pretense to be universal in scope or to discern universal historical laws, and because he has either carried out or mastered the historical research on a number of different countries at different periods.

So there is some piquancy in this book which combines sketches in intellectual autobiography with reflections on the craft of history, its scope, its uses, and its limitations. Here, in fact, is Max Beloff's philosophy of history. It is a philosophy (echoed, incidentally, in Robert Conquest's recent Jefferson Lecture) that the lessons of history, if there are any, cannot be reproduced in any simple or mechanical fashion:

> No two series of events ever reproduce each other completely; some victories include hubris, others do not; some revolutions have their Thermidor, others avoid it. All one can ever hope to have are suggestions and intimations that set the imagination working. This is a far cry from the pretensions of the social scientists, whose belief in strict causality has over and over again been disproved by the outcome.

As he takes the reader on a Swan's Classical Cruise of British, French, American, etc. history, therefore, Professor Beloff insists that this event was unpredictable, that one wholly accidental (though powerfully influencing the future course of events), a third productive of consequences that cannot be yet be estimated and indeed may not be estimated "for centuries" (this of the British Empire), none of them inevitable except through the distorting window of retrospect.

That is not to say that, once enough time has passed, certain powerful and recurrent themes in a nation's history cannot be abstracted from the tangle of events by the imaginative historian. They plainly can, and Professor Beloff cites such examples as the centrality of Parliament to English (and later British) history, the fact that the history of the Jews, being largely a history of the Diaspora, is also a history of other peoples to an unusual extent, and how the greater influence of ideas and ideologies in French politics has produced in turn a greater mutability of political institutions. He is an admirable and fair-minded guide through these labyrinths, although M. Chauvin might feel

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that his view of France is slightly too close to that of the librarian in the *Punch* cartoon who, on being asked for a copy of the French constitution, replies: "I am sorry, Sir. We do not stock periodicals."

In keeping with this restrained philosophy, Professor Beloff takes a negative view of the political uses of history. A good working knowledge of some nation's history will not tell the statesman how to deal with some crisis that has blown up there; but it may tell him how *not* to deal with it. Given the snares that lie in wait in places as small and relatively weak as Bosnia and North Korea, almost any historical knowledge will come in handy at some time. But the apprentice Kissinger will particularly want to read his observations on three topics: the transformation of European empires into the Third World, the myth of European unity versus its reality, and the unique difficulties faced by the United States when it engages the outer world.

Mr. Beloff is, as he ruefully concedes, out of step with most contemporary historians of the great European empires. He tells the story of how at a recent conference on Winston Churchill there was general agreement that "he was of course a very great man but that his 'imperialism' must be regarded as a defect to be castigated." This consensus paid no regard to the fact that Churchill's gloomy predictions about the futures of independent India and Egypt had come to pass. It was founded essentially on an ideological hostility to the idea of empire so deep as to be impervious to actual historical evidence or argumentation of any kind, leading to an equally strong investment in the success of post-imperial nations.

By contrast, the author bases his judgments of empire and its aftermath on the old test of "the condition of the people." And the evidence of corruption, incompetence, and oppression imposed by the kleptocratic class governing much of the Third World in the last three decades leads him to ask of the anti-colonialist school of historians: "Do they read the newspapers?" The same question might perhaps be addressed to those American "globalists" who hope to make the promotion of democracy the basis for U.S. foreign policy. Almost all of Africa's kleptocracies began independence with model Westminster constitutions and the gift of a Mace from the House of Commons. But, other, more local, political traditions overwhelmed these imports in short order. Democratic globalists, following Bacon and hoping to exploit Beloff's reluctance to foreclose options, might respond that history, like success, goes by a winding stair. But it has yet to be demonstrated that the promotion of democracy by the State Department would achieve more than the encouragement of mimicry and hypocrisy in the Third World.

PROFESSOR BELOFF does, however, come close to foreclosing the option of European federalism, in perhaps the best and certainly the most contrarian chapter in his book. If this has the flavor of heresy about it, that is because American policymakers have been among the most committed partisans of European "integration," not averse to pushing reluctant Europeans along that path at crucial moments in the last forty years. George Ball, for instance, persuaded President Kennedy to urge Macmillan to join the EEC in the early sixties, and President Bush clearly signaled his preference that Mrs. Thatcher should drop her objections to steps such as monetary union after the 1989 NATO summit. ("Europe's" performance in the Gulf War and over Bosnia may have modified his enthusiasm.)

Americans have been attracted by the notion in part because their own federal experience leads them to see a United States of Europe as required by the logic of history. Yet, as Beloff points out, "the example of the United States as a working federal system is wholly inapplicable to the European scene." He goes on to explore the ways in which European history undermines the compari-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

son. If language and religion are the basis of nationhood in Europe, as he demonstrates, then Europe is riven by linguistic and religious divisions to a disabling degree. The war between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs reminds us of the power still remaining in religious antagonisms bequeathed by the Turkish conquest. And the perennial instability of Belgium testifies to the liveliness of linguistic passions.

DOES NOT a common European culture provide a counterweight to these impulses? But Europe's common culture is a very much more abstract and theatrical concept than America's which, after all, incorporates a common language, legal system, history, and political tradition. While encompassing too little politically, the notion of European culture encompasses too much geographically to serve as a basis for even federal European statehood. By any purely *cultural* definition such as music (which Professor Beloff thinks is perhaps the single best criterion of the limits and extent of Western civilization), a European culture would have to include both Russia and the United States. And the philistine absurdity of defining culture by reference to a political unit is encapsulated by the European Community's occasional attempts to protect European culture by preventing television stations showing too many English-speaking programs manufactured in Hollywood.

Professor Beloff does not advance the claim that these national, religious, and linguistic divisions make a federal European states impossible. To do that would be to fall into the trap he elsewhere deplores of assuming that one can extrapolate existing trends indefinitely to forecast a certain future. But they certainly undermine any claim that a federal future is inevitable, even likely.

Professor Beloff's final theme is the difficulty that the United States will always have in dealing with the outside world. The U.S.A. is in the position of a Temperance advocate who has inherited a brewery. It took over the role and responsibilities of the British Empire after World War Two, and the end of the Cold War has left it in a dominant position that even Britain at its zenith never occupied. It has inherited in addition the liberal economic and political outlook of imperial Britain. The rest of the world expects it to assume a similar responsibility for world political and economic order.

Yet the United States has been traditionally uncomfortable with any role that could be called imperial. As recently as the Second World War, Franklin Roosevelt was under the illusion that he could cooperate more easily with Stalin than with Churchill, because he and the Georgian shared a common hostility to imperialism. The Cold War enabled American statesmen and public to justify the exercise of world power as a moral obligation or, as Professor Beloff puts it, using "modern means of communication to create a common perception of external threats." With victory, some thought that America would again turn inwards. Professor Beloff himself points out that in the light of American history "it is understandable that a retreat into isolationism should so frequently close a period of expansion; and here right and left...may find common ground."

But forty years of exercising a semi-imperial power in the world had modified the isolationist instinct considerably—while not eliminating it entirely. Quakers in charge of an army, like teetotalers who own a brewery, are likely to veer unpredictable between their old principles and their new responsibilities. Hence, the collision between the Bush administration's self-conscious *realpolitik* and public outrage at the plight of the Kurds after the Gulf War; the justification of American intervention as a form of "humanitarianism"—a justification which in Somalia became a genuine impulse; and the prolonged dithering that has constituted American policy toward the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

break-up of Yugoslavia. The conflict underlying these might be resolved by the development of a bipartisan foreign policy based on the pursuit of the U.S. national interest broadly defined. But such a foreign policy would have to emerge from the maelstrom of American domestic politics, in the manner of containment in the 1940s. As Mr. Beloff points out, increasing partisanship makes that unlikely.

SUCH THEMES sound distinctly conservative in the current academic climate. Yet for almost all his professional life Max Beloff saw himself, and was seen by others, as a liberal. Indeed he was a Liberal even in narrow party terms during the long years of that party's decline and submersion. His fidelity to liberalism even now is evident in the disquiet he expresses repeatedly throughout this book at the increasing orthodoxy of historical scholarship, as it is subjected to passing ideological concerns.

But liberalism of that kind is itself increasingly a historical phenomenon. It has either been subordinated to the doctrine of political correctness (which is no more than the old fallacy that you can force men to be free), or it has migrated regretfully to the right. Like a number of other liberal academics and writers in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s (and like the neoconservatives in the U.S.), Max Beloff embarked on the second course when he became principal of the new private university at Buckingham in 1974 and later accepted a peerage from Mrs. Thatcher's governments. He has since been an independent ally of English conservatism, generally supporting the more robust foreign and economic policies of the government, but sharply dissenting from what he felt was its philistine commercial attitude to university scholarship.

It is now impossible to use the phrase "independent liberal" without comic intent. Not long ago, however, there were splendid specimens on both sides of the Atlantic; doubtless some are still hiding in the long grass; and every now and then one streaks across a clearing in the academic jungle, as Arthur Schlesinger did recently with the publication of *The Disuniting of America*. Max Beloff's little book—calm in argument, rooted in deep scholarship, accessible to the general reader, and occasionally tetchy in dealing with the latest follies—reminds us of what we will have lost if the breed ever becomes entirely extinct. □

John O'Sullivan is editor of the *National Review*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On Soviet Communism:

IN THE COURSE of an otherwise informative article William Odom has the following to say about the impact of European and Russian Social Democrats of the Menshevik persuasion and their impact on American Sovietology: They were convinced that Marxism was basically sound as a theory of development, that Lenin was merely a Social Democrat gone astray and that he was not beyond redemption....Similar thoughts were uttered in an earlier article by Martin Malia.

Before this travesty of the historical role of Menshevism becomes a new orthodoxy a few corrections may be in order. Menshevism was in the beginning Marxist, but then virtually every Russian *intelligent* was at the time (and as we learn from Mr. Kristol's article in the same issue, the phenomenon was not unknown in the West). But after 1919 there were no more realistic and perspicacious assessments of Soviet developments than those of the Mensheviks. (The few who disagreed, like Dan and Yugov, left the party). Even Martov, the most Marxist of them all, when asked by a Soviet newspaper to contribute an article about Lenin, replied that the only article he was willing to write about Lenin was his obituary. This does not betray a belief in Lenin's redemption.

Menshevik attitudes toward Bolshevism were succinctly expressed by Pavel Axelrod in a letter in 1921 in which he said that "it was not in an outburst of polemical ardor but from deep conviction that he had described ten years earlier the Leninist as a Black Hundred gang of double dyed criminals within the Social Democratic Party."

In 1928, Abramovitch, the Menshevik representative,told the Second International: "However much Fascism and Bolshevism may differ in their social ideals and class contents, they are alike as blood brothers in their methods and ways. Fascism and Bolshevism are the two great dangers threatening the working class from opposite sides but equally strongly. It is imperative that the Socialist International fights them in different fashion but with all the energy and strength it can muster."

It is useful to recall that such views were uttered at a time when Soviet studies were dominated by non-Social Democrats such as Sir Bernard Pares, S. Harper, F. Schumann and E.H. Carr. There is but little doubt that Abramovitch would have been drummed out of a meeting of American Sovietologists for uttering such crude and primitive anti-communist views.

I have recently written about the record of Menshevism in this respect, which was superior to all other groups (*Novoe Vremia*, Moscow, 45, 1992), and there are other, more detailed and thorough studies such as those by M. Andre Liebich. What could have induced Messrs. Odom and Malia to enunciate views wholly out of line with the historical record? Did they perhaps, in a fit of absentmindedness, confuse Menshevism with Trotskyism? Or do they think that a well known article by Mr. L. Haimson (1964) about the inevitability of the October revolution in 1917 was a Menshevik manifesto?

I do not profess to know the answer. But I think a word of apology is due. It was said about Russian literature of the 19th century that "we all came out of Gogol's *Shinel* [Overcoat]." In the same way all serious Sovietology came out of the mantle of Menshevism, and this includes those not aware of it.

Walter Laqueur
Center for Strategic International Studies
Washington, DC

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IN GENERAL, I found the political analysis in the special issue to be excellent, particularly the essays by professors Fairbanks, Reddaway, Malia, and by Robert Conquest. Nevertheless, there are real problems with the issue. First, it is heavily weighted to Western analysis of Soviet politics and the political viability of the former Soviet Union. Only one essay is devoted to economics, concluding that economics really was not a factor in the Fall. Only a portion of Dr. Sestanovich's essay and one short section of General Odom's essay are devoted to the military. As more information becomes available I am more and more convinced that all three aspects—political, military and economic—must be treated more or less equally in explaining the Fall....

[Another] problem I see in the special issue is unpleasant but largely limited to Gen. Odom's essay. His generalization that Soviet military issues were analyzed "through a prism of Western preconceptions" is just plain false. To be sure, it applies to Raymond Garthoff, and perhaps to a majority of military Sovietologists to some degree. Nevertheless, a number of people got it mostly right, notably Team B members (of which Professor Pipes was one), the book on Soviet military policy written by myself and Richard Staar, and the basic research of Bill and Harriet Scott. In addition, a number of people whose work is not in the public domain, but whose existence at least should be acknowledged, also analyzed the Soviet military on its own terms. And General Odom knows at least some of those folk.

Zagladin didn't just prove Mr. Garthoff and others of similar persuasion wrong; he proved that a number of Western military analysts were right on the mark. Furthermore, some of the few accurate predictions of Soviet weapons development were based to a significant degree on requirements inferred from Soviet military doctrine and strategy. These accurate predictions included, but were not limited to, the SS-11 and SS-9; the SS-18; and the "window of vulnerability" of U.S. ICBMS that the latter system would open in the mid-1970s....

Similarly, the flood of information on the military burden and the Politburo's deliberate militarization of the Soviet economy has done much more than just demonstrate the errors of analysts such as Professor Holzman. The same applies to the CIA, and the entire U.S. intelligence community, from whence General Odom came. After all, by 1990 the CIA and Professor Holzman differed by only some two percentage points (at most) on the military burden ratio, and never differed by more than three to five points. There is a big difference between Holzman/CIA's 12-15 percent of Soviet GNP and General Lobov's 33 percent or more.

A few Sovietologists were on, or close, to the mark on these issues as well. However, this list is very short, not much longer than: yours truly; Professor Steve Rosefielde; and the emigré economist Igor Birman. The latter's analysis of Soviet consumption, and the CIA's corresponding errors on that issue, also has been largely corroborated by the glasnost flood.

If we finally are going to face up to the "Sins of the Scholars", let us do so fairly and squarely....

William T. Lee
Alexandria, VA

YOUR SPRING 1993 Special Issue ("The Strange Death of Soviet Communism") is, in my judgment, the best single periodical scholarly publication in my professional lifetime—which comes closer to a half-century than I care to remember. An awesome display of intellectual firepower, and appropriately so: the subject is (or, happily, was) the major political phenomenon of the 20th century.

And yet...and yet...the question remains

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whether anyone, even in your cast of superstars, has "got it right"...most of your authors—true to their social science vocations—try too hard to find coherence and rational order in a phenomenon, Soviet communism, that was preeminently an exercise in the systematic use of force and terror.... They attempt to fit the messy sprawling reality of human behavior into this or that "scientific" model...but reality keeps intruding anyway. Who possibly could have foreseen—indeed, did even the Soviet ruling cadres deserve such a fate!—that a Reagan *and* a Thatcher *and* a John Paul II would ascend to world leadership positions all at once, and that they would insist not just on the survival of the West but on victory.

I borrow this rhetorical question from a former top aide to CIA director Bill Casey, Herbert E. Meyer [who] "got it right" as far back as the 1970s....So, too, did Bernard Levin prefigure in 1977 the real-world scenario, in the almost spookily prescient London *Times* piece that you reprint in the Special Issue....

Charles Lichenstein
The Heritage Foundation
Washington, DC

TWO POINTS THAT were mentioned but not emphasized in the Spring issue deserve to be given more weight. The first is that the Soviet economy operated against the background of other economies and, to a certain degree, in competition with them. The Soviet economy was not in itself a failure. The population worked, ate, was clothed and sheltered, and even multiplied. What made the Soviet economy a *relative* failure was the existence of more successful capitalist economies, combined with the claim that socialism was superior to capitalism in its ability to deliver economic growth and consumer goods. This claim may have been plausible when Krushchev made it in the late Fifties, but became ever less so as not only America but Western Europe and Japan, followed by the Asian tigers, prospered....

The second point that deserves emphasis is that there was a communist empire. The acute phase of the fall of communism started outside of the Soviet Union and then spread to the Union itself. By 1987, Gorbachev made it clear that he would not interfere with internal experiments in Soviet bloc countries. As it turned out, this was a vast blunder....If Poland could become independent, why not Lithuania and Georgia? Once communism fell in Eastern Europe, the alternative in the Soviet Union became civil war or dissolution. The collapse of the Soviet Union might well be called the revenge of the colonies.

Daniel Klenbort
Professor of History
Morehouse College
Atlanta, GA

YOUR SPECIAL ISSUE is an outstanding and comprehensive achievement. Even if we find it still enormously difficult to understand this terrible system, your effort demonstrates that first post-mortem assessments are of tremendous value and interest...

Martin Malia's essay is the best critique of the analysts and apologists of socialism, communism and its varieties that I have read in the field of political and social science. Malia is perceptive and original in saying "that if one is ruthlessly logical about democracy, one arrives at the idea of socialism." He gives us a profound critique of the Socialist model and the social-democratic humanitarian model....

It is disturbing that American and European universities are still replete with Marxist, neo-Marxist, and "progressive" socialist scholars. Many still have not learned the lesson of 1989 or bothered to admit their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

monumental intellectual errors. For the most part, the sins of the scholars have neither been atoned for nor confessed.

Amos Perlmutter
Professor of Political Science & Sociology
The American University
Washington, DC

YOUR AUTOPSY on Soviet communism is a public service even though a single magazine issue can only be the first broom stroke in Augean stables full of academic and journalistic manure.

I hope you will have more on the role of the news media, beyond the insert recalling that Bernard Levin got it right. As Robert Conquest remarked of so many Sovietologists, some of the journalists who got it wrong deserved to be harshly judged, but instead are polishing their Pulitzers.

I've never heard a peep out of anyone in the news media over the campaign by A.M. Rosenthal in his *New York Times* columns (February 4 and 8, 1990) to prevent the reunification of Germany under the banner, "Intellectuals of the world, unite!" Another thirty years of communism would do the East Germans good, he suggested. For months previously, his newspaper had misinformed readers blatantly: East Germans didn't want reunification, but reform communism. *Times* reporters hopefully suggested Communist successors to Erich Honecker, each in turn thrown out by the citizens. The paper proudly quoted Marcus Wolf as their source. A *Times*man routinely collected a Pulitzer prize for this.

My own employment in the news business, from 1947 to 1987, coincided with the Cold War. From 1954 to 1975 I visited Soviet bloc nations every year from bases in Germany and Austria. It was a hopeless project for a tabloid reporter to get editors to believe that East Germany was *not* the world's tenth-largest economy with exemplary education and health systems, that people in much of Moscow used kerosene lamps in the 1970s, that Czechs wanted the pleasant Alexander Dubček only temporarily, as a bridge to a non-Communist system, and that you wouldn't really want to invite the clever Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife Elena to your garden party....

Russ Braley
Rockville, MD
New York Daily News
Correspondent, 1955-75

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Vertical Invasion

Michael Lind

CULTURE OF COMPLAINT, by the art critic, Robert Hughes, is one of a number of contemporary jeremiads lamenting the fragmentation of American society and the sterility of outmoded partisan debates.[1] It is also a hoot. Unlike most of his targets and many of his critics, Hughes is capable of being *intentionally* funny. Hughes on academic studies of Madonna: "There is a Lacanian Madonna, a Baudrillardian Madonna, a Freudian Madonna, a Foucaultian Madonna—rather as, in Mediterranean Catholic cults, one may pray to the Madonna of Loreto, of Fatima, or of Lourdes." On anti-Eurocentrism: "Those who parrot phrases like 'dead white male' might reflect that, in writing, death is relative; Lord Rochester is as dead as Sappho, though by no means as moribund as Brett Easton Ellis or Andrea Dworkin." On native Americans: "Aztec culture was messianic and invasive and imperialistic; it had been so ever since the Aztecs came down from the north, under the command of a charismatic ruler whose name translates as Hummingbird-on-the-Left, and slaughtered or enslaved the resident people around Mexico City. I suppose the survivors could be glad there was no Hummingbird-on-the-Right." On Afrocentrism: "If, as H. Rap Brown once observed, violence is as American as apple pie, then slavery would seem to be as African as yams." On government-subsidized Dutch art: "So there it all sits, democratic, non-hierarchical, non-elitist, non-sexist, unsalable, and, to the great regret of the Dutch government, only partially biodegradable."

The left is not amused. David Futrelle, writing in the left-wing newsmagazine *In These Times*, attacks Hughes for his undemocratic belief in artistic standards: "Unfortunately, Hughes moves from a spirited, entertaining attack on the timid middlebrow multiculturalism of the contemporary NEA to an unabashed defense of old-fashioned artistic elitism. Who needs that? Let's hear it for art with no redeeming social value"—like the art of Robert Mapplethorpe, which Hughes believes inspires "the kind of exhausted and literally demoralized aestheticism that would find no basic difference between a Nuremberg rally and a Busby Berkeley spectacular, since both, after all, are examples of Art-Deco choreography."

Though the chief target of his polemic is the multicultural left, Hughes has a sharp eye for the hypocrisies and fatuities of the contemporary right. Some of his criticisms of conservatism fail to persuade (his defense of public funding for PBS leaves me skeptical), and when his strained effort to lampoon the Christian right's "fetus chic" falls flat, it does so with an appalling thud. At his best, howev-

Michael Lind is executive editor of *The National Interest*.

[1]Robert Hughes, *Culture of Complaint: The Fraying of America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 210 pp., $19.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

er, his eye is as sharp as his tongue. On the opportunistic substitution of gay-baiting for red-baiting by the right after the Cold War: "Having lost the barbarian at the gates, they went for the fairy at the bottom of the garden." On Republican business leader Charles Keating:

> Keating co-founded the National Coalition Against Pornography, with the intent of saving the innocent from Satan, and became a major agitator for "traditional moral values" in the Midwest. Only later did it appear why Keating was so interested in preserving American innocence: he cheated thousands of innocent people of hundreds of millions of dollars in his manipulations of Lincoln Savings and Loan...

Hughes is correct in thinking that today's far-right nativism is not so much a reaction to the excesses of the Sixties as it is the latest reincarnation of centuries-old Anglo-American nativism and puritanism. "Today, America is not 'heading back' to the 1920s or to the McCarthy years of the 1950s," Hughes notes. "Like fungal spores in the spoil, these repressive tendencies are always there, always latent, and capable of fruiting overnight given the right conditions." At the moment the "cultural elite" and homosexual citizens, as scapegoats and hate objects, have replaced the former subjects of nativist demonization and conspiracy-mongering: Jews, High Finance, Darwinists, immigrants, Catholics, Freemasons, Illuminati. The basic themes of American nativism, however, are unchanged from the days when Protestant preachers warned that giving civil equality to Catholics, Jews, black Americans, or women would bring about moral ruin, a war against Christianity, and the end of the nuclear family. Hughes paints a grim picture of the likely consequences of fundamentalist success in revamping American education: "Intelligent Americans have no grounds for complacency—not unless they want to hear their kids chirping about the Sin of Sodom and parroting the inanities of 'creation science' after school a few years from now."

Until quite recently, neoconservatives might have agreed. Some, unfortunately, now appear to endorse a strategy advocated by Patrick J. Buchanan, that proponent of "religious and cultural war," in a memo to his master Nixon that Hughes quotes: "If we tear the country in half, we can pick up the bigger half." This strategic logic, perhaps, explains why James Bowman, reviewing *Culture of Complaint* unfavorably in *The New Criterion*, criticizes Hughes for not limiting his attacks to targets on the left. According to Bowman, Hughes is guilty of intellectual draft evasion, of trying

> to duck the fight by pretending to live in some ideal world where the fight would not be necessary. Thus cut loose from the need to argue responsibly, Hughes can choose targets of opportunity from among the rich variety afforded him by both sides without regard to questions of rationale, whether moral or strategic.

The fight? Argue responsibly? Moral *or* strategic rationale (is there a conflict between morality and strategy in public discourse)? Orwell admonished that one "should never turn back from a train of thought because it may lead to a heresy." Was he wrong? Must "responsible" conservative intellectuals attack the idiocies of multiculturalism while passing in silence over the imbecilities of the nativist and fundamentalist right? Should the same conservatives who criticize liberal "anti-racists" for wanting to pull *Huckleberry Finn* from school shelves say nothing when Protestant fundamentalists try to remove *Catcher in the Rye* and *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, simply because the latter zealots are likely to vote Republican? Must the old slogan "No enemies to the left" be replaced by "no enemies to the right"?

Evidently so, if one believes that there really is a "culture war." Like the term "secu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lar humanism," this unfortunate and misleading phrase seems to have contaminated mainstream conservative rhetoric by seepage from the writings of Protestant fundamentalists, who claim that, because Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, and secular public school children are no longer pressured into chanting Protestant prayers, and because white-supremacist Bible academies are denied tax-exempt status, the government is waging a Bismarckian *Kulturkampf* against religion and morality. The new familiarity of the term should not blind us to just how peculiar the idea of a "culture war" is. If you think about it, it seems rather strange that the diverse parties to aesthetic, moral, and political debates should consistently divide into the same two camps—Donkeys and Elephants.

Such neat symmetries rarely occurred in the past. In early twentieth-century Britain, avant-garde poets and artists like Yeats, Eliot, and Wyndham Lewis were right-wing radicals in their politics. Across the water, interwar New York intellectuals squabbled over aesthetics even as they shared a common Marxist political orientation. The Art Deco style was used by democrats, Nazis, and communists alike, as neoclassicism had earlier been adopted by both monarchists and republicans. A century earlier, Shelley, an atheist radical, was one of the masters of traditional poetic forms. Earlier still, Milton, a Protestant republican revolutionary, learned much of his art from the Counter-Reformation Catholic Baroque.

THE SAME pattern, I submit, obtains today. *There is no culture war in America*. The American people are not divided into two discrete camps, with modern artists, rock and rap musicians, homosexuals, divorcees, agnostics, performance artists, feminists, socialists, and (as Pat Robertson claims) devil-worshippers on one side, and classical violinists, Christians, heterosexuals, easel painters, and capitalists on the other. In reality, there are Republicans who love rock and roll, and connoisseurs of classical music who vote Democratic; atheist conservatives who live with girlfriends or boyfriends out of wedlock and Christian family men whose deep religious faith, as they interpret it, mandates left-wing activism.

A rigid linkage between aesthetic, moral, and political radicalism or conservatism is found only among small, intense, eccentric minorities at the fringes of American life. One of these sects might be called the pork-barrel left—the university-based network of federal grant-funded artists whose art tends to be a form of left-wing political agitation. Their nemesis, and symbiote, is another moral minority, the fund-raising far right—a collection of entrepreneurs who make their living by attacking the latest antics of the pork-barrel left. Hughes cleverly captures the mirror-imaging of these two militant puritanisms with his claim that today there are two kinds of PC: Political Correctness and Patriotic Correctness.

The similarities between the pork-barrel left and the fund-raising right are striking. Both despise America as it actually exists, seeing the United States as a rotten place in which virtuous victims (women-and-minorities, "Judeo-Christian" white folks) are tyrannized by a sinister, conspiratorial elite (the military-industrial complex, the mythical "new class"). Both sides corrupt thought by abusing language: by the once-noble word culture, the radical left means "race" and "gender," and the radical right means "morals" and "religion." In the past several years, confusing matters still further, some conservatives have begun using "cultural" as a synonym for "social" (as in William Bennett's Cultural Indicators, most of which have to do with illegitimacy and graduation rates, not the number of symphony orchestras nationwide). Race, gender, morality, and religion are undoubtedly important topics, but they might be more profitably discussed under their proper names, not lumped together under the same rubric with art, music and literature.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Equally striking is the fact that the chief participants in the so-called culture war on both sides are not, for the most part, cultured individuals. Many radical artists know little about either art history or artistic craft, having mastered only the arts of self-promotion and grantsmanship (grantspersonship?). On the right, few of the leading self-described cultural critics have any background in the study of literature or the fine arts, to say nothing of the *making* of fiction, poetry, painting, or music. Recently I received an announcement from a conservative Washington think tank listing its new "culture warriors." One was a former federal bureaucrat, another a California talk-radio showman.

The Washington think tank in question was soliciting donations for its troops in the "culture war." While the fund-raising right sustains itself on checks from little old ladies in Topeka worried about dirty pictures, the pork-barrel left seeks *public* monies for its projects. A few years ago, at the notorious Mapplethorpe exhibition in Washington, visitors (I was one) were badgered to sign a petition claiming that the refusal to fund artists with tax dollars is a form of censorship (think about it). This suggests the most important symmetry between the *Kulturkämpfer* of left and right. Though in reality there is no culture war dividing the general public into two irreconcilable camps, it is in the interest of the radicals of left and right to pretend that there is, *in order to raise money*. The culture war has far less to do with culture than with entrepreneurialism in Soho and the Beltway.

While this phony war is fought in a few magazines and newspapers and AM talk radio shows, high culture in the United States remains alive and reasonably well, thank you. Far from the Punch-and-Judy show of Karen Finley and Jesse Helms, a small number of American artists continue to produce competent and occasionally excellent work. The last several decades have seen real improvements in American architecture, and the return of meter and story to poetry. True, the visual arts and symphonic music are in bad shape, but for reasons having less to do with politics than with technology. Renaissance easel painting and orchestral music are probably played out forever; the masterpieces of tomorrow may be in new forms—computer graphics, virtual reality, electronic music. Of one thing we may be sure: the great pioneers of twenty-first century American art will be ignored—*are* being ignored—by partisan culture warriors who can think of nothing better to do with a Stradivarius than club someone over the head with it.

The beginning of wisdom in matters of culture is to recognize that aesthetics, morals, and politics, though linked tangentially, are essentially distinct. Allies in one realm may be opponents in another. A reasonable person may be a political conservative and a moral liberal, or an aesthetic traditionalist and a political progressive. Those who treat politics as a simple extension of morality, or attempt to translate political alliances into aesthetic movements, display an inability to make elementary distinctions.

Ortega y Gasset warned sixty years ago of the vertical invasion of the barbarians. He was right: the important distinction today is horizontal. "The sense of quality, of style, of measure is not an imposition bearing on literature from the domain of class, race or gender," Hughes writes—he might just as well have added, politics. The real culture war, it might be suggested, is not between liberalism and conservatism, it is between the forces of reason, taste, insight, intelligence, learning, urbanity, and candor on the one hand, and on the other the forces of unreason, vulgarity, obscurantism, ignorance, superstition, fanaticism, bigotry, and dishonesty, whatever form they may take. In that never-ending war, Robert Hughes, sometimes wrong, usually insightful, frequently brilliant, and always honest, is one of the good guys. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Agree or not, you won't be able to put it down.


Commentary
Is America on the Way Down?
(Round Three)
The Scandal of College Tuition
Why Likud Lost – And Who Won
Europe: Miracle or Monster?
Joseph Alsop & the WASP Ascendancy
Once Again, Anti-Semitism Without Jews
Politics & the Academy

From the editorial pages of the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal* to the floor of the U.S. Senate, *Commentary* commands attention and earns respect.

Now you can learn firsthand what some of the most influential people in America already know: *Commentary* is always gripping . . . hard- hitting . . . intellectually stimulating . . . controversial . . . anything but "politically correct."

Take a look at what you've missed in the last few months alone: Editor-in-Chief Norman Podhoretz on anti-Semitism . . .Thomas Sowell on college tuition . . . Joseph Epstein on Carl Sandburg . . . Charles Murray on the LA riots. Plus *The New Anti-Catholicism . . . Europe: Miracle or Monster? . . . Clarence Thomas and the Blacks . . . Is America on the Way Down?*

And that's just the beginning. Each month, you'll be there as Richard Pipes, Paul Johnson, James Q. Wilson, Midge Decter, Irving Kristol, Peter L. Berger, Samuel Lipman, and others dissect the issues facing our country and the world, and come to provocative and intriguing conclusions.

You'll also enjoy vigorous book reviews, our famously contentious **Letters from Readers**, and our bold new department, **Israel Watch**. Politics, foreign affairs, culture, literature, Jewish concerns – all covered boldly and incisively .

So don't wait to read about *Commentary* somewhere else. Subscribe today to see for yourself why *Commentary* enjoys a reputation for intellectual honesty that's second to none. Agree or not, you won't be able to put it down.

Commentary

❑ **YES!** Enter my subscription today. I don't want to miss a single issue. I understand I'll get 8 monthly issues at the low introductory price of $19.50. That's a savings of 35% off the cover price.

❑ Payment enclosed ❑ Please bill me

Name_____

Address_____

City_____State_____ZIP_____

Clip and mail to:

Commentary Magazine
165 East 56th Street, New York, NY 10022

or call toll-free:
1-800-829-6270

Note: *Regular price is $39 per year, or $3.75 per issue. Foreign subscribers should add $8 for postage. Offer good through December 31, 1993.* 62XC

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED